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Abstract 
 
Background 
Surveillance has been described as an essential component of an effective infection prevention and control 
programme. With increasing concerns over the rising levels of antimicrobial resistance there has been 
emphasis on the requirement to improve infectious disease surveillance and outbreak detection. The 
availability of healthcare information in electronic formats provides an opportunity to perform surveillance 
and outbreak detection at the hospital level.  
Aim 
To determine if data available from national and local microbiology surveillance systems can be utilised for 
outbreak detection of infectious diseases within the acute healthcare setting. 
Methods 
A critical analysis of a national microbiological surveillance system is performed prior to the application of 
methods for automated outbreak detection. At the local level, an epidemiological analysis is performed to 
ascertain the levels of antimicrobial resistance and identify trends before carrying out outbreak detection 
for multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO). Several methods for outbreak detection are investigated, 
including exceedance detection algorithms, cumulative sum methods and variable life adjusted display 
charts.   
Results 
Results from a comprehensive systematic review found that the employment of systems utilising electronic 
data sources for healthcare-associated infection surveillance is feasible. Evaluation of a national 
microbiological surveillance system identified several issues with using data reported through a voluntary 
system for outbreak detection at the hospital level. After identification of a hospital laboratory exhibiting 
consistent and timely reporting it became apparent that outbreak detection methods could be applied to 
data available through the national system. At the local level, MDRO were identified through the 
application of algorithms to electronically stored microbiology data. The selected outbreak detection 
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methods were successfully applied to local level data, identifying several potential MDRO outbreak 
situations. 
Conclusions 
This thesis demonstrates that there is potential for the implementation of automated systems for hospital 
level outbreak detection using both national and local microbiological data sources. 
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HPA Health Protection Agency 
ICD-9-CM International Classification of Disease, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification 
ICHT Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 
ICU Intensive care unit 
iGAS Invasive Group A Streptococci 
IPCT Infection Prevention and Control Team 
IQR Interquartile range 
KPC Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase 
LIMS Laboratory information management system 
LR Likelihood ratio 
MALDI-TOF MS Matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry 
MDRO Multidrug-resistant organism 
MRAB Multi-resistant Acinetobacter 
MRAB-C Multi-resistant Acinetobacter plus carbapenem-resistance 
MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
NDM New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase 
NHS National Health Service 
NINSS Nosocomial Infection National Surveillance Service 
NLP Natural Language Processing 
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NPV Negative predictive value 
OPIE Organism Patient Illness Episode 
OR Odds ratio 
PAS Patient administration system 
PDS Post-discharge surveillance 
PHE Public Health England 
PHLS Public Health Laboratory Service 
PPS Point prevalence survey 
PPV Positive predictive value 
SENIC Study of the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control 
SGSS Second Generation Surveillance System 
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm 
SPC Statistical process control 
SSI Surgical site infection 
STROBE Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology 
STSS Space-time scan statistic 
TLE Trust Level Exceedance 
UL Upper limit 
VAP Ventilator-associated pneumonia 
VLAD Variable life adjusted display 
WGS Whole genome sequencing 
WHO World Health Organisation 
χ2 Chi-squared test 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS AND OUTBREAK DETECTION – 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND INNOVATION 
 
1.1. What are the current challenges? 
A number of surveillance strategies have been implemented with the aim of reducing the occurrence of 
healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) in England (1). However, surveillance is often limited to a select 
number of pathogens and has been influenced by political statements and media coverage which have 
historically focussed on methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Clostridium difficile 
infections (CDI) (2). The need to extend surveillance beyond MRSA and C. difficile was emphasised in a 
recent report by the present Chief Medical Officer (CMO) (3). In the report, Professor Dame Sally Davies 
states that “Antimicrobial resistance is a very real threat” and stressed the need for improved surveillance, 
particularly around antimicrobial resistance. This report was published more than 10 years after “Getting 
ahead of the curve: a strategy for combating infectious diseases” (4). Within this report, the former CMO 
acknowledged that although the surveillance systems in England are respected internationally, “the system 
falls short of what is necessary fully to protect the public health”.  
 
Although new surveillance initiatives have been instigated since the publication of “Getting ahead of the 
curve” in 2002, it is of great concern that surveillance systems currently in operation are not considered to 
be adequate for the comprehensive monitoring of HCAI and antimicrobial resistance. With publications in 
the scientific literature indicating that electronic data can be utilised more effectively for surveillance (5), it 
appears that barriers may exist in the implementation of novel surveillance systems and the translation of 
research into practice. 
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Additionally, although many methods utilising surveillance data for outbreak detection exist, these tend to 
focus on employing national data sets and therefore only provide analysis at a national or regional level (6). 
There are many instances of outbreaks within hospitals documented in the media (7-9) and several studies 
have shown that outbreaks in hospitals have been missed using traditional outbreak detection methods 
(10-12). An automated and systematic approach utilising electronic surveillance data for the purpose of 
outbreak detection is required at the hospital level. 
 
1.2. Hypothesis 
The application of outbreak detection methods to routinely collected microbiology data will improve the 
detection of infectious disease outbreaks and emerging pathogens within the healthcare setting. 
 
1.3. Aims and Objectives 
The overarching aim of this project was to determine if data available from national and local 
microbiological surveillance systems can be utilised for outbreak detection of infectious diseases within the 
healthcare setting. To achieve this aim a number of objectives needed to be fulfilled: 
 Identify and describe surveillance systems collecting data on infections occurring within the 
healthcare setting  
 Provide a comprehensive overview of electronic surveillance systems for HCAI 
 Determine the utility of data available within national and local surveillance systems for outbreak 
detection 
 Identify, acknowledge and discuss the limitations of using microbiological surveillance systems in 
outbreak detection 
 Use existing definitions to identify cases of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) within electronic 
microbiology data sources 
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 Develop and apply statistical methods to microbiology data to demonstrate the potential for 
incorporating automated outbreak detection systems into routine infection control practices 
 
1.4. Thesis overview 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This first chapter includes a brief introduction to the area of research, 
describing the purpose of surveillance and outbreak detection. In addition, this chapter identifies several 
data sources that may be employed for outbreak detection in the healthcare setting. The subsequent five 
chapters are structured in a similar way to research articles, with introduction (including the chapter 
objectives), methods, results and discussion sections. Chapter 2 presents a systematic literature review on 
the utility of electronic surveillance for HCAI. Chapters 3 and 5 provide an insight to the data sources used 
for outbreak detection prior to the application of outbreak detection models; Chapter 3 involves the critical 
analysis of LabBase2, a national microbiological surveillance system, whereas Chapter 5 presents an 
epidemiological analysis of data available from a local laboratory information management system (LIMS). 
The development, application and assessment of outbreak detection methods are presented in Chapter 4 
(national data) and Chapter 6 (local data). Chapter 7 provides an overarching discussion, summarising the 
main findings of the thesis, discussing limitations and puts the work presented into context. The final 
chapter concludes the thesis and provides a number of recommendations based on the results from the 
preceding chapters. 
 
1.5. Healthcare-associated infections 
As described in a practical guide published by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2002, a “hospital-
acquired infection” can be defined as “An infection occurring in a patient in a hospital or other health care 
facility in whom the infection was not present or incubating at the time of admission. This includes 
infections acquired in the hospital but appearing after discharge, and also occupational infections among 
staff of the facility”(13). The term hospital-acquired infection was later replaced with HCAI to take into 
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account the fact that infections associated with medical care can take place a variety of other healthcare 
settings outside of the hospital. Technically speaking, any infection developing as a result of clinical 
intervention can be deemed a HCAI. However, the term tends to relate to those microorganisms endemic in 
the hospital and healthcare setting. Infections may be caused by the acquisition of a microorganism from 
another patient (cross-infection), the healthcare environment via a contaminated object or surface 
(environmental infection), or may be caused by the patient’s own micro-flora (endogenous infection) (13). 
 
HCAI can be further categorised into specific infection types. The main categories of HCAI that are routinely 
surveyed and frequently described in scientific literature are bloodstream infections (BSI), urinary tract 
infections (UTI), surgical site infections (SSI) and pneumonia (including ventilator-associated). Surveillance 
of HCAI often relies on the application of complex definitions, which vary between countries. A study by 
Haustein et al. discussed the limitations of comparing infection rates between countries (14). The authors 
recognised the challenges presented when attempting to compare results, such as the use of different 
definitions across institutions and the subjectivity of complex definitions used to identify specific infections, 
such as ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) and SSI. Further to this, a study by Hansen et al. 
investigated the concordance between the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
definitions and the definitions used in the Hospitals in Europe Link for Infection Control through 
Surveillance (HELICS) project (15). They found that differences in definitions existed for BSI, pneumonia and 
UTI, as well as how terms associated with the source of infection were applied. However, when the 
different definitions were applied to the same case data sets, the authors observed excellent concordance 
between definitions used for primary BSI and pneumonia. The authors concluded that countries using 
either the US or European definitions could compare results, but that differences in terminologies and 
surveillance protocols should be acknowledged when presenting results. 
 
HCAI have a detrimental effect at the patient and hospital level. The English National Point Prevalence 
Survey on Healthcare-associated Infections and Antimicrobial Use, 2011, revealed that the prevalence of 
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HCAI was 6.4% (16). HCAI can lead to increases in length of stay, morbidity, mortality and financial costs 
(17-19). One study estimated that the cost of HCAI to the National Health Service (NHS) was almost £1 
billion a year (20). 
 
1.6. Antimicrobial resistance 
Antimicrobial resistance has become an increasing concern not just in England, but globally. This has lead to 
suggestions for antimicrobial resistance surveillance to be set up at local, national and international levels 
(21). Creating systems that can identify changes in resistance patterns nationally and internationally can 
help identify emerging resistance threats, with local level systems able to guide clinicians in the prescription 
of antimicrobials and treatment of infection depending on the local situation.  
 
Some species of bacteria are intrinsically resistant to certain antibiotics but bacteria can also develop or 
acquire resistance (22). Prolonged exposure to antibiotics can cause mutations within the bacterial 
genome, leading to changes in the expression of genes, which can cause a previously sensitive bacterium to 
become resistant to a particular antibiotic or class of antibiotics. Another mechanism by which bacteria can 
gain resistance is through the acquisition of mobile genetic elements, called plasmids. Plasmids can carry 
resistance genes and exist within bacterial cells exclusive of the chromosomal deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
although resistance genes can transpose from the plasmid to the chromosomal DNA (and vice versa). 
Through the process of conjugation plasmids are able to transfer horizontally between bacterial cells, 
spreading the resistance genes, potentially across species. 
 
With foreign travel now more widely available, the ability of local resistance issues to travel outside of a 
country and become an international problem has increased. A number of carbapenemases, such as 
Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) and New-Delhi metallo-β-lactamase 1 (NDM-1), originated in 
areas outside of England (KPC originated from North Carolina (23) and NDM-1 was first identified in India 
(24)); however, several bacterial species harbouring these resistance mechanisms have been isolated from 
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patients within English hospitals. Many of these cases have been associated with recent travel to areas 
where resistant strains are endemic, but other cases have occurred in patients without any travel-
associated risk factors, indicating that the resistant bacteria have been acquired within the healthcare or 
local community setting.  
 
A report prepared by the CMO in April 2013 made recommendations for antimicrobial resistance 
surveillance; specifically the need to monitor carbapenem resistance in Gram negative infections, such as K. 
pneumonia and Escherichia coli (25). The report makes reference to evidence indicating that an increase in 
resistance to cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides occurred between 2005 and 2010, 
which in turn resulted in an increase in the use of carbapenems. As discussed above, prolonged exposure to 
antibiotics can result in resistance, and it appears that a reliance on carbapenem antibiotics has been a 
major driver in the evolution of carbapenemases.  
 
A recent report by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) established that the 
increasing spread of carbapenem-resistant organisms has resulted in local outbreaks in healthcare settings 
in several European countries (26). Figure 1.1 was generated using an online tool created by the ECDC 
based on information reported through the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-
Net) during 2011. The following map displays the percentage of invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates 
resistant to carbapenems across Europe. It is clear to see that there is variation in the rates of resistance 
across the European countries, although it is not possible to determine variation across regions within 
countries from the EARS-Net analysis. A further limitation of the results displayed in Figure 1.1 is the 
variation in how countries report data to EARS-Net (27). Test results are collected from clinical laboratories 
by the national repsresentative for that country; the microbiological methods employed for resistance 
testing may therefore differ across countries (and even across institutions within countries). Additionally, 
the laboratories involved in reporting data to EARS-Net serve a variety of healthcare institutes and only 
data on invasive isolates (isolated from blood or cerebrospinal fluid specimens) is collected. The 
24 
 
respresentativeness of data reported by countries must therefore be considered when interpreting the 
percantage of resistance presented. 
 
 
Source: EARS-Net (http://www.ecdc.europa.eu). Only countries reporting more than 10 isolates shown  
Figure 1.1: Percentage of invasive (blood and cerebrospinal fluid specimens) P. aeruginosa isolates resistant 
to carbapenems, 2011. 
 
1.7. Purpose of surveillance 
Surveillance has been defined as the “Systematic collection of data from the population at risk, 
identification of infections using consistent definitions, analysis of these data and dissemination of the 
results to those responsible for the care of the patients and to those responsible for implementation of 
prevention and control measures” (28). It has been described as an essential component of an effective 
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infection prevention and control programme (29) and has been shown to lead to a decrease in infection 
rates (29-31). Haley et al. suggested that there are four essential components required to reduce HCAI 
infection rates: surveillance, control strategies, the employment of an infection control nurse to collect and 
analyse data and the involvement of a physician or microbiologist with skills in infection control. Results 
from the landmark project, the Study of the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control (SENIC), showed that if 
one of the essential components was missing a reduction in infection rates would not be achieved (29). 
 
According to the WHO the “surveillance of antimicrobial resistance is essential for providing information on 
the magnitude and trends in resistance and for monitoring the effectiveness of interventions” (32). Carrying 
out surveillance on antimicrobial resistance can help determine the extent of the problem, assess whether 
resistance rates are increasing and detect novel mechanisms of resistance (33). Surveillance is required at 
the local, national and international level; local surveillance data should be used to inform the clinical 
management of infection and design treatment guidelines around the local resistance situation, whereas 
nationally collected surveillance data can be used to inform policies and  evaluate the effectiveness of 
interventions, with international level data having the ability to provide  information capable of detecting 
unusual patterns or emerging resistance (32). 
 
Surveillance is often seen as the first step in the development of an effective infection prevention and 
control programme. In 2002, the CMO stated that: 
“The bedrock of infectious disease prevention and control is high quality clinical expertise, microbiology and 
surveillance which allows outbreaks or epidemics to be anticipated and prevented, disease trends to be 
tracked, new and emerging diseases to be spotted, epidemics and outbreaks to be identified, and the impact 
of control measures to be  evaluated.”(4) 
Information from surveillance systems has the ability to inform those responsible for infection prevention 
and control of key areas to be targeted (34). With this knowledge, resources can be utilised in the most 
effective manner; interventions can be put into place with the aim of preventing infections occurring. 
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Through the continuous gathering of data (i.e. prior to and post intervention) the effectiveness of the 
intervention(s) can be measured and results reported to those that require them. The continual informative 
loop created by the process of surveillance (Figure 1.2) has led to this process being described as “the 
foundation for good infection control practice”(28). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Cyclical nature of surveillance 
 
The surveillance process itself has several components, each required to result in an efficient and effective 
programme. After the initial identification of the area(s), infection type(s) or organism(s) to be targeted, 
data must be collected through a systematic method with the aim of complete case ascertainment. It is 
important at this stage that the method is capable of identifying all cases, as well as denominator data if 
this is to be included in the analysis. Whether it is through the use of electronic data management systems, 
an admission questionnaire, laboratory reports or the examination of patient notes, this stage is critical in 
the surveillance system’s ability to accurately include or exclude cases based on the case definitions. 
Definitions that are too sensitive will lead to an over-estimation of the infection numbers or rate, whereas 
extremely strict definitions will under-estimate the true infection rate.  
 
The data collected should ideally include patient demographics, such as age, sex, location (for example a 
ward location at hospital level, or a hospital name/region at national level), type of infection and co-
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morbidities, amongst other data items. This type of information is crucial for accurate and informative data 
analysis. With demographic data available analysis can provide a better understanding of the epidemiology. 
Patients with similar demographics can be stratified into groups for comparative analysis, identifying those 
patients at an increased risk of developing a particular infection. Rates can also be adjusted by age, sex or 
other variables, rather than producing one crude rate from the surveillance data. 
 
It is vital that results from the analysis of surveillance data are fed back to those responsible for infection 
prevention and control, as well as those responsible for patient care (4). Information resulting from 
surveillance can be used to; detect outbreaks of infectious disease; identify areas with high or low infection 
rates; identify areas of good practice, which can in turn inform areas where practice can be improved and; 
inform clinicians and staff at a local level of their performance compared to others. It is through the entire 
surveillance process that infection rates can be determined and reduced through further surveillance and 
other interventions. 
 
Surveillance systems for HCAI and antimicrobial resistance need to be adaptable and must evolve over time 
in order to remain effective. As problems emerge surveillance systems must be able to be modified and 
allow the re-prioritisation of time, finances and other resources to focus on current issues. This prevents 
financial and human resources being consumed in areas where either targets or aims have been achieved, 
ensuring that the resources available are allocated to current problems. 
 
1.8. Evolution of surveillance in England 
The majority of infectious disease surveillance in England was carried out by the Public Health Laboratory 
Service (PHLS), prior to the formation of the Health Protection Agency (HPA) in 2003, which became Public 
Health England (PHE) on the 1st April 2013. The PHLS was established in 1947 and comprised of eight groups 
of laboratories, with the Central Public Health Laboratory based in Colindale, London, which provided 
reference services for a range of microorganisms (4). In 1977 the Communicable Disease Surveillance 
28 
 
Centre (CDSC) was established with the remit of co-ordinating services relating to the surveillance of 
infectious diseases and providing advice on the control of outbreaks (4). Surveillance of HCAI was carried 
out on a voluntary basis and was not seen as a priority within the NHS at the time (35). 
  
In 1993 The Infection Control Standards Working Party published “Standards in Infection Control in 
Hospitals” (36). The Standards emphasised that surveillance and feedback of infection rates be encouraged 
throughout the NHS. The Nosocomial Infection National Surveillance Service (NINSS) was formed by the 
PHLS and the Department of Health (DH) in 1996 (37). National data on HCAI was not available until the 
implementation of NINSS, which was established with the aim of improving patient care by providing 
hospitals with standard methods for infection surveillance. This resulted in the ability to compare infection 
rates between hospitals for the first time (38;39). Participation was voluntary, although data submission 
was required for a selection of infections and patient groups for at least three months per year (37).  
 
Although many hospitals participated in the voluntary surveillance of infectious diseases, a number of 
reports and guidelines prepared by the Government and expert committees made recommendations for 
the mandatory surveillance of certain HCAI with the aim of tackling increasing infection rates. In October 
2000, Health Minister John Denham announced at a conference that all NHS trusts must monitor HCAI (40). 
The Health Minister stated that “Current levels of hospital acquired infection are unacceptable”, noting also 
the variation in infection rates in trusts across England. The compulsory monitoring was to include 
information on bloodstream infections, infections of wounds following orthopaedic surgery and infections 
that became apparent after discharge from hospital. Figure 1.3 summarises HCAI and antimicrobial 
resistance schemes launched since the establishment of the PHLS in 1947. This timeline comprises mainly 
of schemes established by the PHLS/HPA. 
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Figure 1.3: Timeline of healthcare-associated infection and antimicrobial resistance surveillance 
 
Several drivers have been identified to have played a role in the development of surveillance schemes for 
both HCAI and antimicrobial resistance in England (Table 1.1). Besides the evidence of increasing infection 
rates and antimicrobial resistance gained from passive surveillance systems, political agendas appear to 
have an involvement in the decisions made regarding the implementation of schemes devised to tackle 
specific issues. The introduction of several mandatory reporting initiatives seem to have been influenced by 
comments made by politicians (40-43). Reports produced by government organisations (mainly the DH) 
have also shaped and guided the evolution of surveillance in this area (4;28;44-48). Besides these drivers, a 
number of research studies have taken place with many making recommendations to enhance current 
surveillance.  
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Date Event Motivator(s) 
1947 Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) established, comprising of 
8 groups of laboratories. The Central Public Health Laboratory in 
London  provides reference services for a range of microorganisms 
(4) 
Created under same legislation as the National Health Service (NHS); PHLS to 
undertake microbiological laboratory work and investigations required for the 
diagnosis, prevention and control of infectious diseases (4) 
1977 Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) launched (4) The Centre was set up with the remit of co-ordinating services relating to the 
surveillance of infectious diseases and provision of advice on the control of 
outbreaks (4) 
1988 Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) and the PHLS 
publish “Hospital Infection Control: guidance on the control of 
infection in hospitals”(44) 
No official guidance had been produced since 1959; purpose of guidance: 
 Provide expert support to the DHSS in its co-ordinating role of infection 
control in hospitals 
 Revise guidance on the management of infection control 
 Highlight gaps in guidance and guidance/practice that is not cost effective 
1990 PHLS’s voluntary monitoring of healthcare associated infectious 
diseases caused by the main human pathogens commences. 
Pathogens include Clostridium difficile, Staphylococcus aureus and 
glycopeptide resistant enterococci amongst others 
 
1993 The Infection Control Standards Working Party publishes 
“Standards in Infection Control in Hospitals” (36) 
Realisation of the importance of healthcare-associated infection (HCAI) as an 
indicator of quality in healthcare. Standards needed to be produced to underpin 
the quality initiative (36) 
1996 The Nosocomial Infection National Surveillance Service (NINSS) is 
formed by the PHLS and the Department of Health (DH) (37) 
National data on HCAIs not available until implementation of NINSS (38); 
established with the aim of improving patient care by providing standard methods 
for infection surveillance (38;39) 
1998 and 2001 British Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy Resistance 
Surveillance (BSAC) Projects: 
 Respiratory Resistance Surveillance Programme (49) 
 Bacteraemia Resistance Surveillance Programme (49;50) 
Set up in response to concerns over the increasing level of antimicrobial resistance 
observed throughout the UK in the 1990s (49;51) 
April 2001 Mandatory methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) bacteraemia 
surveillance established (34) 
Concerns over the high proportion of S. aureus bacteraemias caused by MRSA 
compared to other European countries was one of the main factors leading to 
mandatory reporting (1;35). Also, in October 2000, Minister for Health stated that 
“current levels of hospital acquired infection are unacceptable” and therefore all 
trusts must monitor HCAI (40) 
2003 Formation of the Health Protection Agency (HPA) through the 
merger of  the PHLS, National Radiological Protection Board, 
Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research, and the National 
Routine surveillance of infectious diseases was not comprehensive. To overcome 
gaps in surveillance a new organisation with overall responsibility for conducting 
and co-ordinating national surveillance activities was created (4) 
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Focus for Chemical Incidents (4) 
October 2003 Mandatory reporting of glycopeptide-resistant enterococci (GRE) 
bacteraemia (52) 
Chief Medical Officer announces extension of mandatory surveillance to GRE 
bacteraemia (52). Working Group acknowledges that GRE infections are 
associated with a significantly worse prognosis than susceptible strains and make 
recommendations for carrying out surveillance (53) 
January 2004 Mandatory reporting of C. difficile infection (CDI) in patients over 
65 years old begins (54) 
Increase in CDI rates detected through voluntary surveillance to the HPA (1) 
April 2004 Reporting of orthopaedic surgical site infections to the HPA 
becomes mandatory for at least one surveillance period i.e. 3 
months per year (54) 
The National Audit Office report “Hip-replacements: getting it right the first time” 
argues that all NHS trusts should monitor infections following orthopaedic surgery 
(45). Pilot study demonstrates feasibility (55) 
November 2004 Minister for Health sets a target of 50% reduction in MRSA cases 
by 2008 (34;41) 
Analysis of mandatory data shows an increase in the number of cases in the first 2 
years of surveillance (1) 
October 2005 MRSA surveillance system enhanced  and requires that NHS trusts 
collect more information on cases of bacteraemia reported (56;57) 
 
April 2007 CDI surveillance extended; all cases of CDI in patients over the age 
of  2 years old to be reported (1) 
 
January 2008 Department of Health announces a 30% reduction in CDI be 
achieved by 2010/11, based on 2007/08 figures (58) 
Number of CDI cases were increasing year-on-year since the introduction of 
mandatory surveillance until 2007 (1) 
January 2009 Norovirus Outbreak Reporting Tool launched (59) A 2008 report by the HPA identified norovirus as “the most commonly detected 
pathogen both in sporadic cases and outbreaks of gastroenteritis” (1). No formal 
way of reporting outbreaks until the tool was launched (59) 
January 2011 Mandatory reporting for methicillin-sensitive S. aureus (MSSA) 
bacteraemia introduced (60) 
Advisory Committee on Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare Associated 
Infection (ARHAI) Surveillance Subgroup “strongly recommended that mandatory 
surveillance of MSSA is improved using the same methodology as for MRSA” (61). 
Health Secretary announces mandatory reporting of MSSA bacteraemia infections 
to give patients more information and drive down infections (43) 
June 2011 Mandatory reporting for E. coli bacteraemia commences (42) ARHAI recommend that the rise in E. coli bacteraemia cases is investigated and 
suggests the need for mandatory surveillance be assessed (61). Health Secretary 
announces mandatory reporting of E. coli bloodstream infections “in line with 
expert advice” (43)  
April 2013 Public Health England (PHE), an executive agency of the DH is 
formed, incorporating several existing agencies, including the HPA 
The formation of PHE resulted from proposals to reorganise the NHS, as detailed 
in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (62) 
Table 1.1: Summary of the evolution of healthcare-associated infection and antimicrobial resistance surveillance and potential motivators 
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One of the main areas of research has focussed on post-discharge surveillance (PDS) for the detection of 
SSI, which has been identified as essential in determining accurate rates of infection by several groups (63-
69). Studies have found that 41-84% of infections were not detected during the inpatient surveillance 
period (variation dependent on surgical procedure assessed amongst other factors e.g. study size, PDS 
surveillance method) (63-65;67). In addition, several research articles, guidelines and reports have 
identified clinical specialties that require surveillance systems specific to their area. Clinical areas 
recommended for enhanced surveillance include neonatology (38;70;71;71;72), high dependency/intensive 
care units (38;61;73;73-75), renal units (38;73;75;76) and oncology/haematology units (38). 
 
1.9. Data sources available at the national and local levels 
Many of the surveillance schemes described above provide information on the occurrence of infections 
within the healthcare setting. At a national level, PHE collects information on a variety of infectious 
diseases via a range of systems, as shown in Figure 1.4. Each system is responsible for collecting data on 
different organisms and conditions and Table 1.2 describes the main features of the systems identified for 
potential use in hospital level outbreak detection. It must be noted, however, that the landscape of 
surveillance is always changing. From March 2014, the current system of data flowing into LabBase2 via the 
CoSurv and AmSurv modules will be replaced by the Second Generation Surveillance System (SGSS). It is 
anticipated that SGSS will improve the efficiency, quality and granularity of data reported by laboratories. 
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Figure 1.4: Healthcare-associated infection and antimicrobial resistance surveillance systems and data sources  
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Surveillance system Description 
Communicable Disease 
Reporting (CDR) 
This system of reporting by laboratories across England forms the basis of 
much of PHE’s infectious disease surveillance. All laboratories carrying out 
NHS work should report to the CDR system. Laboratory records are entered 
onto CoSurv and data is subsequently sent to the Regional Epidemiology 
Units, where it is validated before being submitted to LabBase2 (PHE 
Colindale). 
Notifications of Infectious 
Diseases (NOIDS) 
Registered Medical Practitioners are legally required to provide information 
on 31 notifiable diseases to enable the detection of possible outbreaks and 
epidemics. 
Modular Open Laboratory 
Information System (MOLIS) 
MOLIS is the LIMS at PHE Colindale. This system collects and manages 
information for all routine reference work. 
Data Capture System Web-based reporting tool for hospitals to report mandatory data, such as 
MRSA, MSSA, GRE and E. coli bacteraemia, CDI and denominator data. 
Surgical Site Infection 
Surveillance Service 
Web-based data entry tool supporting the mandatory and voluntary 
reporting of SSI. 
C. difficile Ribotyping Network Reference laboratory for C. difficile to refer those isolates that meet specific 
criteria. 
C. difficile Random Sampling 
Scheme 
Introduced on 1
st
 January 2005 in response to a reduction in the number of 
samples being sent to the Anaerobe Reference Unit. All Acute NHS Trusts 
are allocated one week at random during which they provide consecutive 
positive samples, up to a maximum of ten. 
Norovirus Outbreak Reporting 
Tool 
Web-based reporting tool for reporting outbreaks of norovirus 
BSAC Bacteraemia Surveillance Involves 20-25 sentinel clinical laboratories which each collect ten 
consecutive isolates taken from blood cultures considered to be clinically 
significant (20 consecutive isolates for S. aureus and E. coli). 
European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance 
Network (EARS-Net) 
Managed by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC). Participating laboratories send data to the country’s data manager 
where it is uploaded onto The European Surveillance System (TESSy), a web-
based system for collection, validation, cleaning, analysis and dissemination 
of data. 
Table 1.2: Summary of surveillance systems providing information on cases of infection in the healthcare 
setting 
 
After liaising with staff responsible for some of the surveillance systems listed above it was determined that 
data submitted to LabBase2 would be used in the outbreak detection models. A comprehensive description of 
LabBase2 and a critical appraisal of this system are provided in Chapter 3. 
 
At the local level, data within one of the LIMS at Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust (ICHT) was used in the 
outbreak detection models. Data from this system was anonymised and made available on a dedicated 
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research server before being used in data analysis. A description of this process and the LIMS is provided in 
Chapter 5. 
 
1.10. Outbreak detection 
In 1984 Corkill et al. recognised that the ability to detect communicable diseases and track cross-infection was 
“invaluable”, with the success of controlling outbreaks heavily dependent on the “rapidity with which initial 
clusters are identified and aborted” (77). There are many methods available for prospective outbreak 
detection, although there is no consensus on the “best” method for outbreak detection (78). Choosing the 
most appropriate method for outbreak detection depends on several factors, including; the scope of the 
system; the quality of the data; the count frequency; features of potential outbreaks and; the availability of 
resources. Although these factors may determine that some approaches may be more appropriate than others 
in specific circumstances, the fundamentals of outbreak detection should be observed in all systems; the 
ultimate aim is to rapidly identify outbreaks so that effective control measures can be implemented to contain 
the outbreak. 
 
This thesis will focus on automated, prospective methods for outbreak detection. In this instance there are 
several components to an outbreak detection system, including; the testing of specimens to identify cases; 
recording of data and the reporting of this data to a central system; application of outbreak detection models 
to identify potential outbreaks and; reporting the findings back to those responsible for implementing control 
measures. There are other important processes required to ensure that informative feedback is provided, such 
as the regular assessment of data quality. A critical appraisal of a national surveillance system is presented in 
Chapter 3 to emphasise this point. The selection of suitable methods for outbreak detection is also essential 
and is discussed in detail in the literature review presented at the beginning of Chapter 4. Additionally, 
although the literature on automated outbreak detection often refers to systems implemented at the national 
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level (6), Chapter 6 demonstrates the potential for implementing an automated, prospective outbreak 
detection system at the hospital level. 
 
1.11. The future of surveillance and opportunities for innovation 
Surveillance has developed over time in response to numerous stimuli. Some surveillance schemes have been 
successfully implemented. However, many clinical areas have yet to see advances in surveillance specific to 
their area and are reliant upon generic passive surveillance systems. Many electronic data sources exist at the 
national and local levels and can be used more effectively in surveillance and outbreak detection. The future 
development of surveillance systems to rapidly identify clusters and outbreaks of a variety of organisms across 
all clinical areas will ensure that control measures are best directed to prevent further cases occurring. 
Additionally, performing surveillance on a range of organisms across all clinical specialties will help prevent 
emerging situations being overlooked. 
 
Struelens et al. recognised that Europe-wide surveillance of emerging pathogens needs to be strengthened to 
improve the ability of surveillance systems to detect arising problems (21). They suggested that the linkage of 
national databases and the use of early warning systems should be studied further as “best practice” to 
efficiently contain threats from extremely resistant pathogens. The work presented in this thesis will focus on 
improving outbreak detection of infectious diseases within the acute healthcare setting through the application 
of automated statistical models to data readily available in existing surveillance systems. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. ADVANCES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED 
INFECTIONS: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This thesis comprises of two main research areas; infectious disease surveillance (specifically within the 
hospital setting) and outbreak detection methodologies. As a comprehensive review on statistical methods for 
the prospective detection of infectious disease outbreaks was already being carried out by another research 
group when I commenced my studies, carrying out a systematic review on outbreak detection methods was 
deemed unnecessary. It was therefore decided that the systematic review should focus on surveillance, 
specifically focussing on the advancement of automated and electronic surveillance systems (ESS) in recent 
years. 
 
Surveillance has been described as an essential component of an effective infection prevention and control 
programme and has been shown to lead to a decrease in infection rates (79-81). However, traditional 
methodologies for HCAI surveillance can be resource intensive and time consuming. As a consequence, 
surveillance is often limited to specific organisms or conditions. In 1993, Glenister et al. concluded that 
selective surveillance methods for HCAI are more appropriate in the healthcare setting than hospital-wide 
continuous surveillance, which are too labour intensive (82). These conclusions were made based on the use of 
manual methods for the collection of data, where electronic data sources were limited.  Whole-hospital 
surveillance tends only to be performed within point prevalence surveys (PPS), which are extremely resource-
intensive. The results of PPS can help identify issues requiring further investigation, but they cannot provide 
real-time information as the data collation, analysis and feedback process is extensive. In recent years, 
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however, the collection and storage of healthcare information in electronic formats has become ubiquitous 
and various electronic databases exist within the healthcare setting, which may be utilised to perform 
continuous HCAI surveillance. 
 
In addition, surveillance schemes often rely on the application of complex definitions, which vary between 
countries (83). These definitions can be subjective and therefore have the potential to introduce variation 
across institutions participating in national surveillance schemes. With increasing emphasis on benchmarking 
and public reporting of surveillance data (14), surveillance methods need to be efficient, reliable and 
transferable. A systematic review was therefore carried out to assess the utility of electronic surveillance for 
HCAI and determine the performance and feasibility of the methods and systems described.  
 
2.2. Objectives 
The main objective of this systematic review is to: 
 Provide a comprehensive overview and identify different automated methods for HCAI surveillance 
Additional objectives: 
 Within individual studies, compare the performance of automated surveillance methodologies with 
traditional surveillance methods 
 Discuss the utility of ESS for monitoring and detecting HCAI 
 
This chapter was accepted for publication in the Journal of Hospital Infection in November 2012, with a 
commentary piece prepared by Professor K. F. Woeltje preceding the paper (84). A copy of the review article 
can be found in Appendix 1. 
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2.3. Methods 
2.3.1. Search strategy 
An intentionally broad systematic search was carried out to locate articles published in journals across several 
disciplines. The search aimed to capture articles proposing novel ESS as well as studies demonstrating the 
utility of electronic surveillance within healthcare settings.  
 
Databases were searched for articles published between January 2000 and December 2011. MEDLINE (via 
PubMed), The Cochrane Library (specifically the Cochrane Methodology Register and Health Technology 
Assessment Database), Ovid, EMBASE, Web of Science, Scopus, JSTOR and Wiley Online Library were searched 
for relevant articles within the time period specified above. BIOSIS Previews was searched for conference and 
meeting abstracts published between 1998 and 2008 due to access limitations. As stated in the Cochrane 
Handbook of Systematic Reviews, filters, language restrictions and format restrictions were not introduced at 
this stage to achieve high sensitivity (85). Manual searches were performed by exploring the reference lists of 
all evaluated articles. 
 
A combination of Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) searches and free text searches were performed using 
Boolean operators. Search terms were divided into three categories: i) infection terms; ii) surveillance terms 
and; iii) data management terms. In order to achieve a comprehensive overarching search, a wide range of free 
text terms were selected to include synonyms, related terms and variant spellings. Truncation and wildcard 
features were also incorporated into search terms. Although standard terms were used across all databases, 
search strategies were customised for each database to account for the differences between the interfaces and 
capabilities of each database. The search carried out using MEDLINE returned the most results (15,542), and 
full details of the search strategy can be found in Appendix 2.  
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2.3.2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Studies were included if they either presented a working ESS for detecting or monitoring HCAI, or if they 
proposed/described an electronic system for HCAI surveillance. Retrospective and prospective cohort studies, 
surveillance studies, validation studies, observational studies and system descriptions were included if they 
were published in English. In instances where abstracts of interest were published in English, but the full-text 
article was published in another language, an English translation of the article was sought. Outbreak detection 
systems were excluded as these will be reviewed as part of a different chapter. Furthermore, papers on 
predictive modelling of HCAI and risk factor models for HCAI surveillance were excluded. A random sample of 
papers included for full-text evaluation were assessed against the inclusion criteria by a second reviewer (L.S.P. 
Moore) to validate that the first reviewer had successfully applied the criteria to all studies evaluated.  
 
2.3.3. Quality assessment 
The Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) (86;87) checklist for 
cohort studies and the Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems (88) were 
combined to create a unique quality criteria tool. Fifteen items assessing the purpose and operation, resources 
required and the performance of the surveillance system were selected and added to the relevant items 
identified within the STROBE checklist. A 37-point checklist was created to assess the included articles (20-
point checklist for articles proposing or describing a system). The combination of source documents meant that 
the tool could be used to assess the quality of the publication and assess the quality of the ESS presented in the 
article. This novel tool was applied to all papers included for full review and can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
2.3.4. Data extraction 
All search results were imported into reference manager software (RefMan version 12) where duplicates were 
identified and removed. The titles and abstracts of all retrieved articles were screened to assess their 
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relevance. After all irrelevant studies were identified and removed, a list of potentially relevant results 
remained and full-text retrieval was attempted. Full-text evaluation was performed to determine if each study 
satisfied the inclusion criteria.  
 
A number of articles included for full-text evaluation were not available through the Imperial College London 
Library directly, and therefore had to be retrieved using the Document Delivery service available through the 
College; in these instances the articles were provided by the British Library. 
 
Information was extracted and collated in data collection forms. For all included studies the data sources used 
for surveillance, organisms or conditions under surveillance, and the clinical specialty surveyed was recorded. 
Sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV) and the kappa (k) 
statistic of agreement were recorded if reported within validation studies.  
 
2.4. Results 
The initial search returned 44,765. Figure 2.1 summarizes the process undertaken to identify all relevant 
articles. Thirty-nine articles were included for review following full-text evaluation. A further 29 conference and 
meeting abstracts were pursued to try and locate any subsequent publications. Of the 14 papers identified 
from searches based on these abstracts, nine had already been identified from the original search. Five papers 
were therefore included from the abstract searches; one paper had been published immediately after the 
original searches had been performed; two papers had been previously identified in the reference list of an 
included study; one paper was located on a conference website and; one paper was undetected from the 
original search for unknown reasons. No studies were excluded following quality assessment. Although some 
papers did score low in terms of quality, these tended to be papers from conference proceedings rather than 
articles published in scientific journals. Forty-four articles were therefore included in the final review. A further 
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48 papers on outbreak detection methods were identified and will be used to provide a background review on 
this subject in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Flow diagram of studies for inclusion 
 
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 summarize each article included in this review. Thirty-seven articles presented methods 
utilising several data sources, including microbiology data. Of the 44 articles included for review, 21 were 
validation studies. The validation studies assessed the performance of the reported electronic surveillance 
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method with traditional surveillance methodologies or a manual reference method. Table 2.4 summarises the 
performance of each electronic method compared to the authors’ chosen reference method. The performance 
of electronic surveillance methods varied across infections. Consistently high sensitivity results were observed 
across studies focussing on bloodstream infections (72-100%), although performance in terms of specificity 
varied greatly (37-100%). Validation studies on UTI provided similar results with sensitivities ranging from 86-
100% and specificities of 59-100% reported. The reported sensitivities for electronic systems detecting cases of 
SSI ranged from 60-98%, with one study reporting a NPV of 100%, and sensitivity and specificity results for 
systems designed to detect cases of pneumonia ranged from 71-99% and 61-100%, respectively.    
 
The majority of studies involved the development of “in-house” surveillance systems rather than employing 
commercially available software. Dao et al. suggested that significant costs associated with purchasing 
commercial software packages could be avoided if existing databases within the hospital were exploited 
instead (89).  However, a number of studies did involve the development or use of commercial software 
packages for electronic surveillance of HCAI and these are indicated in Table 2.1 and Table 2.3. Systems and 
methods described in the literature have been categorised and are described in detail below. 
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Article Year Study design Study duration 
and sample size 
Data sources Organism(s)/ 
condition(s) 
Clinical area(s) Country 
Bouam et al. 2003 Validation study 11 weeks, 548 
positive cultures 
Microbiology, 
administrative 
BSI, UTI Surgery, 
medicine, 
intensive care  
France 
Wisniewski et al.  2003 System description N/A Microbiology, pharmacy, 
radiology, ADT, 
emergency department, 
non-electronic data 
(scanned in) 
"Antimicrobial 
resistant 
pathogens" 
Whole hospital USA 
Graham et al.  2004 Validation study 2 years Microbiology, patient 
demographics 
BSI Neonatal 
intensive care 
USA 
Trick et al. 2004 Validation study 6 months, 127 
patients 
Microbiology, pharmacy, 
ADT, radiology 
BSI Whole hospital USA 
Spolaore et al.  2005 Validation study 1 year, 865 
suspected SSI 
Microbiology, discharge 
diagnoses 
SSI General surgery Italy 
†
Brossette et al.  2006 Validation study 1 week, 907 
patients 
Microbiology (including 
serology and molecular 
testing), inpatient census  
All HCAI (as 
defined by CDC) 
Whole hospital USA 
†
Chalfine et al.  2006 Validation study 1 year, 807 
procedures 
Microbiology, 
administrative, 
operating room 
database, plus manual 
input 
SSI Gastroenterology France 
†
Doherty et al.  2006 System description N/A Microbiology, 
administrative 
N/A N/A USA 
†
Meek and Tinney 2006 System description N/A Microbiology, patient 
admissions 
BSI, UTI, wound 
infections, 
respiratory (incl. 
VAP) 
Whole hospital USA 
Pokorny et al.  2006 Validation study 37 months, 1043 
patients 
Microbiology, discharge 
diagnoses, pharmacy, 
administrative 
All HCAI (as 
defined by CDC) 
Intensive care Spain 
Amadoz et al.  2007 System description N/A User defined User defined User defined Spain 
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Bellini et al.  2007 Validation study 2 years, 669 
episodes 
Administrative, 
microbiology  
BSI Surgery, 
medicine, 
intensive care  
Switzerland 
Kac et al.  2007 Cohort study 5 separate 
audits, 506 
alerts 
EMR (for microbiology 
and clinical data), ADT, 
MDRO database 
MDRO Whole hospital France 
Adlassnig et al.  2008 System description N/A Microbiology, 
electronically available 
clinical data 
BSI, pneumonia, 
UTI 
Intensive care Austria 
Anderson et al.  2008 Cohort study 22 months, 2052 
procedures 
Charge codes, 
microbiology 
BSI Endoscopy USA 
Borlawsky et al.  2008 System description N/A Microbiology, pharmacy, 
administrative 
BSI Intensive care, 
haematology, 
oncology 
USA 
Dao et al.  2008 System description N/A Microbiology, infection 
control database 
(includes patient 
demographics and ADT) 
N/A N/A USA 
Golob et al.  2008 System evaluation 3 months Microbiology, patient 
demographics, 
medications, plus 
manual input 
N/A Intensive care USA 
Klompas et al.  2008 Validation study 3 months, 459 
patients 
EMR, microbiology, 
radiology reports, 
ventilator settings  
VAP Intensive care USA 
Woeltje et al.  2008 Validation study 1 year, 540 
patients 
Microbiology, 
medications, vital signs, 
ADT, CVC presence 
BSI Intensive care USA 
Adlassnig et al. 2009 System description N/A Microbiology, patient 
data management 
system 
BSI, pneumonia, 
UTI 
Intensive Care Austria 
Claridge et al.  2009 Validation study 1 year, 769 
patients 
Microbiology, patient 
demographics, 
medications, plus 
manual input 
VAP, BSI Intensive care USA 
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Evans et al.  2009 System description N/A EMR, microbiology, 
pharmacy, ADT 
N/A N/A USA 
Fadlalla et al.  2009 System description N/A Microbiology, patient 
demographics, 
medications, plus 
manual input 
N/A Intensive care USA 
†
Passerini et al.  2009 Cohort study 28 months, 150 
alerts 
Microbiology, patient 
demographics, 
admissions 
Various - 23 
organism/ 
antimicrobial 
sensitivity 
combinations 
Oncology Italy 
Hota et al.  2010 System description N/A Microbiology, ADT, 
pharmacy 
BSI Whole hospital USA 
Koller et al.  2010 Validation study 4 months, 99 
patients 
Microbiology, clinical, 
nursing records, 
administrative 
BSI, CVC 
contamination, 
pneumonia, UTI 
Intensive care Austria 
Leal et al.  2010 Validation study 1 year, 2281 
patients 
Microbiology, 
administrative 
BSI Whole hospital 
(and any 
healthcare 
contact) 
Canada 
Apte et al.  2011 System description N/A Over 20 electronic 
sources, including 
microbiology, 
administrative, patient 
locations, medications 
BSI, pneumonia, 
UTI, SSI 
Whole hospital USA 
Apte et al. 2011 Cohort study 1 year, 5918 
patients 
Microbiology, 
administrative, surgical 
patients (from Infection 
Control) 
SSI General surgery USA 
Benoit et al.  2011 Cohort study 18 months, 4585 
patients 
Microbiology, ADT CDI Whole hospital USA 
Bouzbid et al.  2011 Validation study 6 years, 1499 
patients 
Microbiology, 
administrative, antibiotic 
prescriptions, textual 
discharge summaries 
BSI, pneumonia, 
UTI 
Intensive care France 
47 
 
Choudhuri et al.  2011 Validation study 2 months, 136 
patients 
Microbiology, clinical, 
patient demographics, 
financial database 
UTI Whole hospital USA 
Garcia-Alvarez et al.  2011 System description N/A Microbiology, infection 
control, audit, death 
certifications, 
administrative, H1N1 flu 
data, Occupational 
Health, pharmacy, ward 
management  
N/A N/A UK 
Shaban-Nejad et al. 2011 System description N/A Microbiology, clinical 
chemistry, pharmacy, 
operating room records, 
patient demographics, 
patient movement 
SSI General surgery Canada 
Tinoco et al.  2011 Cohort study 15 months, 2137 
patient 
admissions 
Microbiology, serology, 
ADT, radiology, surgical 
BSI, LRTI, SSI, UTI Whole hospital USA 
Woeltje et al.  2011 Validation study 18 months, 331 
patients 
Microbiology, 
medications, vital signs, 
ADT, CVC presence 
BSI General surgery, 
general medicine 
USA 
N/A, not applicable; BSI, bloodstream infection; UTI, urinary tract infection; ADT, admission, discharge and transfer; SSI, surgical site infection; HCAI, 
healthcare-associated infection; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; VAP, ventilator-associated pneumonia; EMR, electronic medical record; 
MDRO, multi-drug resistant organisms; CVC, central venous catheter; CDI, Clostridium difficile infection; LRTI, lower-respiratory tract infection 
† 
Study involved the use or the development of commercially available software (although, some commercial systems are no longer available) 
Table 2.1: Multi-source surveillance systems (incorporating microbiology data) for healthcare-associated infections 
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2.4.1. Incorporation of standard definitions for electronic surveillance 
Several authors have incorporated established HCAI surveillance definitions into their systems (90-94). 
Choudhuri et al. created an electronic surveillance tool based on adapted versions of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention National Healthcare Safety Network (CDC-NHSN) definition for catheter-
associated urinary tract infection (CA-UTI) (90). Routinely collected clinical and laboratory data were 
extracted from the hospital information system (HIS) and results were compared to traditional manual 
review of electronic records by an infection prevention and control specialist. The authors found that 
the electronic system allowed more efficient surveillance than was achieved with manual chart review. 
Klompas et al. employed a similar approach, which mirrored the CDC definitions, although quantitative 
thresholds were developed to replace qualitative criteria (91). The system presented by Adlassnig et al. 
involved the use of rules based on established HCAI definitions and several programs which allowed the 
monitoring of organisms exhibiting specific resistance patterns, the identification of potential cross-
infection incidents and the detection of increasing rates of infection (93). 
 
2.4.2. Data warehouses for electronic surveillance 
The creation of data warehouses for the surveillance of HCAI have been presented by several authors 
(95-100). In the system developed by Bellini et al. data were processed through a multi-step algorithm 
to exclude contaminated blood cultures, distinguish between community and nosocomial BSI and 
classify BSI as catheter or non-catheter associated (95). The results of the automated surveillance were 
highly concordant with the manual surveillance method. The authors did acknowledge that the 
automated surveillance system differed from the CDC surveillance criteria as clinical details required to 
satisfy the definitions were not available in the HIS, yet the  sensitivity and specificity for the detection 
of BSI were high (Table 2.4).  
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Wisniewski et al. developed a relational clinical data warehouse using existing data for the purpose of 
infection control (98). Data extraction from each data source was automated and the data was 
deposited into the data warehouse every 24 hours to provide timely surveillance data. Tinoco et al. 
compared the performance of a computerised surveillance system (CSS) with manual chart review for 
the detection of adverse events, including HCAI (100). The system managed several electronic data 
sources, which were prospectively screened for indicators of adverse events. All BSI were detected by 
the CSS and this method detected more HCAI than manual chart review (92% vs 34%). 
 
2.4.3. Computer algorithms and queries for electronic surveillance 
Computer algorithms and data queries have been used by the majority of systems presented.  Benoit et 
al. used data submitted to a national automated surveillance system to detect cases of CDI and generate 
facility-specific rates (101). Data were queried through either the detection of specific codes for 
hospitals that submitted coded data, or through the identification of key words within text reports for 
laboratories that did not provide coded data.  
 
Bouzbid et al. developed several algorithms using different data sources individually or in combination 
(102). Similarly, Pokorny et al. designed an algorithm based on information that could be used to 
retrospectively detect HCAI (103). Three data sources were employed in the development of the 
algorithms: i) positive microbiology results; ii) initiation of antibiotic therapy and; iii) diagnosis codes 
(International Classification of Disease, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes). The best 
performing algorithm included the use of all three data sources (Table 2.4), although this could not be 
applied for real-time detection of HCAI as ICD-9-CM codes are only available on patient discharge.  
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Woeltje et al. developed a method that aimed to accurately identify patients without infections (high 
NPV) to reduce the number of patients requiring full review by infection prevention specialists (104). 
The best-performing algorithm had an excellent NPV (99.2%) and was able to exclude approximately 
two-thirds of positive blood cultures from consideration as representing central-line associated BSI 
(CLABSI). The same group subsequently investigated the use of computer algorithms for the detection of 
CLABSI outside of the intensive care unit (ICU) and found that algorithms based on specific rule sets 
performed extremely well (sensitivity, specificity, PPV and NPV, all >90%)(105).  
 
Trick et al. compared five methods for surveillance of BSI, including the use of computer algorithms 
(106). All methods’ performances were assessed against a reference standard and the authors found 
that computer algorithms that used electronic clinical data outperformed manual review by infection 
control professionals. Borlawsky et al. described the amendments they made to the Trick algorithm 
described above (107). The original algorithm was developed specifically using one data set and was not 
seemingly transferable to other hospitals. Borlawsky et al. therefore combined Trick’s algorithm with 
clinical and business knowledge-bases to produce a system that could be used across a range of hospital 
settings. The authors believed that interoperability of algorithms should be considered when being 
developed to allow general application of methods to healthcare settings.  
 
Apte et al. compared two computer algorithms developed for detecting cases of SSI (108). The 
performance of each algorithm was assessed against the results gained from traditional surveillance 
methods. Both algorithms detected cases not found by traditional surveillance. Although three cases 
were missed by both algorithms, these were due to SSI being diagnosed outside of the hospital setting 
and outside of the study period parameters. 
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2.4.4. Knowledge-based electronic surveillance 
Knowledge-based computer algorithms have been described by several studies (109-111). Koller et al. 
used an automated system which could interpret relevant data to determine the presence or absence of 
HCAI (110). This method was compared with the results of surveillance carried out by trained 
surveillance personnel, which was considered to be the “gold standard”. They found that the time taken 
for conventional surveillance was 82.5 hours, compared to 12.5 hours for automated surveillance, and 
that a sensitivity of 100% could be achieved when systematic errors were rectified.  
 
Shaban-Nejad et al. described the development of a knowledge-based surveillance system for the 
detection of SSI (111). Evaluation of the accuracy of case detection was determined by comparison with 
patient chart review. However, these results are not presented in this paper. The authors stated that 
their framework is compatible with criteria specified by the CDC and proposed many potential uses for 
the system, including HCAI case identification, risk factor analysis and diagnostic capabilities. 
 
2.4.5. Importance of data linkage in electronic surveillance 
Linkage of several data sources was often fundamental to the development of ESS. Brossette et al. 
compared an electronic method using clinical microbiology reports and an inpatient census on patient 
location, with comprehensive medical records review (112). They found that this was an effective 
strategy for hospital-wide HCAI surveillance as it required far less resources than medical record review 
and could be implemented with minimal support.  
 
Leal et al. developed a novel ESS with the ability to classify infections as nosocomial, healthcare-
associated community onset, or community acquired infections (113). Patient data were linked across 
two independent systems through unique patient identifiers. For a random sample of patients, data on 
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the incidence of BSI and location of acquisition were obtained from the ESS and assessed to determine 
whether these data were in agreement with similar data obtained by traditional chart review. Revisions 
to the original definitions saw the number of concordant episodes increase, resulting in an overall kappa 
statistic of 0.81.  
 
Spolaore et al. linked microbiology results to ICD-9-CM codes to detect incidents of SSI and calculated 
the PPV by comparing results with infections detected from full chart review (114). Of the 865 suspected 
SSI, 64.5% were identified from the microbiology database, 27.1% from discharge codes, and only 8.4% 
from both. According to the authors the findings support the combined use of discharge codes and 
microbiology reports as a valuable tool for surveillance of SSI.  
 
Graham et al. validated an ESS used to monitor BSI in neonates across six medical centres (115). Multi-
hospital data were aggregated to monitor the emergence of multidrug-resistant pathogens. Data from 
the electronic system was compared with data collected by an infection control practitioner as part of 
an unrelated study. The authors found that when coagulase-negative staphylococci (CoNS) infections 
were removed, the electronic surveillance data closely approximated the “gold standard” surveillance.  
 
2.4.6. Electronic systems requiring manual input 
Some approaches required manual input, such as that described by Chalfine et al. (116). The computer-
assisted surveillance system relied on the identification of positive microbiology results for surgical site 
specimens and the confirmation of each suspected SSI by the surgeon in charge of each patient. As SSI 
were only suspected on the presence of a positive microbiology results, several culture-negative 
infections were missed by the computer-assisted method. However, this semi-automated system 
required 60.7% less time than the conventional method and was therefore adopted by the hospital.  
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Fadlalla et al. stated that administrative and clinical systems were not adequate for research or 
surveillance of HCAI (117), and thus developed a research data repository known as the Surgical 
Intensive Care-Infection Registry (SIC-IR). SIC-IR is a relational database that prospectively collects more 
than 100 clinical variables daily. To gain user support, several components were added to help with daily 
patient care activities in return for manual data entry by clinicians. The system’s reliability and 
integration into routine practice were assessed by Golob et al., who found that 78% of doctors using the 
system felt that SIC-IR improved the care that they were able to offer to patients (118). They also found 
that data available electronically showed 100% accuracy, whereas manually entered data exhibited 
significantly decreased accuracy. Additionally, in the validation study carried out by Claridge et al., SIC-IR 
performed better than the manual surveillance method used to detect cases of VAP (119). 
 
2.4.7. Other approaches to electronic surveillance 
Overall, a range of methods and systems have been reported in the literature. In response to a cluster of 
four cases of P. aeruginosa BSI after endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography Anderson et al. 
developed a novel automated system to prospectively detect these infections (120). The authors 
concluded that the automated surveillance tool that they had developed could be used to monitor the 
development of BSI but the efficacy of this method was unknown.  
 
Dao et al. developed a data mining tool by using a laboratory information system and an infection 
control database (89). The system was capable of automatic rate calculation and the early detection of 
increased rates. Specific conditions required for reporting to relevant external health departments could 
also be automated through the use of this tool. Meek and Tinney described how a commercial data 
mining system could automatically review data readily available in the HIS and create reports which 
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could be made available to clinical staff (121). In addition, a cost analysis showed reduction in HCAI of 
13% and associated cost savings ($575 885 over 15 months).  
 
Evans et al. described how an established system for surveillance was updated within their hospital 
(122). The system comprised of a number of modules, which contained rules that could support the 
detection of HCAI if evidence was found within the many data sets feeding into the system. Daily HCAI 
alerts were retrieved from the system, as well as infections at sterile body sites, reportable diseases, 
antibiotic resistant organisms and alerts of patients not receiving appropriate antimicrobial therapy 
based on culture and susceptibility results.  
 
Doherty et al. explained how, after increasing interest, a system was adapted for use in several 
institutions (123). The system was originally developed in one hospital and had been in use at that 
institution for over a decade. Adaptations to the original system included the replacement of text report 
rules (specific to the original hospital where the original system was developed) with generic XML based 
rule sets. The new system was successfully installed in a large academic hospital and two community 
hospitals, although numerous issues related to differences in pre-existing systems and infrastructure at 
each individual hospital had to be addressed first.  
 
The application of electronic methods for objectives beyond the detection of HCAI has also been 
demonstrated. Kac et al. developed a computerised system that involved the daily merger of multidrug-
resistant bacteria data and the admission, discharge and transfer (ADT) database (124). The aim of this 
study was to improve staff compliance with the implementation of isolation procedures around patients 
with infections caused by multidrug-resistant bacteria. The results of the study confirmed that the 
computerised system did improve clinical practice and was associated with sustained effect following 
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the intervention. Passerini et al. aimed to introduce a standardised method for alerting relevant 
members of staff to positive microbiology results (125). An automated email system was developed and 
implemented in 2006 for routine use within the hospital, which resulted in the rapid detection and 
notification of alert conditions.  
 
2.4.8. Electronic surveillance systems excluding microbiology data 
As seen in Table 2.1, the majority of electronic systems identified included the use of microbiology data. 
However, the systematic search also identified several studies that did not utilise microbiology data 
(126-129). Inacio et al. used a hybrid system to detect cases of SSI following total joint replacement 
surgeries (126). The system involved the screening of data contained within a registry, which was used 
to identify all total joint replacement procedures, ICD-9-CM codes for electronic screening, and a review 
of electronic health records of flagged SSI cases. Although the sources of data were all electronic, the 
process of screening and review was carried out manually by trained personnel. The algorithm 
performed well but the processing of data required an increased amount of manual input compared to 
other ESS reported in the literature. This system, did, however, reduce the number of charts required 
for manual review by 90.5% (440 infections identified from review of 4,000 charts, NPV=100%). 
 
Shaklee et al. evaluated the performance of administrative data for the detection of CDI (127). ICD-9-CM 
coding data and billing data for testing and treatment were compared with positive microbiology 
results. ICD-9-CM codes alone demonstrated the best performance in terms of sensitivity, illustrating 
that ICD-9-CM codes for CDI were reliable and accurate in identifying hospitalised children with CDI. 
 
Wright et al. used information contained within the electronic medical record to identify patients with 
invasive devices (129). Although this system was not developed to monitor HCAI, the information 
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generated is imperative to the calculation of rates of HCAI and patients at risk of developing device-
related infections. To assess the performance of the automated system, medical records from a random 
sample of patients were reviewed to determine the presence of indwelling devices. The automated 
system was successful in the identification of all three devices surveyed (Table 2.4) and the data 
collection process required much less time than manual data collection, resulting in an estimated 
reduction of 142 hours per year.  
 
2.4.9. Single-source electronic surveillance systems  
All three methods using a single data source used Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques for 
HCAI identification (130-132). Haas et al. compared the performance of traditional surveillance for 
nosocomial pneumonia and computerised surveillance of chest x-rays using an automated detection 
system based on NLP (130). The NLP converts electronic narrative into coded descriptions appropriate 
for the automated rule-based system. This method had a low PPV (7.9%), but a very high NPV (>99%) so 
could be used to target the investigation of patients with suspicious chest x-rays, rather than having to 
assess all patients. Penz et al. found that spelling errors and abbreviations were a clear source of error in 
NLP-based methods and appreciated that this needed to be addressed (131).  
 
Proux et al. recognised that tools to automate reporting are necessary as information is spread across 
various databases containing ever evolving information, which makes data difficult to obtain (132). The 
aim of their study was therefore to produce a tool capable of automatically detecting HCAI from patient 
records, using NLP. A series of text-based rules were applied to the patient discharge summary, which 
meant that their method relied solely on events documented in medical records. 
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Article Year Study design Study duration Data sources Organism(s)/ 
condition(s) 
Clinical area(s) Country 
Wright et al. 2009 Validation study Unsure, 700 
patients 
EMR, ADT Invasive device 
presence 
Whole hospital USA 
Inacio et al. 2011 Validation study 2 years, 42173 
procedures 
EMR, registry, clinical 
codes 
SSI Orthopaedics USA 
Shaklee et al. 2011 Validation study 6 months, 119 
patients 
Clinical coding, financial 
(billing data) 
CDI Paediatrics USA 
Vasilakis et al. 2011 Cohort study 61 months, 
4820 patients 
Admissions, operation 
data, patient 
demographics, ASA score, 
wound recordings 
SSI Orthopaedics UK 
EMR, electronic medical record; ADT, admission, discharge and transfer; SSI, surgical site infection; CDI, Clostridium difficile infection; ASA, American Society of 
Anesthesiologists 
Table 2.2: Multi-source surveillance systems (excluding microbiology data) for healthcare-associated infections 
  
Article Year Study design Study duration Data source Organism(s)/ 
condition(s) 
Clinical area(s) Country 
‡
Haas et al. 2005 Validation study 2 years, 2932 
patients 
Radiology reports Pneumonia Neonatal 
intensive care 
USA 
‡
Penz et al. 2007 Validation study 5 years, sample 
of 316 records 
EMR BSI Intensive care USA 
Proux et al. 2011 System description N/A Patient discharge 
summary 
All HCAI (not 
defined) 
Intensive care, 
surgery 
France 
EMR, electronic medical record; BSI, bloodstream infection; HCAI, healthcare-associated infection 
‡ 
Method relies on use of MedLEE, a commercially available natural language processing engine 
Table 2.3: Single-source surveillance systems for healthcare-associated infections 
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Study
Sensitivity, % 
(95% CI)
Specificity, % 
(95% CI) PPV, % (95% CI) NPV, % (95% CI) k (95% CI) Clinical Specialties
Bloodstream infection
     Hospital-acquired BSI 96.0 94.0  -  -  -
     Community-acquired BSI 100.0 100.0  -  -  -
     Nosocomial catheter-related BSI 78.0 96.0  -  - 0.72
     Nosocomial BSI of other origin 98.0 69.0  -  - 0.68
     Primary BSI 92.0 (89.0-95.0) 96.0 (94.0-98.0) 85.0 (80.0-90.0) 95.0 (92.0-98.0) > 0.75
     Secondary BSI 80.0 (75.0-85.0) 97.0 (56.0-99.0) 80.0 (75.0-85.0) 97.0 (95.0-99.0) > 0.75
     BSI 98.0 (93.9-100) 58.3 (55.8-60.9) 7.4 (5.4-9.4) 99.9 (99.6-100)  -
     CVC-related BSI 100.0 37.3 (33.9-40.7) 9.5 (7.1-12.2) 100.0  -
     BSI Brossette et al. 100.0  -  -  -  - Whole hospital
     BSI Graham et al. 84.0 99.0 84.0 99.0  - NICU
     BSI Leal et al.  -  -  -  - 0.81 Whole hospital
     CVC-related BSI Penz et al. 72.0 80.8 64.3 85.0*  - ICU
     HA-BSI 97.0 73.0  -  - 0.74
     Primary BSI 90.0 57.0  -  - 0.49
     Complete algorithm 81.0 72.0 62.0 87.0
0.49 (0.35-
0.63)
     Complete algorithm + CVC status 81.0 90.0 81.0 90.0
0.73 (0.61-
0.85)
     CLABSI Woeltje et al. 94.3 68.0 22.8 99.2  - ICU
     CLABSI Woeltje et al. 95.2 (88.5-98.2) 97.5 (95.4-98.7) 90.0 (82.1-94.7) 99.2 (97.2-99.6) 0.91 Medicine, Surgery
Urinary tract infection
     UTI Bouam et al . 95.0 (92.0-98.0) 100.0 100.0 95.0 (92.0-98.0) > 0.75
Surgery, Medicine, 
ICU 
     UTI Bouzbid et al 98.4 (96.1-100) 59.4 (56.8-62.0) 18.3 (15.5-21.3) 99.8 (99.4-100)  - ICU
     UTI Brossette et al . 100.0  -  -  -  - Whole hospital
     CAUTI Choudhuri et al. 86.4 93.8 85.0 94.4
0.80 (0.71-
0.89) Whole hospital
Trick et al . Whole hospital
Bellini et al .
Surgery, Medicine, 
ICU 
Bouam et al .
Surgery, Medicine, 
ICU
Bouzbid et al. ICU
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Performance calculations have been categorised into infection-type where possible and are representative of the best algorithm as determined by the authors. 
Performance calculations remained grouped in the analyses carried out by Koller et al. and Pokorny et al. and their results could therefore not be separated 
into the relevant categories. 
95% CI, 95% confidence interval (not presented if not provided in study); PPV, positive predictive value; NPV, negative predictive value; k, kappa statistic of 
agreement; BSI, bloodstream infection; ICU, intensive care unit; CVC, central venous catheter; NICU, neonatal intensive care unit; HA, hospital-acquired; 
CLABSI, central line-associated bloodstream infection; UTI, urinary tract infection; CAUTI, catheter-associated urinary tract infection; SSI, surgical site infection; 
CDI, Clostridium difficile infection; VAP, ventilator-associated pneumonia; RTI, respiratory-tract infection; CR-BSI, catheter-related bloodstream infection; HCAI, 
healthcare-associated infection; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
* estimated from chart within article 
Table 2.4: Summary of performance statistics for validations studies 
Study
Sensitivity, % 
(95% CI)
Specificity, % 
(95% CI) PPV, % (95% CI) NPV, % (95% CI) k (95% CI) Clinical Specialties
Surgical site infection
     SSI Brossette et al . 60.0  -  -  -  - Whole hospital
     SSI Chalfine et al . 84.3 (66.0-94.0) 99.9  -  -  - Gastroenterology
     SSI Inacio et al. 97.8 91.5 11.0 100.0  - Orthopaedics
     SSI Spolaore et al.  -  - 72.0 (69.0-76.0)  -  - General surgery
C. difficile infection
     CDI Brossette et al. 83.0  -  -  -  - Whole hospital
     CDI Shaklee et al . 80.7 (72.1-87.7) 99.9 (99.8-99.9) 74.0 (65.1-81.6) 99.9 (99.9-100)  - Paediatrics
Pneumonia
     Pneumonia Bouzbid et al . 98.7 (96.9-100) 60.8 (58.2-63.4) 23.0 (19.9-26.2) 99.8 (99.4-100)  - ICU
     VAP Claridge et al. 97.0 100.0  -  -  - ICU
     HA-pneumonia Haas et al . 71.0 99.8 7.9 > 99.0  - NICU
     VAP Klompas et al.  -  - 100.0  -  - ICU
Respiratory tract infection
     RTI Brossette et al . 80.0  -  -  -  - Whole hospital
Grouped methods - statistics not reported separately for each infection type
BSI, CR-BSI, pneumonia, UTI Koller et al. 90.3 100.0  -  -  - ICU
All HCAI as defined by the CDC Pokorny et al. 94.3 (79.5-99.0) 83.6 (76.8-88.9) 55.9 (42.5-68.6) 98.5 (94.2-99.7) 0.62 ICU
Other
     Invasive devices (denominator data)
          Urinary catheters 99.0 99.0 99.0 (99.0-100) 98.0 (96.0-99.0)
          Ventilator-days 100.0 96.0 96.0 (87.0-99.0) 100.0 (93.0-100)
          CVC-days 95.0 98.0 99.0 (92.0-100) 93.0 (84.0-97.0)Wright et al . Whole hospital
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2.5. Discussion 
This review has highlighted the range of electronic surveillance methods available for HCAI and the 
feasibility of adopting systems effective in the detection of HCAI. Systems described in the literature include 
the use of NLP, data warehouses, knowledge-based algorithms and the application of electronic 
surveillance criteria to linked data sources. In several instances ESS outperformed manual methods where 
both methods were compared against a “gold standard” (91;104;108;109;119), and many methods 
detected HCAI with excellent sensitivity and specificity (Table 2.4). The majority of studies demonstrated 
the utility of bespoke ESS developed within institutions rather than commercially available software, which 
is often expensive to purchase and maintain (89). 
 
The purpose of surveillance is to detect, report and monitor cases of infection; it is not required for the 
diagnosis of infections. Surveillance definitions for HCAI involve many criteria which are often subjective 
and require the personnel responsible for applying the definitions to undergo specialised training. For 
example, the CDC-NHSN definition for UTI includes 33 criteria (133). Choudhuri et al. adapted the CDC-
NHSN definitions for UTI for electronic detection of catheter-associated UTI (90). The rich data sources used 
in their system meant that the majority of infection indicators could be captured, and the tool performed 
well. However, more basic algorithms involving the use of only microbiology and administrative data 
sources also performed well when compared against “gold standard” methods (95;103;109;123).  
 
The lack of availability of clinical data in an electronic format can, however, reduce the ability of electronic 
methods to detect HCAI. HCAI surveillance definitions do not always require a positive microbiology result 
and the absence of electronic clinical data has seen a number of systems fail to detect cases of HCAI. This 
tends to be a concern in SSI surveillance, with diagnoses often based on symptoms rather than 
microbiology results. Brossette et al. noted several discrepancies between their ESS and medical record 
review (112). Four out of the seven confirmed infections undetected by the electronic system were due to 
surgical wound infections lacking microbiological evidence. The same issue was seen by Chalfine et al., who 
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found that three out of the five SSI missed by their computerised system were due to the absence of a 
positive microbiology result (116). With surgical patients spending substantially less time in hospital after 
surgery, the identification of patients developing infection post-discharge will present the biggest challenge 
in electronic surveillance methods for SSI. Furthermore, the identification of HCAI heavily depends on 
specific investigations being carried out if an electronic method is relying on particular data sources. The 
method developed by Haas et al. relied on chest x-rays being performed as part of the routine investigation 
into pneumonia, which was rarely undertaken in one of the neonatal intensive care units involved in the 
study (70% of patients with pneumonia did not have x-rays, so the system could not perform adequately) 
(130). Advances in mobile health (mHealth) could help overcome these issues by allowing medical staff to 
compile clinical information in an electronic format through the use of mobile devices at the patient 
bedside, which could be incorporated into ESS. This is an area requiring further investigation, as a report 
prepared by the WHO found that mHealth was not frequently employed for surveillance, despite the fact 
that relevant literature supports the use of mobile devices for data collection and disease surveillance 
(134). Incentivising and incorporating data collection into routine practice could help in the uptake of 
surveillance systems requiring comprehensive information to improve the performance of ESS (116;118). 
 
Systems based upon detection of positive microbiology cultures alone tend to overestimate HCAI (113). In 
order to increase method validity, step-wise adjustments of algorithms were performed in several studies. 
Graham et al. used microbiology and patient demographic data to identify BSI in neonatal patients (115). 
They found that by removing coagulase-negative staphylococci (CoNS) isolates the results from their 
electronic method closely approximated traditional, “gold standard” surveillance. However, one group in 
the Netherlands found that 59% of BSI were caused by CoNS, suggesting that definitions for BSI should be 
amended for neonates (135). An alternative approach to refine ESS based on microbiology data includes 
the use of proxy indicators. This was demonstrated in the study carried out by Klompas et al. whose system 
detected changes in ventilator settings to identify patients likely to develop VAP (91). However, there is 
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debate around the validity of antibiotic prescription, a commonly available data source, as a proxy indicator 
for HCAI as antibiotics are often prescribed for reasons besides HCAI treatment (102;136). 
 
Difficulties have also been encountered when implementing ESS. The development of a clinical data 
warehouse described by Wisniewski et al. took two years (98). They faced difficulties accessing and using 
data, as the data custodians considered themselves data "owners", and allowing a third party direct access 
to computer servers may be perceived as compromising data-keeper responsibilities. This was overcome by 
obtaining senior-administrative level endorsement and informing data keepers and administrators that the 
use of the information they provided would help meet regulatory mandates and improve patient care. 
Similar issues were encountered by Apte et al, who also reported that it took almost two years to develop 
and integrate their electronic system (96). 
 
In the second volume of the CMO’s Annual Report, it was recognised that there was a, “need for improved 
surveillance around infections and particularly around antimicrobial resistance” and that this may be 
achieved by utilising existing data sets more effectively through data linkage (3). The CMO also suggested 
the focus of surveillance should be extended beyond MRSA and CDI in light of the emergence of 
carbapenem-resistance in Gram-negative bacteria. Increasing the number of infectious diseases under 
surveillance will inevitably increase the workload; with surveillance being an essential component of any 
programme designed to tackle the increasing levels of antimicrobial resistance, it seems logical that we 
rapidly progress from manual surveillance methods towards an era where electronic methods are routinely 
employed for HCAI surveillance.  
 
A limitation of this work is that only I carried out the search process and data/information extraction. 
However, the role of the second reviewer ensured that inclusion/exclusion criteria had been applied 
appropriately; both reviewers agreed on the classification of all articles randomly selected for secondary 
review (20/20 references reviewed, 100%). Although a formal assessment of each included study was 
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made, this quality assessment tool was developed for the purpose of assessing articles to be reviewed as 
part of this chapter and it has therefore not been validated. Whilst developing the quality assessment tool 
for this study it was recognised that further work is required to develop a framework for assessing the 
quality of surveillance systems presented in the scientific literature. It was considered that I could develop a 
framework for this purpose, but the considerable amount of time required to produce such a framework 
meant that I could not pursue this task. 
 
Leal and Laupland carried out a systematic review to determine the validity of ESS (5). They identified 24 
articles comparing electronic and conventional methods for infection surveillance (not limited to HCAI) and 
concluded that electronic surveillance has good utility compared with conventional surveillance, but that 
this form of surveillance was not widespread. The results from the presented review support previous 
findings, but indicate that research in this field is increasing, with almost 30% of the articles reviewed 
published in the final year of the search period. This review also identified a number of novel methods and 
systems which had not been evaluated against a reference standard and were therefore not included in the 
Leal and Laupland paper.  
 
It is difficult to estimate the workload required to establish an ESS for HCAI.  A limitation reported by 
several authors was the transferability of ESS developed “in-house”. Doherty et al. encountered difficulties 
when attempting to implement a well-established system in several hospitals outside of their institution, 
which took several weeks to resolve (123). Hota et al. note that substantial differences in data available in 
an electronic format meant that they encountered challenges when trying to implement generic rules for 
infection detection at different hospitals (94) and Klompas et al. acknowledged that implementation of 
their method is limited by the breadth of data captured in an electronic format at hospitals outside of their 
own (91). However, implementation of electronic surveillance was found to be feasible, with many systems 
fully integrated into hospital information systems and routine surveillance practices 
(89;93;98;105;109;116;119;122;125;129).  
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Automated methods for the identification of HCAI allow the consistent application of simplified definitions 
designed for the purpose of surveillance.  ESS should be seen as an opportunity to enhance current 
surveillance practices. Staff involved in surveillance activities should not feel threatened by advances in this 
area, but recognise that these methods can reduce the burdens associated with traditional surveillance 
methodologies, which will only increase as the emphasis on transparency and public reporting causes 
increased demand for more information to be reported. The findings of this review suggest that hospitals 
should develop and employ ESS for HCAI. Although it must be acknowledged that the architecture of 
systems described in the literature vary, and therefore individual hospitals need to identify and assess 
available information sources before making the decision to develop or adopt ESS. 
  
 65 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA CHARACTERISTICS IN A NATIONAL 
MICROBIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM  
 
3.1. Introduction 
A key finding from the systematic review presented in the previous chapter was that issues around data 
quality and completeness can limit the ability of automated systems to detect cases of HCAI. This is also 
true for automated outbreak detection methodologies; if information has not been completely or 
accurately reported it cannot be used confidently in outbreak detection. Before the development and 
application of outbreak detection algorithms it was therefore essential that a full system evaluation was 
performed. This chapter evaluates the data available from the voluntary reporting system LabBase2, 
investigating issues associated with the reporting process.  
 
In England, infectious disease surveillance consists of mandatory, enhanced and voluntary surveillance 
systems, which are co-ordinated nationally by PHE. Surveillance for infectious diseases based on electronic 
reporting systems has been undertaken by PHE (previously the HPA) since the early 1990s. The data is 
collected via a voluntary reporting system where data from hospital LIMS is reported to the respective 
Regional Epidemiology Unit via an electronic data transfer system (CoSurv). The data sources for voluntary 
reporting have been previously described in Chapter 1 and are represented in Figure 1.4 (page 32). The 
data is initially processed by the regional units before being submitted to LabBase2, the national laboratory 
reporting database for PHE.  
 
From October 2010, Regulation 4 of The Health Protection (Notifications) Regulations 2010 came into force 
placing a new legal obligation on laboratories to report a specified list of causative agents; although there 
remains a more comprehensive list of “core organisms” that are subject to voluntary reporting in addition 
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to those subject to the statutory requirements (137).The HPA issued updated guidance to reporting 
laboratories in August 2010, to remind them of these reporting requirements (138). 
 
According to the guidelines “Laboratory Reporting to the Health Protection Agency: Guide for Diagnostic 
Laboratories”, there are 39 bacterial pathogens that laboratories are requested to report to LabBase2, 
which are specified in Table 3.1. Invasive disease is considered to be isolation of an organism from one of 
the sites listed in Table 3.2. There are set targets for reporting to the voluntary system; it is requested that 
all laboratories undertaking NHS work report to the system, preferably in an electronic format. Emphasis on 
the importance of completeness, timeliness and quality of laboratory reports is made in the Guidelines, and 
it is recommended that laboratories report once a week, with preliminary reports to be received by regions 
within 14 days of the specimen date in at least 90% of cases, and no later than 21 days (138). 
Organism name Infections to be reported Organism name Infections to be reported 
Acinetobacter spp. Invasive disease Mycobacterium spp. All 
Actinomyces spp. All Mycoplasma spp. All 
Aeromonas spp. Invasive disease Neisseria gonorrhoeae All 
Bartonella spp. All Nocardia spp. All 
Chlamydia pneumoniae All Pasteurella spp. Invasive disease 
Chlamydia trachomatis All Plesiomonas spp. All enteric infections and 
invasive disease 
Citrobacter spp. Invasive disease Proteus spp. Invasive disease 
Clostridium difficile All Providencia spp. Invasive disease 
Clostridium perfringens All Pseudomonas spp. Invasive disease 
Clostridium spp. Invasive disease Serratia spp. Invasive disease 
Coxiella spp. All Staphylococcus auerus Invasive disease 
Enterobacter spp. Invasive disease Staphylococcus spp. Invasive disease 
Enterococcus spp. Invasive disease Stenotrophomonas 
maltophilia 
Invasive disease 
Erysipelothrix spp. All Streptobacillus 
moniliformis 
All  
Escherichia coli All enteric infections and 
invasive disease 
Streptococcus spp. Invasive disease 
Klebsiella spp. Invasive disease Treponema pallidum All 
Leptospira spp. All Treponema spp. All 
Listeria spp. All Vibrio spp. All 
Lymphogranuloma 
venereum (LGV) 
All Yersinia spp. All 
Morganella morganii Invasive disease   
Table 3.1: Core organisms requested for reporting to LabBase2 
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Specimen site 
Bladder Lung 
Blood/blood components Lymph node 
Bone Ovary/fallopian tube 
Bone marrow Ocular fluid 
Brain Pancreas 
CSF Peritoneum 
Fascia/muscle Pleura 
Gall bladder Surgical implant e.g. vascular shunt/graft 
Gland e.g. thyroid, parotid Spinal cord 
Heart Spleen 
Heart valve Tissue/tissue fluid 
Joint Uterus 
Kidney  Vascular system (vein/artery) 
Liver  
Table 3.2: Specimen sites representing invasive disease 
 
Currently, PHE uses an automated analytical system to assist in identifying potential clusters or outbreaks, 
the LabBase Exceedance Reporting, which utilises the statistical algorithm developed by Farrington et al. 
(139). The algorithm is applied to time-series data available on hundreds of different organisms, with 
reports produced at the national level, and for each of the nine regions across England (and Wales and 
Northern Ireland). The system produces alerts and reports if the number of cases observed in the current 
week exceeds the upper 99.5% prediction limit from a quasi-Poisson regression analysis. This method has 
been developed for the analysis of large data sets exhibiting varying characteristics (such as high and low 
reporting frequencies, seasonality and trend) and has been a robust method for the early detection of 
outbreaks of infectious diseases for a number of years. The Farrington algorithm has been adopted and 
adapted by several other countries as part of their national surveillance programmes (6). Recently, 
however, proposals have been made to improve the performance of the algorithm to reduce the number of 
false positive alerts by making several amendments, such as incorporating more weeks’ data in the 
regression analysis and revising the re-weighting of unusual observations in the historical data used to 
estimate expected values (140). 
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With instances of outbreaks often reported in the media (7-9) and studies showing that outbreaks have 
been missed using traditional outbreak detection methods (10-12), it is apparent that an automated and 
systematic approach for outbreak detection is required at the hospital level. The data contained within 
LabBase2 consists of information reported by hospital laboratories. In England, hospitals are managed by 
NHS Acute trusts; therefore, data within LabBase2 has the potential for use in outbreak detection at the 
trust level.  
 
3.2. Objectives 
 Evaluate the timeliness, completeness and quality of data available from LabBase2, a national 
voluntary reporting system 
 Present variations in the specimen types and organisms reported by laboratories 
 Describe the data processing necessary to enable the development and application of outbreak 
detection methods for healthcare settings 
 Describe issues associated with performing outbreak detection analysis at the trust level 
 
Sections of work presented in this chapter were accepted for publication in the Journal of Infection in July 
2013 and a copy of the article can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
3.3. Methods 
Trust Level Exceedance (TLE) reporting, an extension of the LabBase Exceedance Reporting, had been 
implemented shortly before this critical analysis was performed, although output generated from the 
weekly analysis was not being fed back to staff at the regional or trust level. Initially, data extracted for TLE 
reporting was used in the data analysis (five year time period up to 19.05.12, based on specimen date 
loaded). Tabulating the antimicrobials recorded in this data set revealed that only 11 antimicrobials were 
recorded over the five year time period: cefotaxime, cefpodoxime, ceftazidime, ceftriaxone, ciprofloxacin, 
ertapenem, gentamicin, imipenem, meropenem, methicillin and vancomycin. This suggested that only 
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reports of organisms tested against one of the named antimicrobials were being used in the weekly TLE 
reporting. Although key resistances were identified for inclusion in the outbreak detection system, these 
were not supposed to be applied to all reports submitted to LabBase2. It appeared that a 
miscommunication had resulted in the accidental filtering of data required for outbreak detection at the 
hospital level. This finding was discussed with the Information Manager in the Information Management 
Department to clarify the exact content of the query. Going through the query used to extract data from 
LabBase2 for the TLE reporting confirmed that only reports containing susceptibility results for at least one 
of the antimicrobials named above were being included for analysis in the outbreak detection algorithm. 
This was not intended; the original criteria for inclusion in TLE reporting was any report for one of the 
organisms listed in Table 3.3a, with antimicrobial susceptibility results to be reported for specific drug-bug 
combinations, as detailed in Table 3.3b. All organisms listed in Table 3.3a are also included in the list of core 
organisms for laboratory reporting (Table 3.1) and should therefore be reported to the central database by 
laboratories on a regular basis. 
Organisms 
Acinetobacter baumannii Legionella spp. 
Aspergillus spp. Listeria spp. 
Bacillus spp. Morganella spp. 
Beta-haemolytic streptococci groups A -G  Mycobacterium spp. 
Burkholderia spp. Proteus spp. 
Citrobacter spp. Providencia spp. 
Clostridium difficile Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Enterobacter spp. Pseudomonas spp. 
Enterococcus spp.  Salmonella spp. 
Escherichia coli Serratia spp. 
Group A streptococci Staphylococcus aureus 
Group B streptococci Stenotrophomonas spp. 
Klebsiella spp. Streptococcus pneumoniae 
Kluyvera spp.  
Table 3.3a: Original organisms for inclusion in Trust Level Exceedance reporting  
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 
Organism Antimicrobial name 
  Gen Cip Ctx Ctz Ctr Cpx Imi Mer Ert Met Van 
Citrobacter spp. 
      
   
  Enterobacter spp. 
      
   
  Enterococcus spp. 
          
 
Escherichia coli          
  Klebsiella spp.          
  Kluyvera spp. 
      
   
  Morganella spp. 
      
   
  Proteus spp. 
      
   
  Providencia spp. 
      
   
  Serratia spp. 
      
   
  Staphylococcus aureus 
         
 
 Gen, gentamicin; Cip, ciprofloxacin; Ctx, cefotaxime; Ctz, ceftazidime; Ctr, ceftriaxone; Cpx, cefpodoxime; Imi, 
imipenem; Mer, meropenem; Ert, ertapenem; Met, methicillin; Van, vancomycin 
Table 3.3b: Original drug-bug combinations for Trust Level Exceedance reporting.  
 
A new data extract was requested, removing any antimicrobial criteria from the query used. The original 
data extract contained 1,072,664 records after de-duplication, whereas the new extract contained 
1,932,171 records after going through the same de-duplication process. This is a difference of 859,507 
records, an increase of 80%. Of particular note is the difference in the number of reports of C. difficile. The 
original extract contained 151 reports, whereas the new extract contained 160,157 reports of C. difficile. 
Following the confirmation of the incorrect data feed, a new data extract was requested. It was intended 
that a complete data set containing all antimicrobial susceptibility results would be produced. However, the 
size of the data file produced was too big, even when the data retrieved was split into four outputs. It was 
therefore decided that the main query would not include data on antimicrobial resistance, rather smaller 
data files would be produced for specific drug-bug combinations. Fifteen different queries were created 
and executed to provide data extracts containing antimicrobial susceptibility results for specific organisms, 
as detailed in Table 3.3b. 
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The data evaluation performed up to the point of finding the error in the TLE data was repeated. Initial 
analysis of the new data extract found that several organisms not required for TLE reporting were included 
in the data set; these included reports on Candida spp., Fusarium spp., Mucor spp., Paecilomyces spp., 
Penicillium spp., Pneumocystis spp., and Raoultella spp., which were removed prior to analysis. At this 
point, the organisms included for TLE were reconsidered, and it was decided that reports on Salmonella 
spp. should be removed. It was decided that as the vast majority of reports for Salmonella spp. did not 
contain any details on patient location (52,406/52,408 reports had either missing or “unknown” locations), 
the information provided from performing outbreak detection for this organism would be of little benefit to 
trusts. The organisms included in the final analysis were selected on the basis that they represent 
pathogens associated with hospital transmission according to previously published literature (11) and 
therefore early identification of a potential outbreak would be of interest to hospital trusts. The complete 
evaluation process was performed on this data extract.  
 
 The final data evaluation was performed on an extract of records loaded into LabBase2 between March 
2007 and May 2012 and contained many more variables than the original extract used for TLE. The extra 
variables were requested to help understand the contents of the data extract, as initially it appeared that 
many duplicate reports were contained in the data extract. However, the addition of the variables 
“specimen type description” and “specimen accession number” uncovered the fact that many specimen 
types were being assigned the same Organism Patient Illness Episode (OPIE), and thus the same “earliest 
specimen date” and “date  loaded”. For the purpose of this evaluation no patient identifiable information 
was included in the data extract and a full list of variables included in the data analysis can be found in 
Table 3.4. 
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Variable Description Format/ Example 
OPIE ID Organism Patient Illness Episode 
(unique identifier) 
07ASF034946/01 
Trust name Name of reporting NHS Trust [NAME] NHS TRUST 
Date loaded Date report loaded to LabBase2 DD/MM/YYYY 
Earliest specimen date Earliest known specimen date for all 
specimens within OPIE 
DD/MM/YYYY 
Organism name Organism name STAPHYLOCOCCUS AUREUS 
Antimicrobial name Antimicrobial name CEFOXITIN 
Susceptibility result Antimicrobial susceptibility result SUSCEPTIBLE, INTERMEDIATE, 
RESISTANT 
Specimen type description Specimen type BLOOD, ABSCESS, URINE,… 
Parent specimen type Parent category for specimen type BLOOD, SKIN/WOUND, 
URINE/KIDNEY,… 
Specimen date Date of individual specimen(s) within an 
OPIE 
DD/MM/YYYY 
Specimen accession number Specimen accession/laboratory number M899112 
Specimen source type 
description 
Patient location at time of specimen HOSPITAL INPATIENT, 
HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT, GP, 
UNKNOWN,… 
Table 3.4: Description of data items included in data extract 
 
3.3.1. Specimen hierarchy 
When reports are uploaded to LabBase2 an OPIE is generated. If further reports are sent to LabBase2 for 
the same patient, organism and within a defined episode length, an automated de-duplication algorithm 
will merge the records so there is only one OPIE for the whole episode of illness. For the majority of 
organisms, an episode is a cumulative time period of 14 days (this is extended to 26 weeks for 
Mycobacterium spp.). 
 
There can be multiple test and specimen combinations and antimicrobial susceptibility results associated 
with each OPIE. The current de-duplication process in LabBase2 will retain the first reported specimen as 
the main record for that OPIE. A specimen hierarchy was therefore developed and implemented to ensure 
that the report within an OPIE representing the most clinically significant specimen type was identified and 
retained before additional specimens were removed from the analysis (Table 3.5). The order of the 
specimens was determined after consultation with the Healthcare Epidemiologist for PHE and the Head of 
the Healthcare-Associated Infection & Antimicrobial Resistance (HCAI & AMR) department at the time. It 
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was decided that the report representing the most clinically significant specimen would be prioritised. 
Specimens were grouped into parent specimen categories within the hierarchy. All specimens were 
assigned a parent specimen group and given a specimen group number, representing the order within the 
hierarchy (as listed in Table 3.5).  
 
The hierarchy was created to promote reports of more severe infection in cases where several different 
specimen types were recorded within one OPIE and was developed primarily for the benefit of end-users 
within trusts rather than for data evaluation purposes. The prioritisation of specimen types also reflects the 
findings from the most recent PPS performed in England in 2011. The preliminary results of the survey 
revealed that 80% of HCAI were caused by six specific types of infection: respiratory tract infections; UTI; 
SSI; clinical sepsis; gastrointestinal infections and; BSI (16). Specimen types associated with these infections 
are represented in the top ten specimen types listed in the hierarchy (Table 3.5). Figure 3.1 represents a 
situation where more than one specimen type has been reported within a cumulative 14 day period; 
application of the specimen hierarchy will promote the report with the most clinically relevant specimen (in 
this case the last report), and this report will act as the main record for the OPIE. It was considered that 
end-users at the trust would be more interested in outbreaks of infectious diseases if the cases reported 
included severe clinical infections, such as bacteraemia.  
 
After the implementation of the hierarchy, it was still possible to identify records containing multiple 
specimens, and OPIEs containing reports on several different specimen types. To easily identify OPIEs 
containing more than one specimen site, a new variable (“total”) was created, containing the total number 
of different specimens reported within one OPIE. Using information contained within the “total” column, 
users at the trust level can easily identify patients with multiple different specimens and can further 
investigate this should they wish to. 
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Order Specimen site description Order Specimen site description 
1 BLOOD 12 FLUID (NOT SPECIFIED) 
2 CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM 13 PERITONEUM 
3 INTRA-VASCULAR LINE 14 GENITAL TRACT 
4 PUS/ABSCESS/TISSUE (UNDEFINED) 15 BREAST 
5 BONE/JOINT 16 EYE 
6 URINE/KIDNEY 17 EAR 
7 GASTRO-INTESTINAL TRACT 18 ORAL 
8 LOWER RESPIRATORY TRACT 19 UMBILICUS 
9 UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT 20 OTHER 
10 SKIN/WOUND 99 UNKNOWN 
11 ASPIRATION (UNSPECIFIED)   
Table 3.5: Hierarchy of specimen types 
Figure 3.1: Alternative outcomes using the current de-duplication and specimen hierarchy processes 
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 3.3.2. Data processing 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the required data processing. This was extensive, requiring the generation of many 
queries to extract data from the central database. Specifically, antimicrobial susceptibility data could not be 
included within the main data extraction query for all organisms included in TLE reporting. Specific queries 
were created to extract data on organism-antibiotic susceptibly combinations of particular interest. After 
the removal of susceptible organisms, these records were recoded, distinguishing them as resistant 
isolates, and appended to all isolate data extracted using the main query to create the complete data set 
for analysis. To avoid the analysis of duplicate records, data evaluation was performed prior to the addition 
of the resistant-organism files. 
 
To allow the use of date variables in the analysis the existing date format had to be converted into a Stata 
date format i.e. number of days since 1st January 1960. This was achieved by generating new date variables 
for “earliest specimen date” and “date loaded”, using the Stata command: 
 generate variable_name = date(existing_variable, “DMY”) 
Following this, it was possible to extract the week and year components of the dates, as well as calculate 
the number of days between two dates. 
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Figure 3.2: Data processing flow diagram 
 
To allow analysis to be performed efficiently at multiple levels i.e. trust, regional, national and organism-
specific analysis, several tables were created and merged with the main data extract. Each reporting trust 
was assigned a trust number, which was merged into the main data set. Tables for grouping organisms by 
genera and grouping trusts into their corresponding regions were also created. By assigning numerical 
values to trusts and organisms it was possible to run the data processing code in a loop, resulting in a 
reduction of manual, repetitive data manipulation. 
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Further data processing was required specifically for organism files containing antimicrobial susceptibility 
results. Prior to the application of the specimen hierarchy, the data was re-shaped from long to wide. In the 
long format, each antimicrobial susceptibility result was recorded on a separate row, as seen in Figure 3.3. 
Re-shaping the data into a wide format meant that all susceptibility results for a report were available in 
one observation and would therefore allow the identification of specific antimicrobial resistances in 
selected organisms. 
Figure 3.3: Re-shaping data from long to wide 
 
Complications related with re-shaping the data occurred when inconsistencies in variables were observed. 
These specifically related to the “specimen accession number”, “specimen source description” and 
“specimen source code” variables. Table 3.6 summarises the inconsistencies observed in one report of K. 
pneumoniae. Although the OPIE and specimen date is the same for all antimicrobial results, there are very 
slight differences in the specimen accession number, specimen source description and specimen source 
code between the details recorded for the cefotaxime and ceftazidime results when compared with the 
cefpodoxime result. For this reason, these three variables had to be dropped from the data set for the 
purpose of reshaping. This was not an issue for specimen accession number as this variable was only 
required for the data extraction. However, as patient location at time of specimen was required, a table 
containing OPIE and specimen source description fields was created so that it could be merged into the 
master data set after the data re-shaping had been performed. 
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OPIE Specimen 
type 
Specimen 
date 
Antimicrobial Specimen 
accession number 
Specimen source 
description 
Specimen 
source code 
[…]158/01 BLOOD 07/04/2009 CEFOTAXIME MB880715 INPATIENT 40 
[…]158/01 BLOOD 07/04/2009 CEFPODOXIME MB880715M UNKNOWN 99 
[…]158/01 BLOOD 07/04/2009 CEFTAZIDIME MB880715 INPATIENT 40 
Table 3.6: Example of specimen causing re-shape errors in data processing 
 
3.3.3. Analysis of reporting habits 
To detect any changes in reporting behaviour resulting from the introduction of Regulation 4 of The Health 
Protection (Notifications) Regulations in October 2010, a negative binomial model was fitted with an 
indicator variable for the periods pre- and post-October 2010 to determine whether there were important 
changes in reporting as a result of the new Regulations.   
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distribution test was employed to detect differences in reporting 
delays observed within trusts between the pre-October 2010 and post-October 2010 periods i.e. before 
and after the 1st October 2010. Reporting delays were calculated by subtracting the “earliest specimen 
date” from the “date loaded”. There were 37 reports exhibiting negative delays. This may have been due 
either to errors in the recorded dates or because the first report received by LabBase2 did not have the 
specimen date recorded and the earliest specimen date known was derived from subsequent test records. 
These records were removed from the data set prior to analysis. 
 
Simpson’s diversity index ( ) was calculated to provide a quantitative summary measure of the relative 
abundance of reported organisms in each trust dataset. D  was calculated using the formula described in 
Equation 3.1. 
   
∑          
 
   
      
 
[Equation 3.1] 
where R is the total number of organism groups (genera) in the data set,   is the total number of reports in 
each organism group and  is the total number of reports made across all organism groups. All values will 
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lie within the range zero to one, with higher values representing less diversity. This provides a summary 
statistic that quantifies the selective reporting that is apparent in certain trusts; values close to zero 
represent high levels of diversity, whereas values close to one represent very little diversity. 
 
Data was extracted from LabBase2 directly using a number of generic and organism-specific queries. Data 
files were imported into Stata/SE Version 12 for statistical analysis. 
 
3.4. Results 
A total of 1,921,559 reports were made to the voluntary reporting system between March 2007 and May 
2012. After the application of the specimen hierarchy and the removal additional reports within OPIEs, 
1,705,126 reports remained (11.3% of reports were removed). Within the entire time period evaluated, 167 
laboratories submitted data to LabBase2, including contribution from nine laboratories in Wales. Further 
investigation revealed that two of the trusts contributing to the data set were non-acute hospital trusts. 
Initially it appeared that 13 trusts were not reporting to the voluntary system however, further 
investigation revealed that some hospitals send microbiology specimens to laboratories associated with 
other trusts. These specimens have subsequently been assigned the details of the main trust associated 
with the laboratory, which means that their reports are not distinguished from the other trust’s and their 
reports are consequently being assigned to a different trust. This was only detected after feeding back 
results from this analysis to the Information Management Department. The hospital name is recorded in a 
free-text field, and is only complete in approximately half of reports (40% complete in 2007, increasing to 
54% complete in 2011). 
 
Many of the trusts in the TLE data actually represent hospital groups that have been incorporated into 
either new or existing NHS trusts. This indicates that the trust list used for TLE is not regularly updated. In 
addition, two trusts recorded in the data set are none-acute trusts and thus should not be contributing to 
the TLE data. Two trusts that appear in the weekly TLE extract could not be included in the trust-level data 
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analysis as these trusts had only reported a very small number of cases on one day within the five-year 
study period (Queen Victoria Hospital and the Royal Surrey County Hospital), however, reports from these 
trusts were used in analyses carried out at the national and regional levels. 
 
3.4.1 Variation in reporting  
There is great variation in how laboratories report to the system. Appendix 5 summarises the differences in 
reporting observed across all reporting trusts. In sixteen trusts with annual KH03 bed-days of between 
300,000 and 350,000 the total number of reported infections ranged from 370 to 84,510 (median 8,055.5; 
inter-quartile range (IQR) 6,944.5 – 12,034.5). This finding indicates that there is severe inconsistency in 
reporting by laboratories. Data fields were often incomplete; 42.4% (722,921) of reported isolates did not 
contain any information on patient location at time of specimen. There were also many instances of 
inconsistencies in laboratory number and specimen source i.e. patient location at time of specimen, which 
introduced complexities in implementing the specimen hierarchy.  
 
There were 147 different organism types recorded in the data set. Many of these could be grouped at the 
genus level for the purpose of data analysis and Table 3.7 summarises the frequency of reports. The mean 
number of reports belonging to a single OPIE was 1.1, ranging from one to 58. The record containing 58 
reports was a case of A. baumannii. Specimens had been taken regularly over 72 days. As each subsequent 
specimen had been taken within 14 days of the previous, all reports were assigned the same OPIE and 
therefore allocated the same attributes as the original specimen. This record also contained eight different 
specimen types, including samples taken from skin/wound sites, urine cultures and swabs from central 
venous catheter sites.  
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Organism group Frequency Percent Organism group Frequency Percent 
Staphylococcus aureus 510,600 29.95 Other beta haemolytic 
Streptococci 
21,722 1.27 
Escherichia coli 367,304 21.54 Aspergillus spp. 15,173 0.89 
Clostridium difficile 160,157 9.39 Serratia spp. 8,978 0.53 
Enterococcus spp. 107,624 6.31 Citrobacter spp. 8,415 0.49 
Streptococcus pneumoniae 100,221 5.88 Stenotrophomonas spp. 6,243 0.37 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 73,925 4.34 Bacillus spp. 4,986 0.29 
Klebsiella spp. 51,410 3.02 Morganella spp. 4,441 0.26 
Group B Streptococi 46,251 2.71 Acinetobacter baumanii 2,617 0.15 
Pseudomonas spp. 43,114 2.53 Burkholderia spp. 1,209 0.07 
Mycobacterium spp. 42,288 2.48 Legionella spp. 887 0.05 
Proteus spp. 40,912 2.4 Listeria spp. 894 0.05 
Group A Streptococci 34,451 2.02 Providentia spp. 737 0.04 
Streptococcus Group C, D, G 26,950 1.58 Kluyvera spp. 152 0.01 
Enterobacter spp. 23,465 1.38 Total 1,705,126 100 
Table 3.7: Frequency of organism reported in LabBase2 study extract 
 
The values resulting from the calculation of Simpson’s diversity index indicates that laboratories vary 
greatly in the frequency of organisms they submit to LabBase2. Values ranged from 0.102 to 0.917 (IQR 
0.151 – 0.215). Figure 3.4 demonstrates the difference in organism distributions observed in a laboratory 
with a low diversity index score (D < 0.2) compared to a laboratory focussed on submitting reports of 
specific organisms (D > 0.4), and Figure 3.5 illustrates the distribution of D values across all reporting trusts. 
It must be noted that results from the Simpson’s diversity index calculations should be interpreted with 
data available on the number of reports submitted by laboratories, since D only reflects the variety of 
organisms represented within all reports submitted by a particular laboratory. A full list of Simpson’s 
diversity index results can be found in Appendix 6. 
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Colour coding starts at “midday” on pie chart with “Group A Streptococcus” and continues in a clockwise direction 
Figure 3.4: Example of differences in organism diversity between two trusts 
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Simpson’s diversity index scores for all reporting trusts 
 
A total of 225 distinct specimen types were recorded in the data set. The distribution of specimen types 
reported by region is shown in Figure 3.6. There appears to be differences in reporting, with the most 
common specimen type reported varying across regions.  Skin/wound, blood and urine/kidney specimen 
sites represented nearly two-thirds of all reports and 59,920 OPIEs (3.5%) contained reports with multiple 
specimen types. Table 3.8 shows the frequency of specimen types (grouped under a parent category) using 
the specimen associated with the earliest specimen date known, compared with the frequency of specimen 
types after the application of the specimen hierarchy. Blood specimens, which were ordered first in the 
hierarchy, have increased by 5,381, whereas skin/wound specimens have decreased by 6,064, and the 
number of “unknown” specimen sites has decreased by 3,164. In one example of a “BLOOD” specimen 
being promoted above previously reported “SKIN/WOUND” specimens, six specimens were taken within 17 
days of the first report. Five “SKIN/WOUND” swabs were taken within ten days of the first specimen, with a 
blood culture specimen taken seven days after the last skin/wound report. Although the blood culture 
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specimen was taken more than 14 days after the first skin/wound swab taken, the bacteraemia case is 
included within the same OPIE due to the cumulative nature of the OPIE assignment. After the application 
of the specimen hierarchy, the record relating to the blood specimen is retained as the primary report for 
that OPIE.  
 
There are occasions where records contain several distinct specimen site descriptions, although these 
appear to be similar specimen sites. For example, a “SKIN/WOUND” may be reported initially, then a 
“WOUND (TRAUMATIC)” specimen subsequent to that. It is difficult to determine if the samples taken from 
the patient relate to the same site of infection, or different specimen sites. It is possible that these reports 
do relate to the same site but the coding used to report is inconsistent. Grouping of specimen sites into 
parent specimen categories helps overcome these discrepancies. 
 
Figure 3.6: Distribution of specimen types reported to LabBase2 for each region 
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 BEFORE HIERARCHY AFTER HIERARCHY 
Specimen group description Frequency Percent (%) Frequency Percent (%) 
Skin/wound 385,456 22.6 379,392 22.3 
Blood 354,005 20.8 359,386 21.1 
Urine/kidney 341,217 20.0 342,248 20.1 
Lower respiratory tract 237,892 14.0 238,452 14.0 
Gastro-intestinal tract 171,254 10.0 171,564 10.1 
Upper respiratory tract 52,769 3.1 54,360 3.2 
Genital tract 50,542 3.0 49,402 2.9 
Pus/abscess/tissue (undefined) 33,911 2.0 37,371 2.2 
Unknown 21,232 1.2 18,068 1.1 
Eye 15,860 0.9 15,362 0.9 
Ear 9,336 0.5 9,149 0.5 
Intra-vascular line 6,490 0.4 7,006 0.4 
Bone/joint 5,297 0.3 5,383 0.3 
Fluid (not specified) 4,795 0.3 4,258 0.2 
Other 3,718 0.2 3,275 0.2 
Peritoneum 3,716 0.2 3,460 0.2 
Central nervous system 2,791 0.2 2,564 0.2 
Umbilicus 1,941 0.1 1,858 0.1 
Breast 1,166 0.1 1,058 0.1 
Oral 964 0.1 837 0.0 
Aspiration (unspecified) 774 0.0 673 0.0 
Total 1,705,126 100 1,705,126 100 
Table 3.8: Frequency of reported specimen types before and after the implementation of the specimen 
hierarchy 
 
There was a 17.5% increase in the weekly total number of reports across all isolates (95% CI 13.8-21.4%, 
p<0.001) after the implementation of the Regulations in October 2010. Figure 3.7 illustrates the total 
number of reports made by all trusts for all organisms between March 2007 and May 2012, highlighting the 
point at which the new Regulations were imposed. Reporting appears to have increased over time, with a 
noticeable increase in reporting post-October 2010. However, this increase was not observed in all trusts, 
with 54 laboratories seeing a statistically significant decrease in reporting after October 2010 (full details 
can be found in Appendix 7). 
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“October 2010” indicates when Regulation 4 of The Health Protection (Notifications) Regulations 2010 came into force  
Figure 3.7: Total number of reports made to LabBase2 (March 2007 – May 2012) 
 
3.4.2 Reporting delays 
Reports on Mycobacterium spp. were not included in the reporting delay analysis due to the long time 
period necessary in the identification of this pathogen. 12,758 reports had an earliest specimen date prior 
to 2007 recorded, with one report displaying an earliest specimen date of 18/09/1998. The median 
reporting delay across all trusts was 9 days (range 0 – 3,666; IQR 6 – 16). Although the median delay seems 
reasonable and most reports are made within the 21 day reporting delay limit PHE request all reports are 
submitted by, when investigated at trust level median delay times vary considerably. Seventy-five 
laboratories (44.9%) report in a timely manner, with greater than 90% of reports submitted to the national 
system within 21 days of the earliest specimen date. However, excessive delays (90th centile greater than 
100 days) occurred in 12 trusts. Figure 3.8 displays the distribution of median reporting delays across all 
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trusts. Differences in reporting delays were observed regionally. Table 3.9 summarises the median and 90th 
centiles for the delay distributions observed pre- and post-October 2010.  
 
Figure 3.8: Median reporting delay across all trusts (*reporting delays censored at 50 days if actual delay 
greater than 50, n=7) 
Region Pre-October 2010 
delay – median (IQR) 
(days) 
Post-October 2010 
delay – median  
(IQR) (days) 
Pre-October 2010 
delay – 90
th
 centile 
(days) 
Post-October 2010 
delay  – 90
th
 centile 
(days) 
East Midlands 8 (5 – 23) 8 (5 – 12) 71 219 
East of England 11 (9 – 16) 11 (8 – 16) 23 26 
London 23 (8 – 107) 11 (7 – 17) 234 31 
North East 11 (7 – 22) 7 (5 – 11) 49 17 
North West 8 (6 – 14) 8 (6 – 11) 24 18 
South East 9 (6 – 13) 8 (6 – 11) 21 15 
South West 8 (6 – 15) 6 (5 – 8) 35 10 
Wales 13 (9 – 18) 11 (8 – 14) 27 21 
West Midlands 7 (5 – 10) 7 (5 – 9) 14 12 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
9 (7 – 12) 7 (5 – 9) 17 11 
Table 3.9: Delay centiles (90th percentile) before and after October 2010 by Region  
Reporting delays varied considerably across trusts. The differences observed in reporting habits can be 
clearly seen in Figure 3.9, which compares the delay distribution of one laboratory reporting greater than 
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90% of cases within three weeks, as opposed to one laboratory exhibiting excessive reporting delays (>40% 
of reports with delays of more than 10 weeks).  
 
Note, in these examples reporting delays of greater than ten weeks have been censored at ten weeks for the purpose 
of analysis. 
Figure 3.9: Comparison of reporting delay distributions between two laboratories 
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Results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis showed a significant improvement in reporting delays in 128 
trusts after Regulation 4 of The Health Protection (Notifications) Regulations 2010 was introduced. This 
reflects a reduction in median delay time observed pre- and post-October 2010 at ten days (IQR 7 – 21 
days) and eight days (IQR 6 – 12 days) respectively. Appendix 8 contains the differences observed in 
reporting delay at the trust level.  
 
3.4.3 Antimicrobial susceptibilities 
A number of organism-antimicrobial susceptibility queries were prepared. The proportion of susceptibility 
results available in LabBase2 varied depending on the organism and antimicrobials being investigated. Of 
the 510,600 reports of S. aureus made in the five-year period, 452,284 (88.6%) contained sensitivity data on 
selected antimicrobials used as indicators for MRSA (methicillin, cefoxitin, cloxacillin, flucloxacillin and 
oxacillin). However, susceptibility results were not well reported across all organisms investigated, with 
only 36.2% of Proteus spp. reports containing any information on carbapenem (imipenem, meropenem or 
ertapenem) susceptibility.  Table 3.10 shows the proportion of organisms tested against specific 
antimicrobials, and the number of organisms found to be resistant to any of the listed antibiotics. The lack 
of standardisation of laboratory procedures means that different laboratories will use different 
antimicrobials for susceptibility testing. In addition, LabBase2 only contains sensitivity results included in 
reports prepared for clinicians at the trust and so all antimicrobial susceptibility results may not be 
reported. 
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Organism Total number of 
reports 
Antimicrobials Number of organisms 
tested (%) 
Number of resistant 
organisms (%) 
Klebsiella spp. 51,410 Gentamicin OR 
Ciprofloxacin 
42,854 (83.4) 2,772 (6.5)* 
Escherichia coli 367,304 251,706 (68.5) 16,261 (6.5)* 
Klebsiella spp. 51,410 Cefotaxime OR 
Ceftazidime OR 
Ceftriaxone OR 
Cefpodoxime 
38,800 (75.5) 6,453 (16.6) 
Escherichia coli 367,304 225,108 (61.3) 37,375 (16.6) 
Klebsiella spp. 51,410 Imipenem OR 
Meropenem OR 
Ertapenem 
33,669 (65.5) 228 (0.7) 
Escherichia coli 367,304 155,412 (42.3) 340 (0.2) 
Proteus spp. 40,912 14,805 (36.2) 71 (0.5) 
Providentia spp. 737 477 (64.7) 4 (0.8) 
Citrobacter spp. 8,415 5,753 (68.4) 34 (0.6) 
Morganella spp. 4,441 3,094 (69.7) 26 (0.8) 
Enterobacter spp. 23,465 16,562 (70.6) 231 (1.4) 
Kluyvera spp. 152 83 (54.6) 1 (1.2) 
Serratia spp. 8,978 6,492 (72.3) 23 (0.4) 
Staphylococcus 
aureus 
510,600 Methicillin OR 
Cefoxitin OR 
Cloxacillin OR 
Flucloxacillin OR 
Oxacillin  
452,284 (88.6)  141,254 (31.2)  
Enterococcus spp. 107,624 Vancomycin 53,178 (49.4) 4,899 (9.2) 
* resistant to both antimicrobials 
Table 3.10: Proportion of isolates resistant to specified antimicrobials 
 
3.5. Discussion  
The implementation of a standardised and centralised system for outbreak detection at the trust level is 
required to provide the capability of detecting previously unrecognised outbreaks. This is complicated by 
the variation in reporting behaviours exhibited by laboratories, which may partly be explained by 
differences in the interpretation of the guidelines, or due to differences in practices across trusts e.g. 
variations in practices around taking blood cultures. Inconsistency in reporting will limit the performance of 
outbreak detection systems at the trust level. If a trust chooses only to report on a limited number of 
organisms, but reports in a consistent and timely manner, results from outbreak detection algorithms could 
provide useful information. However, if a laboratory’s reporting behaviour varies over time this will result 
in the generation of unreliable expected values and thresholds data upon which to call exceptions; this can 
lead to an increase in the number of false outbreaks detected or failure in recognising true outbreaks. 
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Furthermore, the ever changing landscape of the NHS, including laboratory closures and trust mergers, will 
have a profound impact on the data received through automated surveillance. Dramatic increases and 
decreases in reporting observed in many trusts may reflect these changes, and although these should be 
acknowledged, they should not affect the ability of automated algorithms in the detection of outbreaks. 
The evolution of laboratory techniques may also affect the application of outbreak detection methods; with 
the potential adoption of rapid detection methods and near-patient testing, standard microbiology reports 
may no longer be produced in some circumstances. In contrast, local situations may dictate that screening 
programmes or other methods of enhanced surveillance be introduced for a period of time, artificially 
inflating the number of specific organisms being reported. According to the HPA Guidelines for Diagnostic 
Laboratories, only clinically relevant organisms should be reported, however, additional information 
required to determine clinical relevance may not always be readily available and laboratories may therefore 
report non-clinically relevant isolates. 
 
Reports within the data extract also included specimens sent from healthcare settings outside of the 
hospital, such as General Practice surgeries. With so many reports lacking information on patient location 
at the time of specimen (42.4%) it is not possible to exclude records reported to the system by patient 
location. Although this means that specimens sent from patients seen in primary care settings are included 
in the analysis, it does allow trusts to gain some insight into the epidemiology of pathogens in the 
community setting, which have the potential to impact on the hospital population.  
 
The lack of standardisation of laboratory procedures means that different laboratories will use different 
antimicrobials for susceptibility testing. Variation in laboratory practices will therefore affect which 
antimicrobials are reported following susceptibility testing. Comparability of results is further complicated 
by the adoption of different susceptibility testing methods by laboratories. Differences in the 
methodologies detailed by the European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST), the 
British Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (BSAC) and the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute 
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(CLSI) will introduce inherent differences in the identification and therefore reporting of antimicrobial 
resistance. Additionally, susceptibility results are only made available to LabBase2 if the results have been 
“authorised” (these are sensitivity results that the microbiologist decides the clinician should see). In these 
circumstances sensitivity results will only be available on a limited number of antimicrobials. It may 
therefore be more appropriate that AmSurv, a surveillance system within PHE designed specifically for 
capturing information on all antimicrobial susceptibility testing, be employed in detecting outbreaks of 
antimicrobial resistant bacteria.  
 
A standard procedure for the establishment of new surveillance initiatives could have helped to avoid 
incorrect data initially being used in the anlaysis. Besides the incorrect application of an antimicrobial filter 
to all organisms required for TLE reporting, there was some confusion around the use of methicillin for the 
identification of MRSA in LabBase2. The original data set only requested that a methicillin-resistant result 
would be used in determining if a S. aureus report actually represented a case of MRSA. As other 
antimicrobials, such as cefoxitin and flucloxacillin, are used by laboratories to indicate that an isolate of S. 
aureus may be MRSA, it seemed unusual that only methicillin resistance be used in the definition applied to 
LabBase2 data. Liaising with members of staff within the HCAI & AMR and Information Management 
departments eventually revealed that the generic version of the antimicrobial methicillin was being used by 
the HCAI & AMR department to identify cases of MRSA. This was not clear from the word document issued 
at the beginning of the evaluation, and was not being used in the weekly extracts prepared for TLE 
reporting. A new data extract was subsequently requested, using generic methicillin, which includes 12 
different antimicrobials used in the identification of MRSA, including: methicillin, flucloxacillin, cefoxitin, 
oxacillin and cloxacillin. In the Results section of this chapter it is reported that 88.6% of S. aureus reports 
contained a susceptibility result for at least one antimicrobial listed in Table 3.10; this proportion was much 
lower when the incorrect data extract was initially analysed, with only 31.6% of S. aureus reports including 
a susceptibility result for methicillin alone.  
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The next chapter explores a wider range of methods suitable for outbreak detection and investigates which 
approaches are most appropriate for outbreak detection at the trust level. While it is attractive to attempt 
to use the same detection algorithm for all organisms, consideration needs to be given as to whether 
employing organism specific detection algorithms would be more appropriate in situations where, for 
example, small numbers are reported on a weekly basis. Different date variables used for analysis will also 
be investigated. The national exceedance algorithm currently analyses data according to the date loaded, 
which is vulnerable to issues related to batch-reporting, such as the identification of false outbreaks. 
Therefore both earliest specimen date and date loaded will be used in the exceedance algorithms in the 
next chapter.  
 
Although there are targets in terms of reporting to the central surveillance system outlined in “Laboratory 
Reporting to the Health Protection Agency: Guide for Diagnostic Laboratories”, it does not appear that all 
laboratories are achieving these targets. This evaluation has identified several issues with how laboratories 
report to LabBase2; less than half of laboratories submit reports in a timely manner; there is variation in 
the numbers of reports being made across trusts of similar size and; there are differences in the specimen 
types being reported across regions. Results from the analysis presented in this chapter indicate that 
timeliness in reporting has improved, but there is little evidence to suggest that data completeness has 
improved; the proportion of reports either missing or recording an “unknown” patient location at time of 
specimen increased yearly within the analysis period (2007=37.0%, 2008=36.8%, 2009=39.2%, 2010=45.5%, 
2011=47.4%, 2012=50.7%). Ultimately, the performance of the outbreak detection algorithms depends on 
the quality of data received via the voluntary reporting system. For any prospective outbreak detection to 
perform optimally it is crucial that laboratories address these issues to ensure that the data submitted is 
complete, consistent and timely. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE OF STATISTICAL MODELS APPLIED TO DATA 
EXTRACTED FROM THE NATIONAL VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEM 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The data evaluation performed in the previous chapter identified several issues associated with using data 
reported at the trust level. Based on these findings it is evident that that only a small number of trusts 
currently have data of high enough quality for reliable TLE reporting.  
 
The original plan for this chapter was to apply a selection of outbreak detection methods to data reported 
from ICHT to LabBase2, then compare these results with the performance of outbreak detection algorithms 
using data available directly from the trust’s LIMS in Chapter 6. Although the reporting delays exhibited by 
ICHT were found to be excessive in the data evaluation (49.4% of reports with delays of greater than or 
equal to 10 weeks), there were a large number of reports made in the five year study period (51,525). 
Other indicators for using ICHT data initially suggested that use of the data would be appropriate for this 
section, with consistent reporting across the pre- and post-October 2010 periods and a significant 
reduction in reporting delay after the implementation of The Health Protection (Notifications) Regulations 
2010 (median delay pre-October 2010 = 108 days, median delay post-October 2010 = 15 days, p<0.001). 
Prior to the application of models to ICHT data a basic time-series plot was created (Figure 4.1.) 
 95 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Weekly count of all organisms reported to LabBase2 by ICHT, March 2009 – February 2012 
 
It is clear to see from Figure 4.1 that there were two dramatic decreases in reporting; the first occurred 
between May 2010 and September 2010 and the second between July 2011 up to the end of the time 
period included in analysis (February 2012). With such low levels of reporting during the time period 
intended for use in the generation of expected weekly counts and the time period for outbreak detection 
analysis, it was not possible to use data reported by ICHT in this chapter. As a consequence it was decided 
that an exemplar trust exhibiting consistent and timely reporting across a range of organisms would be 
selected and data from this trust would be used to investigate the performance of a variety of outbreak 
detection methods. 
 
4.2. Objectives 
 Summarise the literature on the application of outbreak detection methods in the healthcare 
setting 
 Describe and identify a trust reporting in a timely and consistent manner to LabBase2 
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 Describe the differences in performance of statistical algorithms for outbreak detection 
 Determine which parameters are most suitable for use in outbreak detection models at the trust 
level 
 Explore the use of statistical quality control methods, particularly cumulative sum and variable life 
adjusted display approaches, to assess the existence of small shifts in the observed number of 
cases 
 
4.3. Literature review: Outbreak detection 
A comprehensive systematic literature review on the utility of electronic methods for the surveillance of 
HCAI was presented in Chapter 2. As reported in Figure 2.1 (page 42), 48 papers on outbreak detection 
were also identified in the search results. Of the 48 articles identified and assessed, 17 have been fully 
reviewed and are summarised in this section. Articles were excluded from this review if the methods 
presented were not relevant to surveillance data available for TLE or if the research focused on infectious 
disease issues outside of the healthcare setting (n=27). One search result was excluded as it was a 
conference abstract, a further two were excluded as they were only available in Japanese, and one of the 
relevant articles was excluded as the methods presented were not clear and the paper was poorly written. 
As previously mentioned, a comprehensive review on outbreak detection methods has recently been 
published by Unkel et al. (78). The purpose of the review presented here is to provide a context for the 
chapter and, more importantly, help identify outbreak detection methods most suitable for application at 
the hospital level. 
 
Widdowson et al. recognised the role of national surveillance systems in detecting outbreaks locally, 
nationally and internationally, which may not be detected through the use of local, independently-run 
systems (141). They also support the surveillance of a wide range of pathogens to help identify emerging 
diseases, rather than focussing on known issues. The system proposed by this group, based in the 
Netherlands, is similar to the weekly LabBase Exceedance Reporting that currently exists in England, 
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involving the application of an automated outbreak detection algorithm to laboratory data submitted 
voluntarily to a central surveillance system. The initial proposals by Widdowson et al. suggest the use of a 
modified Farrington algorithm in the new system, however, a paper published by another group within the 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) several years later found that a hierarchical 
time series modelling approach may be preferable (142). The authors describe several benefits associated 
with the hierarchical time series method, including the model’s ability to detect relative increases in reports 
as well as absolute exceedances, and the reduced training period required compared to the Farrington 
algorithm (one year versus three years of historical data). 
 
4.3.1. Comparison of outbreak detection methods 
Many of the studies included the comparison of different methods for outbreak detection, with several 
authors investigating the performance of a space-time scan statistic (STSS) for outbreak detection. Kuldorff 
et al. proposed a prospective space-time permutation scan statistic, SaTScan, which required only case 
numbers for the early detection of disease outbreaks (143). The method had been previously proposed by 
Kuldorff in 1997 (144) and the computer program is freely available to download (145). In the paper 
reviewed here the authors focus on the application of the method. A computer algorithm was used to 
search free-text reports to identify “syndromes” of interest e.g. text indicating the presence of diarrhoeal 
disease. The scan statistic uses the case information and spatial information, such as postal codes, thus 
creating an outbreak detection algorithm incorporating space and time parameters. The method uses a 
two-stage process; firstly, the STSS searches the study area to identify the circular region most likely to 
represent a disease cluster, assuming that the disease follows either a Bernoulli or Poisson distribution and; 
secondly, the model estimates the statistical significance of a cluster using Monte Carlo hypothesis testing 
(which is particularly computer intensive). The size of the area analysed and the number of days for 
inclusion in the model can be adjusted depending on the infectious agent under investigation. Kuldorff et 
al. recommend exploiting the increasing availability of timely electronic surveillance data through the 
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application of automated outbreak detection methods rather than relying on physicians and other 
healthcare workers to recognise exceptional events. 
 
 Wang et al. compared the performance of five outbreak detection algorithms, including Kuldorff’s STSS 
(146). The other methods evaluated included an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) method 
and three cumulative sum (cusum) methods. For each model employed, parameters were optimised; the 
authors emphasise the importance of parameter optimisation and stress that this should be performed 
prior to the evaluation of the performance of algorithms. Wang et al. found that the STSS performed better 
than the EWMA and cusum methodologies, with a reported specificity of 99.9%. They also found that the 
STSS outperformed the EWMA and cusum in terms of timeliness, supporting earlier findings of a study by 
Levin et al., who found that cusum methods detected potential outbreaks later than the other methods 
they investigated (147). 
 
Huang et al. raise many issues with using rule-based thresholds for outbreak detection i.e. defining an 
outbreak based on arbitrary criteria such as the number of patients with an infection within a defined time 
period (11). They therefore recommend using automated statistical methods for cluster detection, which 
would allow infection control teams to expand outbreak detection to include all pathogens at any hospital 
location. The authors use WHONET-SaTScan to identify clusters of infection. This method was compared to 
routine infection control methods, specifically comparing WHONET-SaTScan results with clusters of MRSA 
and GRE identified using rule-based criteria (three or more nosocomial cases within two weeks on the same 
ward). Many more MRSA and GRE alerts were generated using the rule based method (73 and 87, 
respectively) compared with alerts generated by WHONET-SaTScan (seven alerts for MRSA and four for 
GRE). Only one of the WHONET-SaTScan alerts was identified using the rule-based method. Huang et al. 
conclude that the automated method outperformed the infection control surveillance system; WHONET-
SaTScan was found to provide more comprehensive surveillance as it was less labour-intensive and the 
identification of clusters based on statistical significance was considered to improve the likelihood that the 
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incidents identified were the result of healthcare-associated transmission events. The comparison of these 
methods highlights the potential misallocation of resources when infection control teams react to alerts 
resulting from rule-based criteria, as these alerts may not actually represent a true infection cluster but 
rather random variation. 
 
Wright et al. also compared the performance of an automated outbreak detection method with suspected 
outbreaks identified by the local infection prevention and control team (12). Control charts were applied to 
electronically-stored laboratory data, incorporating denominator data in the form of patient-days. Alerts 
were generated if the observed number of cases exceeded three standard deviations above the mean level. 
Eighteen alerts were generated by the control charts during the study period and 11 of these were 
determined to represent potential outbreak situations by two independent reviewers (infection control 
practitioners). During the same time period, routine infection control surveillance only identified five 
potential outbreak situations, all of which were identified by the automated method. In contrast to the 
conclusions made by Huang et al. above, this study highlights that infection control teams may miss 
outbreak situations when using traditional methodologies. 
 
Carnevale et al. compared a range of methods for outbreak detection, specifically they investigated cusum, 
EWMA, Kuldorff’s STSS and WSARE (what’s strange about recent events) methods (148). The hospital’s 
infection control team had previously identified five suspected outbreak clusters during the study period, 
but none of these clusters were detected by any of the algorithms investigated. A “gold standard” outbreak 
data set containing 29 outbreaks was generated. For all algorithms evaluated, the PPV relative to the study-
devised “gold standard” was low (5.3% to 29.0%), with sensitivities ranging from 21-31%. The authors 
concluded that the lack of consensus among alerts generated by algorithms and the excessive false positive 
rate (FPR) suggested that none of the four algorithms evaluated could act as a reliable tool for outbreak 
detection. 
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Morton et al. also criticised the use of certain methods often employed for outbreak detection and 
believed that although the use of control charts may be appropriate for the analysis of certain adverse 
events, such as SSI rates, it may not be appropriate in situations where autocorrelation may be present, 
such as in the occurrence of MDRO (149). The authors used prevalence data on cases of community-
acquired MRSA in Shewart control charts with control limits calculated using the negative binomial 
distribution since the occurrence of cases is not independent and therefore the variation is too large to 
apply Poisson-based control limits. The authors criticise the use of control charts for numerous adverse 
events due to the lack of independence of events and instead suggest the use of spline-regression and 
generalised additive models since autocorrelation terms can be incorporated into these methods. 
 
Hacek et al. compared the performance of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) tool using two standard 
deviations as the upper limit (UL) threshold for outbreak detection, a tool using a rolling three-month 
analysis period and manual outbreak detection methods employed by an infection control team (10). None 
of the methods appeared to perform particularly well; sensitivities ranged from 42.9% to 57.1%, with 
specificities ranging from 16.7% to 83.3%. The authors also emphasise that there is a need to develop 
statistical “rules” which should be applied to surveillance data to standardise outbreak detection. 
 
Although cusum methods were often criticised for not identifying potential outbreaks in a timely manner, 
Menotti et al. describe the use of a cusum methodology to provide a statistically-based evaluation of the 
incidence of invasive aspergillosis (150). They claim that the method offers “a simple formulation and 
intuitive representation” which allows the detection of small but persistent changes. The method described 
is not that of the traditional cusum (151); Menotti’s method involved the use of weights (a measure of the 
deviation of each observed count from the target or expected count) and a learning-curve cusum, which 
was employed when the original cusum test detected an incidence above the decision limit. The method 
was applied prospectively on a monthly basis and in September 2005 the cusum crossed the decision limit. 
At this point the learning-curve cusum was employed to test for a significant decrease in the monthly 
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incidence. For eight months the learning-curve cusum stayed above the limit, indicating that the incidence 
of nosocomial invasive aspergillosis was at an unacceptable level. The authors concluded that their cusum 
method proved helpful in interpreting the epidemiology of nosocomial invasive aspergillosis and 
recommended the method for detecting rare events and moderate changes over time. 
 
4.3.2. Alternative approaches to outbreak detection 
Other approaches to automated outbreak detection beyond STSS, control chart-based methods and time-
series were described in the literature. Lamma et al. present a method that relied on antimicrobial 
susceptibility results (152). Infections were counted and clustered depending on isolate antibiograms, with 
strains identified as the same if the difference between antibiograms was less that 30%. The authors did 
not describe any threshold in terms of expected or UL counts in their paper and concentrated only on the 
clustering of infections based on resistance data. 
 
Brosette et al. acknowledge that extensive analysis of hospital data for the early detection of outbreaks and 
emerging resistance is not practical, with hospital epidemiologists often not having the considerable 
amount of time and resources available to carry out active surveillance (153). The method presented in this 
study was designed to automatically detect patterns of infection and resistances, thus reducing the amount 
of time required to identify unusual patterns of resistance. The method is described in detail in the article, 
but essentially involves the use of current and past “windows” of time. The proportion of particular events 
in the past and current window periods were compared through the use of a statistical test of two 
proportions, which may or may not suggest a change in incidence over time. The method presented by this 
group is different to those typically described in the literature and the authors conclude that this approach 
would be best used in combination with methods that detect outbreaks based on time-series data. 
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4.3.3. Method selection and interpretation of results 
There are other issues around the application of outbreak detection algorithms to surveillance data besides 
the actual performance of methods. Buckeridge et al. presented a classification of algorithms for outbreak 
detection based on their functional characteristics to help surveillance practitioners and staff select the 
most appropriate method for the data being analysed (154). The authors recognised the complexities 
associated with prospective outbreak detection using surveillance data, such as selecting the most 
appropriate method for forecasting expected data values and ensuring that there is a suitable gap between 
the historical and test data. They also discussed the fact that methods used in manufacturing, such as 
statistical process control (SPC) charts, often required adaptation when applied to infectious disease 
surveillance data. Supporting the findings described in Chapter 3, Buckeridge et al. also discuss the 
limitations of using surveillance data, specifically inconsistency in reporting of cases, which can impact on 
the algorithm’s ability to accurately and efficiently detect outbreaks. After identifying and discussing 
several issues associated with the use of SPC methods in this research synthesis, Buckeridge et al. went on 
to compare the performance of three algorithms closely related to SPC methods, recommending that a 
guard band parameter should be included in methods to improve the sensitivity for the detection of 
outbreak signals (155).  
 
Beyond the identification of potential outbreaks by automated systems, staff responsible for reacting to 
alerts need to be able to interpret the findings to appropriately respond to outbreak situations. Pelat et al. 
presented a user-friendly tool to facilitate public health practitioners in the rapid investigation of epidemics 
through the application of complex statistical methods (156).  The authors describe how they developed 
software that was available online along with guidance on how to operate the program. End-users were 
able to select and apply a range of parameters to their data through a user-friendly interface. The authors 
believed that one of the most important features of the online tool was that it allowed front-line 
practitioners to interpret data and make inferences from the analysis of results without possessing a 
detailed knowledge of statistical software packages. 
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In addition, Wieland et al. raise an important issue around the variability of model specificity depending on 
the day of the week, month and year of the study data (157). The authors argue that public health 
practitioners cannot respond to alarms generated from a system appropriately if they do not know the 
specificity of an algorithm on any given day. As a consequence, Wieland et al. developed a method that not 
only models the expected number of cases based on historical data, but also the daily variance of cases, 
which  they hoped will enhance the ability of public health practitioners to interpret alarms generated by 
outbreak detection systems. 
 
There are many methods available for use in automated outbreak detection. At the end of their 
comprehensive review, Unkel et al.  explain that that it is not possible to determine the “best” method as 
this depends on several factors, such as; the scope of the system; the quality of the data; the count 
frequency; features of potential outbreaks and; the availability of resources, amongst other issues (78). 
From the brief review presented above there appears to be little consensus on what constitutes the “best” 
approach for outbreak detection and therefore a range of methods will be investigated, which are 
described in the following section. 
 
4.4. Methods 
4.4.1. Identification of trust demonstrating high-quality reporting 
As discovered in the previous chapter, there is wide variability in how laboratories report to the national 
microbiological surveillance system, LabBase2. As mentioned, data from ICHT cannot be used in this section 
of the thesis and therefore a trust exhibiting reporting behaviours suitable for investigation into the 
performance of various outbreak detection methods needed to be identified. Six criteria were selected to 
help identify potential trusts, which are detailed in Table 4.1. These criteria were chosen as they 
represented data properties associated with diverse, consistent and timely reporting. 
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Criteria 1 Trusts must have made more than 10,000 reports in the five year period analysed in the data 
evaluation 
Criteria 2 Only those with greater than 90% of reports submitted within three weeks of the earliest 
specimen date were to be considered 
Criteria 3 Stable or increased reporting must have been observed after the implementation of 
Regulation 4 of The Health Protection (Notifications) Regulations 2010 i.e. post October 2010 
Criteria 4 The variance in reporting divided by the mean should be less than 10 
Criteria 5 The coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) should be within the 
top one-third of trusts (i.e. low coefficient of variation) 
Criteria 6 The trust should have reported on a diverse range of organisms. The result from calculating 
Simpson’s diversity index does not need to be one of the smallest values across all trusts as it 
should reflect population epidemiology i.e. we would expect higher numbers of S. aureus and 
E. coli as these organisms are more commonly isolated from hospital patients than other 
organisms, such as A. baumannii.  
Table 4.1: Criteria used to identify trust data for use in outbreak detection methods 
 
Criteria 1, 2 and 3 were based on the findings from the data evaluation at the trust level presented in the 
previous chapter and documented in appendices 5, 6 and 7. Criteria 4, 5 and 6 were selected based on the 
comparison of results across all trusts that had reported to LabBase2 in the time period 1st November 2010 
to 30th September 2012, and may therefore be considered arbitrary.  
 
4.4.2. Organism selection and data extraction 
Consultation with the ICHT Director of Infection Prevention and Control, one of the nurses from the 
Infection Prevention and Control Team and one of the trust’s Infectious Diseases and Medical Microbiology 
Registrars resulted in the agreement of a list of organisms for inclusion in outbreak detection, which can be 
found in Table 4.2. It was agreed that these represented organisms of most interest in the hospital setting. 
Invasive specimen sites were determined according to the guidelines “Laboratory Reporting to the Health 
Protection Agency: Guide for Diagnostic Laboratories” (138). 
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Organisms for outbreak detection 
Acinetobacter baumannii Enterococcus faecium 
Clostridium difficile Streptococcus pyogenes (invasive infection, iGAS) 
Enterobacter aerogenes Klebsiella pneumoniae 
Enterobacter cloacae Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Escherichia coli Staphylococcus aureus 
Enterococcus faecalis Stenotrophomonas maltophilia 
iGAS, invasive Group A Streptococci 
Table 4.2: Organisms included in outbreak detection analysis 
 
The outbreak detection methods described below were applied to data sets on all organisms listed in the 
table above. Data was extracted from LabBase2 for all reports with an earliest specimen date between 1st 
November 2007 and 31st October 2012. The file “isoweek.ado” was used to extract the week and year 
components from the earliest specimen date so that weekly counts of reports could be generated. This file 
assigns each report a week and year value based on the ISO week date system. The ISO week-numbering 
system will result in years having 52 or 53 weeks, with each new week staring on a Monday. As the 1st 
November 2007 was a Thursday, the first week included in analysis was changed to start on Monday 27th 
October 2007 (a new data extract was therefore required). The last Sunday included in the analysis was the 
28th October 2012. In total, 260 weeks of data were used in the outbreak detection models. 
 
4.4.3. Outbreak detection methods 
The literature review presented earlier in this chapter described a range of methods available for outbreak 
detection. Many authors explored the use of a STSS, which involves modelling data based on the Poisson 
distribution. The assumption that infectious disease data can be approximated using the Poisson 
distribution has been criticised by other authors and the application of Poisson-based methods are often 
considered to be inappropriate due to the high levels of over-dispersion observed as these events are not 
always independent (149). However, it was decided that Poisson regression modelling at the trust level was 
worth investigating as some of the rarely reported organisms may indeed be approximated by a Poisson 
distribution as it is more likely that these events would occur independently. To account for the large 
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variances related to over-dispersed data, a quasi-Poisson model was also investigated which incorporates 
the over-dispersion parameter, phi (φ). 
 
As the Farrington algorithm has been used for outbreak detection by PHE at the national and regional level 
for many years (139;158), it was decided that this method would also be applied to data at the trust level. 
The high FPR associated with this method has resulted in it being criticised recently by those that rely on 
the results produced by the LabBase Exceedance Reporting. Therefore, the application of the updated and 
improved version of this algorithm as described by Noufaily et al. was also included in the analysis (140). 
 
Several authors explored the use of cusums, and although this approach was not found to be the best 
method for use in outbreak detection (146-148), some authors did acknowledge their potential for use in 
the identification of small but consistent shifts in the rate or occurrence of cases over time (150). At the 
most basic level of trend analysis, variable life adjusted display (VLAD) charts were also prepared for all 
organisms investigated. Full details of all methods used are described in the following sections. 
 
4.4.3.1. Poisson and quasi-Poisson regression modelling 
The Poisson distribution is most appropriate for describing the number of occurrences of a particular event 
during a defined time period, provided that the events occur independently and randomly (159). The 
Poisson distribution describes the sampling distribution of the number of occurrences, d, during a period of 
time (e.g. week, month, year). It depends on just one parameter; the mean number of occurrences, μ, in 
time periods of the same length. The relationship of the parameter and variables are described in Equation 
4.1. 
Probability (d occurrences) = e-μ μd/d!       [Equation 4.1] 
The distribution is very skewed for small means (Figure 4.2), where there is a substantial probability that 
zero events will be observed within the defined time period, and may be an issue for rarely reported 
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organisms. However, the distribution is approximately symmetrical for larger means and is sufficiently 
approximated by the normal distribution if the mean is greater than or equal to 10 (Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.2: Poisson probability distribution when the mean value (μ) is one. (Adapted from (159)) 
 
Figure 4.3: Poisson probability distribution when the mean value (μ) is ten. (Adapted from (159))  
 
The assumption that outcome events occur independently of each other and randomly in time is less likely 
to be the case for infectious diseases; however, if there is no strong evidence of clustering, the use of the 
Poisson distribution can still be justified.  
 
A Poisson regression model for the weekly count of reports was performed, including factors for week and 
month, as shown in Equation 4.2. The month factor used was actually an approximation for month, splitting 
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the year into 13 equal four-week periods. This avoids making incorrect conclusions in the variation of 
reports between months consisting of more or less days. 
E[ln count ]  β0 + β1.week + β2.month2 + β3.month3 +  … + β13.month13 
[Equation 4.2] 
 
This model was run for all organisms included for analysis at trust level, as described in Table 4.2, and 
included the full five years’ worth of data available (week 44, 2007 to week 43, 2012). The expected count 
per week was generated using the Stata command predict immediately after the Poisson regression was 
performed. From this it was possible to generate the estimated upper and lower 95% data limits by 
multiplying the square root of the predicted count (which is the equivalent of the standard error of the 
mean for a Poisson distribution) by 1.96 and either adding or subtracting this value to the predicted count 
(Equation 4.3). 
    Upper limit: predicted_count + (1.96*√predicted_count       
                             Lower limit: predicted_count - (1.96*√predicted_count    [Equation 4.3] 
 
To account for any clustering observed, this Poisson regression model was scaled using the over-dispersion 
parameter φ, thus resulting in a quasi-Poisson model. Phi (φ) is the scaled deviance i.e. an estimate of the 
additional variance (when the variance>mean) beyond the traditional Poisson assumptions, and can be 
used to inflate the data limits as required. The parameter φ was extracted from the output of a glm 
(generalised linear model) command and was used to generate a new variance variable (Equation 4.4). 
generate variance = predicted_count * φ    [Equation 4.4] 
The square root of the variance was taken to produce the standard deviation, which was multiplied by 1.96 
and either added or subtracted to the predicted count to produce new upper and lower 95% data limits. 
 
Likelihood ratio (LR) tests were performed using Stata/SE Version 12 to compare the models and help 
identify if either trend or seasonality effects existed. The null hypothesis for each was that there was no 
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evidence of seasonality or trend. The null hypothesis was rejected if p was found to be >0.05 (5% 
significance level). 
 
4.4.3.2. The Farrington algorithm 
The algorithm used in the weekly national exceedance reporting performed at PHE was developed and first 
described by Farrington et al. in 1996 (139). In the paper the authors describe in detail a system developed 
to aid in the detection of outbreaks by applying an automated algorithm to surveillance data received by 
the then Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC, Public Health Laboratory Service). 
 
The algorithm was designed to be robust in the detection of outbreaks, or exceedances, across all 
organisms reported to the national system. The number of different organisms reported to the system is 
vast; an evaluation on data reported into LabBase2 between 1991 and 2011 found that there were 3303 
different organism types reported to the system (158). The algorithm was also developed with the 
intention of analysing data at the national and regional levels and thus large numbers of reports. This is 
obviously not the situation when performing outbreak detection at the trust level, where the average 
number of reports each week will be much smaller. 
 
There are five key aspects of the statistical model designed by Farrington et al, which are described below. 
Firstly, the model uses counts observed in comparable weeks in historical data to generate the expected 
count for the current week. This helps to adjust for seasonality often observed in infectious disease data. 
This method compares data uploaded in the present week with data loaded in the corresponding week, 
plus three weeks either side, for the previous five years. If x  is the current week in year y, then only data 
from weeks x  – 3 to x + 3 from years y – 5 to y – 1 will be used, giving a total of 35 historical values 
included in the model. 
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Secondly, a linear trend is included in the model if found to be significiant at the 5% level using the log-
linear model described in Equation 4.5: 
lo         +     
(N.B.:         ̂ ) 
[Equation 4.5] 
where    is the observed count in week   , and these counts are assumed to be independent. The 
estimated count in the current week is obtained as an “out of sample” forecast for the model with i set to 
the current week’s sequential number.  
 
Third, as the statistical model is a weighted quasi-Poisson model, the dispersion parameter φ (Equation 
4.6), is incorporated into the model. 
     {
 
   
 ∑  
 
   
 
      ̂  
 
 ̂ 
  } 
[Equation 4.6] 
where   is a weight parameter (described below),   =1 or   =2 depending on whether a time trend is 
fitted, and    is the observed count corresponding to the time point   . 
 
To correct for past outbreaks in the historical data, a re-weighting procedure was included in the model to 
reduce the effect of high historical counts on subsequent expected counts, and therefore values 
representing an exceedance. The weighting procedure for weights   at week    are defined by 
   {
   
  
 
 
[Equation 4.7] 
where γ is a constant such that ∑   
 
    = n and the    are scaled Anscombe residuals, as defined in 
Equation 4.8. For Poisson data, when no over-dispersion is observed, the    are standardised Anscombe 
residuals (160). 
 
if    >1, 
otherwise, 
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 [Equation 4.8] 
where     are diagonal elements of the hat matrix (i.e. the matrix used to estimate the expected values). 
The weighting function was chosen empirically so that very low weights were assigned to counts with large 
residuals. 
 
Finally, the threshold is generated based on the expected value for the current week, which is calculated 
based on the historical data as described above. To account for skewness associated with low mean weekly 
counts (as depicted in Figure 4.2) a   ⁄ -power transformation is applied. The prediction error variance on 
the   ⁄ -power scale is 
  r (  
 
 ⁄    ̂ 
 
 ⁄ )   
 
 
   
 
 ⁄   
[Equation 4.9] 
where    is the expected value,    is the observed count for the current week and  
   +   r  ̂      
[Equation 4.10] 
to account for the additional variance associated with infectious disease data (i.e. over-dispersion). The 
upper threshold limit (U) for the current week (  ) is therefore calculated as 
    ̂  { + 
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 ̂
 ̂ 
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 ⁄
}
 
 ⁄
 
[Equation 4.11] 
The weekly LabBase Exceedance Reporting uses a 99.5% UL to provide some control over the false positive 
error rate when so many organisms are simultaneously assessed; therefore a    value of 2.58 is used in the 
above calculation. As we are looking at far fewer organisms compared to the LabBase Exceedance 
Reporting, a less conservative limit can be set and therefore an UL value of 95%,    = 1.64 can be used 
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instead. This ensures that suspiciously high counts that exceed the threshold can be further assessed to 
confirm an outbreak. 
 
The Farrington algorithm was applied to five years’ of data extracted from LabBase2 from the end of 
October 2007 to October 2012. Data from the first three years (week 44, 2007 to week 43, 2010) was used 
to generate expected values (156 historical weeks), with the subsequent two years of data being assesed 
for outbreak detection (week 44, 2010 to week 43, 2012). Farrington et al. acknowledge the issue of 
reporting delays, an issue also identified from the evaluation performed and described in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. They recognised that differences in the delay distributions across different organisms would require 
organism-specific correction factors, which is not ideal for a system designed to be robust in the detection 
of outbreaks across multiple organisms. The authors felt that using the date of report eliminated biases 
associated with delays in reporting. The decision by the authors to use the date the report was loaded onto 
the system as opposed to the specimen date contradicts the conclusion I made as a result of my data 
evaluation. Therefore both “date loaded” and “earliest specimen date” variables will be used in the 
analysis. In addition, thresholds representing when observed reports were considered to be in exceedance 
of the expected number of cases were also compared (95% versus 99.5% UL).  
 
The algorithm had already been coded in Stata/SE Version 12 by two of the Statisticians working in PHE’s 
Statistics, Modelling and Economics Department as weekly TLE reporting based on the Farrington algorithm 
was already in progress. However, several amendments were required to generate retrospective output for 
all organisms under investigation in this study. 
 
4.4.3.3. The Noufaily algorithm 
In 2013 a number of improvements to the Farrington algorithm were described by Noufaily et al. (140). The 
paper describes several different approaches to be considered to address the high FPR exhibited by the 
original algorithm. Various models investigating a range of options for treatment of trend, seasonality, error 
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structure and down-weighting of previous outbreaks occurring in historical data years were created and 
investigated using 42 simulated scenarios.  
 
The current system employed at PHE does not recognise aberrances if less than five reports for a particular 
organism were received in the previous four weeks. The application of this criterion for TLE reporting is not 
appropriate, with much smaller numbers of cases observed at the trust level as opposed to the national 
and regional levels. The authors compared the inclusion and exclusion of this criterion when running the 
model and found that more exceedances were detected if the minimum number of reports in previous 
weeks’ condition was removed (1244 vs. 924). The final model proposed excludes the requirement of a 
minimum number of observations in weeks preceding the current week for analysis. 
 
It was noted that one limitation of the algorithm was the small number of historical data points used. The 
authors advocate using all data points available, minus data from the most current 26 weeks to avoid 
adjustment of the model to emerging outbreaks, which would reduce the model’s ability to detect actual 
outbreak situations. The other main component resulting in a high FPR identified by Noufaily et al. was the 
excessive down-weighting of previous outbreaks observed in the historical data. They therefore 
investigated re-weighting schemes when    > 1, 2 or 3. When models with these different values for    were 
considered, the highest FPR was observed when    > 1, the measure currently used in the system employed 
in the weekly LabBase Exceedance Reporting. Noufaily et al. therefore recommended using a higher 
threshold for re-weighting at    > 2.58. 
 
With much more data incorporated into generating the expected values through the use of more historical 
data points, trends and variance could be estimated better. Users of the system had previously reported a 
lack of consistency in results due to either the inclusion or exclusion of fitting a trend from week to week 
based on whether or not the trend was significant at the 5% level. Results of the simulation study 
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suggested that it was reasonable to fit a trend irrespective of its significance to avoid the occurrence of 
discrepancies in results from week to week.  
 
Although there was only a modest difference between the number of alerts generated when the quasi-
Poisson and negative binomial models were applied to actual data, it was accepted that it was reasonable 
to replace the quasi-Poisson model with the negative binomial (although this was not ideal in all 
circumstances). As a result, the UL in the improved model are calculated using the negative binomial 
distribution. The thresholds are generated in a step-wise process, with the threshold value moved to the 
integer where the probability of exceeding is either 0.5% or 5% depending on the UL being used in the 
model. 
 
Similar to the application of the original Farrington algorithm, data extracted from LabBase2 between the 
end of October 2007 and October 2012 was used in the improved algorithm described by Noufaily et al., 
with the first three years of data (156 historical data points) used to estimate expected counts and 
thresholds for the subsequent two years of data used in outbreak detection. One of the co-authors 
included in the Noufaily et al. study had already coded the algorithm in Stata/SE Version 12 and provided 
the code for use in this study. Again, modification to the code was required to generate output 
retrospectively.  
 
4.4.3.4. Cumulative sum and residual cumulative sum approaches 
As highlighted by Heisterkamp et al., the Farrington algorithm is designed to detect absolute exceedances 
(142). Cumulative sum approaches were therefore selected for further investigation in addition to the 
Farrington and Noufaily methods as they are more able to detect small, persistent shifts in reporting and 
have been recommended for the surveillance of rare events (150), which is more likely to be the case when 
carrying out surveillance at the trust level. 
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The cumulative sum (cusum) method was first described by Page in 1954 (161). The method used in this 
chapter is based on the use of cusum charts for the process mean, as described by Montgomery in 2005 
(151). In this situation, the process mean is in fact the observed weekly count of reports of organisms into 
LabBase2. One of the advantages of using a cusum method is that it directly incorporates all the 
information available over a defined time period. The cusum chart plots the cumulative sum of all the 
deviations of the observed values from a target (or expected) value.  
 
The cusum statistic,    is represented in Equation 4.12. Suppose    is the number of reports for the jth 
observation, if μ  is the target mean, the cumulative sum chart is created by plotting    
   ∑(    μ )
 
   
 
[Equation 4.12] 
against week number   ;    is the cumulative sum up to and including the ith week. If the number of 
reported cases remains in control at the target value of μ , the cusum defined in the equation above is 
described as a “random walk” with a mean of zero. However, if the mean shifts upwards to some value 
where μ > μ  then a positive trend in the cusum will develop, similarly, if the mean shifts downwards i.e. 
μ  < μ , then a negative trend in the cusum will arise. The target mean μ  was initially produced in one of 
two ways depending on the results of a regression analysis performed on the weeks comprising the 
historical data. A regression model of the count data over the 156 historical weeks was performed to 
identify organisms with decreasing counts over time. If   was less than zero in the regression model, the 
target mean μ  was taken to be the expected count at week 156, as predicted using the results of the 
regression analysis. If   was greater than zero, the target mean μ  was simply calculated as the mean count 
of reports over the 156 historical weeks.  
 
There are two ways to represent cusums; the tabular cusum and the V-mask cusum. As the tabular cusum 
was described as “preferable” by Montgomery, this was the representation selected. The tabular cusum 
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accumulates deviations from μ  that are above the target mean with the statistic  
  and accumulates 
deviations below the target mean with the statistic   . Calculation of statistics    and    are described in 
Equation 4.13a and Equation 4.13b, respectively: 
  
             μ +    +     
   
[Equation 4.13a] 
  
         μ         +     
   
[Equation 4.13b] 
Where    is the count in week   and the starting values are    
  =    
  = 0.  
 
K is the reference value and is often selected to represent half of the difference between the target mean, 
μ0, and the out-of-control mean, μ . For the cusum used in this analysis, it was decided that a mean shift of 
one standard deviation would be used. Hence μ  was calculated by adding the standard deviation 
calculated from using data in the historical time period to the mean number of weekly reports during the 
historical period. K is therefore best represented in Equation 4.14 as: 
  
 
 
 
  [Equation 4.14] 
Both   
  and    
  accumulate deviations from the target value that are greater than K, with both reset to 
zero on becoming negative. If either   
  or    
  exceed the decision limit H, the series is considered to be 
out of control and further investigation of the circumstances is required. H is often chosen to be 4 or 5 
times the standard deviation. When H=4σ or H=5σ  and K is employed as described above, the cusum will 
generally provide good average run length properties (similar to Shewart control charts employing the 2σ 
or 3σ limits) and detect a shift of about 1σ in the observed mean. A decision limit of H=4σ was chosen to 
ensure that the sensitivity of the method was prioritised. 
 
Where the   
  statistic breached the H=4σ threshold value the cusum mean recalculated to account for the 
downward shift in reports over time. This allowed the model to incorporate improvements observed in 
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organisms where the counts appeared to be decreasing. The same was not done if the   
  statistic 
breached the threshold as it was not intended that the model would adjust for increases in counts over 
time.  
 
In addition to cusum output generated using the raw data, a cusum incorporating data on residuals was 
also developed, similar to the use of “weights” as described in Menotti’s paper (150). Residuals were 
calculated using the results of the Noufaily algorithm. The observed count was subtracted from the 
expected value in the corresponding week for all weeks in the analysis period (week 157 onwards). These 
residuals were used in the cusum method described above i.e. rather than    representing the number of 
reports for the ith observation,    came to represent the residual (observed minus expected) for the ith 
observation. 
 
The date variable “earliest specimen date” was used in the cusum methods. All components of the cusum 
model described above were coded in Stata/SE Version 12 and can be found in Appendix 9. 
 
4.4.3.5. Variable life adjusted display (VLAD) 
VLAD has typically been used in assessing post-surgery outcomes, particularly patient mortality (162;163). 
In the studies by Lovegrove et al. and Guest et al. the expected post-surgical mortality was adjusted 
according to available estimates of risk factors associated with increased mortality. It was not possible to 
incorporate risk factor data into the VLAD method used in this study as there was no patient-related data 
available from the national data set. In addition, there was only limited patient demographic data available 
for outbreak analysis using data directly from a hospital LIMS (Chapter 6). The identification of patients at 
risk of developing any form of infection and subsequently adjusting for this in the analysis of time-series 
data would have been considerable; an entire PhD project within the Centre for Infection Prevention and 
Management (CIPM) was recently completed (December 2012) on the identification of patient risk factors 
associated with various HCAI, specifically urinary-tract infections and infections resulting from caesarean-
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section and coronary artery bypass graft surgery. This involved the analysis of microbiology, clinical and 
administrative data sets, which were linked for the purpose of identifying risk factors for infection. 
Unfortunately, linked data only existed for infection types investigated and for short periods of time (less 
than a year in most cases), which is obviously not sufficient for the investigation of outbreak detection 
methods. 
 
The VLAD plots in this study therefore use the difference between the actual number of reports in a week 
and the expected number of reports for that week. Equation 4.15 shows how the differences between the 
observed count and expected counts were calculated.  
   ∑     μ  
 
   
 
[Equation 4.15] 
where    is the observed count at time   and μ represents the expected value estimated from the Noufaily 
algorithm (using “earliest specimen date”) at time   . The residuals from subsequent weeks were added to 
the residual difference in the previous weeks to result in a cumulative difference over time. The cumulative 
difference was plotted for all weeks included in the analysis period i.e. 1st November 2010 to 28th October 
2012 (week 44, 2010 – week 43, 2012). The starting week is arbitrary in the VLAD method and unlike the 
cusum described above there is no mechanism to reset the VLAD chart. These charts have been prepared 
to provide a graphical representation of observed changes in trends over time. 
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Selection of trust for outbreak detection analysis 
Thirty-eight trusts had more than 10,000 reports in the five-year time period studied. After the application 
of Criteria 2, the number of trusts considered for use in the data analysis was reduced to 16. Evaluation 
against the remaining criteria was only carried out for these trusts and the results are summarised in Table 
4.3. After application of all criteria, three trusts were considered to act as an exemplar in the application of 
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outbreak detection methods to trust level data: University Hospital of South Manchester NHS Foundation 
Trust, Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust and Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust. With little to separate these trusts it was decided that data submitted by the 
microbiology laboratory associated with the University Hospital of South Manchester NHS Foundation Trust 
would be selected, owing mainly to the large number of timely reports. 
 
SDI = Simpson’s diversity index; Criteria 1, 2 and 3 taken from analysis performed on March 2007 - May 2012 dataset; 
Criteria 4, 5 and 6 taken from analysis performed on November 2010 - September 2012 dataset; Colour coding for 
coefficient of variation: green represents values within top third of all trusts, yellow represents mid-third, red 
represents bottom third. 
Table 4.3: Summary of trusts against criteria used to assess if data would be suitable for use in outbreak 
detection analysis 
TLE no. Trust name
1. Total reports 
>10,000
2. Reporting delay 
(>90% within 3 
weeks)
3. Stable/increased 
reporting post-
October 2010?
4. Variance/ 
mean < 10
5. Coefficient of 
variation
6. Good distribution 
of organisms?
66 Leeds Teaching Hospitals 105,182 98.6 Yes 6.5 0.13
No. Reports 
dominated by S. 
aureus  (70.8%). SDI = 
0.450
143
United Lincolnshire 
Hospitals 98,699 98.4 No 12.9 0.19 Yes. SDI = 0.208
87
Northern Lincolnshire & 
Goole Hospitals 39,918 98.1 Yes 10.7 0.21 Yes. SDI = 0.206
65
Lancashire Teaching 
Hospitals 14,876 98.1 No 1.8 0.19 Yes. SDI = 0.192 
70 Medway 12,002 97.5 Yes 2.7 0.24
No. Reports 
dominated by S. 
aureus  (81.5%). SDI = 
0.705
49 Guy's & St. Thomas' 93,550 96.0 No 1.7 0.19 Yes. SDI = 0.175
77 North Bristol 84,510 95.9 Yes 41.7 0.28
No. Reports 
dominated by E. coli 
(52.6%). SDI = 0.256
146
University Hospital of 
South Manchester 43,321 95.7 Yes 2.8 0.13 Yes. SDI = 0.248
13
Brighton & Sussex 
University Hospitals 16,485 94.9 No 3.8 0.27 Yes. SDI = 0.158
116
Sheffield Teaching 
Hospitals 22,359 94.5 Yes 7.3 0.30 Yes. SDI = 0.170
53 Heart of England 16,923 94.3 Yes 4.3 0.26 Yes. SDI = 0.166
18
Calderdale & 
Huddersfield 20,399 93.5 Yes 7.6 0.27
No. Reports 
dominated by S. 
aureus  (78.5%). SDI = 
0.552
145
University Hospital of 
North Staffordshire 13,974 93.4 No 1.6 0.19 Yes. SDI = 0.159
33 Derby Hospitals 63,077 92.9 Yes 6.3 0.11
No. Reports 
dominated by E. coli 
(50.4%). SDI = 0.198
141 The Whittington Hospital 10,360 92.5 Yes 135.5 0.98 Yes. SDI = 0.218
76
Norfolk & Norwich 
University Hospitals 11,332 90.7 Yes 2.0 0.22 Yes. SDI = 0.180
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The University Hospital of South Manchester NHS Foundation Trust (UHSM) provides healthcare services 
for adults and children at the Wythenshawe and Withington Hospitals and is a major teaching hospital in 
the North West of England. The trust is a specialist centre for cancer, cardiology, cardiothoracic surgery, 
burns and plastics, breast care and respiratory services (164). There were 41,418 reports made by UHSM to 
the national surveillance system between 29/10/07 – 28/10/12; this includes reports across all organisms 
included in the initial data evaluation (Chapter 3). The distribution of organisms included for analysis in this 
chapter can be found in Table 4.4.  
Organism Frequency 
A. baumannii 100 
C. difficile 3,844 
E. aerogenes 69 
E. cloacae 252 
E. coli 2,636 
E. faecalis 341 
E. faecium 397 
iGAS 108 
K. pneumoniae 798 
P. aeruginosa 2,093 
S. aureus 18,935 
S. maltophilia 374 
Total 29,947 
Table 4.4: Frequency of organism reports in study period 
 
It is clear to see from Table 4.4 that of the organisms selected for outbreak detection analysis, reports of S. 
aureus comprise the majority of reports. Of the 18,935 reports of S. aureus, 13,246 (70.0%) were isolated 
from skin/wound specimens. Across all organisms included for outbreak detection, the top three specimen 
types reported were skin/wound (13,933, 46.5%), lower respiratory tract (5,257, 17.6%) and blood samples 
(5,196, 17.6%), which in total make up just over 80% of reports. Only 4.8% of reports had “UNKNOWN” 
recorded as the specimen source, much less than the figure of 42.4% reported in the national data 
evaluation. Of the reports with unknown specimen locations, 1187 (82.3%) were C. difficile records. The 
vast majority of specimens were taken within the hospital setting (86.8%), and the distribution of specimen 
source locations can be found in Table 4.5. In accordance with the findings made in the previous chapter, 
all specimen site locations were included in the analysis carried out in this chapter. 
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 Specimen source location Frequency (%) 
HOSPITAL INPATIENT 18,667 (62.5) 
HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT 7,259 (24.3) 
GENERAL PRACTITIONER 2,422 (8.1) 
UNKNOWN 1,442 (4.8) 
GENITO-URINARY MEDICINE DEPT. 84 (0.3) 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH OFFICER 5 (0.02) 
HOSPITAL A&E 4 (0.01) 
Total 29,947 
 Table 4.5: Distribution of patient locations at time specimen taken 
 
4.5.2. Outbreak detection model output and analysis 
As there was a considerable amount of output generated from including 12 different organisms for 
analysis, it was decided that the full analysis results from a selection of organisms representing commonly 
reported through to rarely reported organisms would be provided in the main body of the thesis. Complete 
results in this section will therefore be presented for S. aureus, E. coli, S. maltophilia and A. baumannii. To 
avoid the presentation of many similar charts in this section, only charts displaying the 95% UL will be 
displayed. Exceedance charts created using both algorithms (employing earliest specimen date and 95% UL) 
can be found in Appendix 10 for all organisms investigated, as can outputs from the cusum (excluding 
residual cusum) and VLAD methods. The differences observed in the number of exceedances detected 
using different parameters in the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms have been summarised for all 
organisms and are reported in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. Exceedances were detected if the observed count 
was equal to or greater than the UL for that week, as calculated using three years of historical data. 
 
There were 29 exceedances detected by the Farrington algorithm when the “date loaded” variable was 
used and a 99.5% UL applied. There were approximately three times more aberrations detected when the 
UL was reduced to 95%, with 93 detected in total. When the date variable “earliest specimen date” was 
used in the algorithm as opposed to “date loaded” there were fewer exceedances detected overall (16 
when an UL of 99.5% was applied, 87 when the 95% UL was used). However, within some organisms, the 
number of exceedances detected increased when the “earliest specimen date” was used in the model. Of 
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particular note is the increase of aberrations in S. maltophilia, which was three when “date loaded” was 
used with 95% UL, but 12 when “earliest specimen date” was used.  
Organism Date Loaded, 99.5% 
UL 
Date Loaded, 95% UL Earliest Specimen 
Date, 99.5% UL 
Earliest Specimen 
Date, 95% UL 
A. baumannii 4 11 3 11 
C. difficile 8 11 3 6 
E. aerogenes 5 7 1 5 
E. cloacae 0 1 0 3 
E. coli 0 9 1 8 
E. faecalis 1 9 0 4 
E. faecium 3 13 2 12 
iGAS 1 5 1 6 
K. pneumoniae 4 17 1 10 
P. aeruginosa 1 3 1 7 
S. aureus 1 4 0 3 
S. maltophilia 1 3 3 12 
UL, upper limit 
Table 4.6: Exceedances detected across all organisms using the Farrington algorithm 
 
There were nine exceedances detected by the Noufaily algorithm when “date loaded” was used and a 
99.5% UL applied. This is 20 fewer than the Farrington algorithm detected using the same criteria, with no 
alerts generated for C. difficile at all, even though this organism generated the most alerts when the 
Farrington algorithm was applied to the data. When the UL was reduced to 95%, 81 exceedances were 
detected. Unlike the results from the Farrington algorithm, there were more exceedances detected when 
“earliest specimen date” was used as opposed to “date loaded” (83 vs 81, using 95% UL).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
Organism Date Loaded, 99.5% 
UL 
Date Loaded, 95% UL Earliest Specimen 
Date, 99.5% UL 
Earliest Specimen 
Date, 95% UL 
A. baumannii 1 13 1 10 
C. difficile 0 4 0 1 
E. aerogenes 5 20 3 21 
E. cloacae 0 4 0 6 
E. coli 0 0 1 2 
E. faecalis 0 2 0 2 
E. faecium 1 4 2 5 
iGAS 1 6 1 9 
K. pneumoniae 0 5 0 1 
P. aeruginosa 0 2 0 6 
S. aureus 0 4 0 1 
S. maltophilia 1 17 7 19 
UL, upper limit 
Table 4.7: Exceedances detected across all organisms using the Noufaily algorithm 
 
Using a lower threshold will result in an increase number of exceptional events being detected, as is clear 
to see from the summary of results presented above. There will also be differences in the number of false 
positive alerts generated. Using 104 weeks of data in the analysis we would expect to see 5.2 false positive 
outbreaks detected when an UL of 95% is used, whereas this is reduced to 0.52 false positive alerts when a 
99.5% UL is used. 
 
More detailed analysis of exceedances for selected organisms in the following sections includes graphical 
outputs. The keys in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 apply to all exceedance charts and cusum charts, respectively. The 
cusum statistics are measured on the primary y-axis, and the frequency of reports are measured on the 
secondary y-axis. 
 
Figure 4.4: Key for all exceedance charts 
 
Figure 4.5: Key for all cusum charts 
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4.5.2.1. Staphylococcus aureus 
There were 18,935 reports of S. aureus made in the five-year study period. As previously mentioned, the 
majority of reports were from skin/wound specimens. 11,785 specimens were taken in the hospital 
inpatient setting (62.2%), 4,824 were taken from outpatients (25.5%) and 2,108 specimens were from 
general practice (11.1%). During the five year study period, the mean number of weekly reports was 72.5 
(standard deviation ( ) 13.5, variance (  
 
) 181.7). Results from the Poisson regression analysis showed 
that there was a significant decrease in the weekly number of reports during month 8 (10.6%; 95% CI 3.8 – 
17.0%, p=0.003) and month 13 (8.5%; 1.7 – 14.9%, p=0.02) when compared to the weekly number of 
observations in month 1. Results from the likelihood ratio tests indicated that there was evidence of 
seasonality and trend throughout the year (p=0.005 and p<0.001, respectively). With such a large variance 
compared to the mean (2.5 times larger) it was no surprise that the goodness of fit (GoF) test indicated that 
the Poisson model was not appropriate for the S. aureus data (p<0.001). The variance was scaled using 
φ=1.6 (calculated and extracted from the glm output) and the graph of the quasi-Poisson prediction and 
95% data limits is presented in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6: Quasi-Poisson chart for S. aureus (95% data limits) 
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The weeks identified as representing aberrations by the various exceedance algorithms used are 
summarised in Table 4.8. The greatest number of exceedances were detected when the Farrington and 
Noufaily algorithms were used with the date loaded variable and 95% UL applied, with four exceptions 
detected each. Only two of these exceptions were common to both algorithms (week 50, 2011 and week 
31, 2012). For both algorithms, when date loaded was replaced with earliest specimen date there was no 
similarity in the weeks identified as representing an exceedance in the number of reports. The UL 
calculated and plotted in the Noufaily charts (Figures 4.9 and 4.10) appear to be less erratic than the UL 
displayed in the Farrington exceedance charts (Figures 4.7 and 4.8).  
 
To determine how often specimen sites were promoted through the specimen hierarchy, all exceedances 
detected in different time periods (nine distinct year/week combinations in total) were further 
investigated. Out of 748 observations included in all the distinct exceedances detected, 78 specimen sites 
had been promoted through the specimen hierarchy (10.4%). 
Algorithm Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit  
Farr | DL | 99.5% UL 31 2012 83 57.3 80.4  
Farr | DL | 95% UL 50 2011 91 70.9 90.8  
15 2012 72 53.2 69.4  
22 2012 75 58.0 73.0  
31 2012 83 57.3 71.7  
Farr | ESD | 99.5% UL No exceedances detected 
Farr | ESD | 95% UL 8 2011 91 72.5 89.2  
42 2011 82 66.1 82.0  
43 2012 77 60.4 75.6  
Nouf| DL | 99.5% UL No exceedances detected 
Nouf |DL | 95% UL 50 2011 91 66.7 86  
8 2012 98 69.1 89  
31 2012 83 58.9 77  
35 2012 79 59.8 78  
Nouf | ESD | 99.5% UL No exceedances detected 
Nouf | ESD | 95% UL 43 2012 77 61.7 77  
Farr, Farrington algorithm; Nouf, Noufaily algorithm; DL, date loaded; ESD, earliest specimen date; UL, upper limit 
Table 4.8: Summary of S. aureus exceedances detected by the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms 
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Figure 4.7: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for S. aureus, using date loaded; four weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Figure 4.8: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for S. aureus, using earliest specimen date; three weeks 
were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.9: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for S. aureus, using date loaded; four weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Figure 4.10: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for S. aureus, using earliest specimen date; one week was 
identified as an exceedance above the 95% UL 
 128 
 
There appears to be strong evidence of a downward trend suggested by the cusum and VLAD charts 
(Figures 4.11 and 4.13). The   
  statistic first exceeded the decision limit, H, at week 17, 2011. At this point 
the target value was changed from 74.7 to 73.1 by the model to account for the decreasing numbers of S. 
aureus reports observed over time. Subsequent to this change in target value, the decision limit was 
exceeded by the cumulative statistic accumulating deviations from    below the target value a further 
seven times (week 26, 2011; week 48, 2011; week 5, 2012; week 18, 2012; week 24, 2012; week 33, 2012 
and; week 40, 2012). The target (mean) value at the end of the study period had decreased to 68.8 reports 
per week, almost six cases per week less than at the beginning of the analysis period. With such strong 
evidence of decreasing numbers of reports throughout the entire analysis period, the   
  statistic did not 
reach the decision limit. There is a small peak in the   
  statistic in Figure 4.11 in the first quarter of 2011, 
which is much more exaggerated in the residual cusum plot (Figure 4.12). Compared to the raw cusum data 
plot, the results of the residual cusum do not illustrate such a strong downward trend (although the 
negative decision limit is reached on one occasion), which is most likely due to the decrease in the expected 
number of weekly reports over time. Incorporating this information into the residual cusum appears to 
allow better detection of potentially aberrant events when there is evidence of an overall decreasing trend. 
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Figure 4.11: Cusum chart for S. aureus 
 
Figure 4.12: Residual cusum chart for S. aureus 
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Figure 4.13: VLAD chart for S. aureus 
 
4.5.2.2. Escherichia coli 
There were 2,636 reports of E. coli in total; 2,252 (85.4%) of these were blood samples. 1,761 (68.4%) 
specimens were taken in the inpatient setting, with a further 770 (29.9%) from the outpatient setting.  
The mean number of reports was 10.1 per week (  = 3.4,   
 
= 11.9). Poisson regression analysis revealed 
that there was a significant increase in the weekly number of reports made during month 3 (37%; 95% CI 
13.2 – 67.3%, p=0.001) and month 8 (23.1%; 95% CI 0.8 – 50.3%, p=0.04). Results from the likelihood ratio 
test indicated that there was some evidence of seasonality (p=0.01) and evidence of trend (p=0.0002). With 
the mean number of weekly reports similar to the variance, the GoF test suggested that the Poisson model 
was a good fit for the E. coli data (p=0.2). The scaled deviance, φ, was found to be close to one and thus 
would make little difference being incorporated into a quasi-Poisson model. Therefore, the chart below 
(Figure 4.14) is a plot of the predicted counts and limits based on the Poisson model initially performed. 
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Figure 4.14: Poisson chart for E. coli (95% data limits) 
A summary of the exceedances detected is presented in Table 4.9. The highest number of exceedances 
were seen when the Farrington algorithm was applied to the data, using date loaded and 95% UL (n=9). 
However, no exceedances in reports of E. coli were detected when the same parameters were used in the 
Noufaily algorithm. Eight exceedances were detected when earliest specimen date was used in the 
Farrington algorithm, similar to the number detected with date loaded. There is some evidence that using 
the earliest specimen date results in the earlier detection of exceptional events. On three occasions the 
algorithm using the earliest specimen date detected an exceedance one week earlier than the algorithm 
using date loaded. Thirteen out of the 16 observations in the exceedance identified at week 6 in 2011 were 
also included in the exception identified in week 5 of 2011 when earliest specimen date was used. Similarly, 
12 out of 17 reports in the exceedance identified in week 25 of 2011 were also included in the exception 
detected in week 24 of the same year when earliest specimen date was used in the Farrington algorithm. 
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Algorithm Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit  
Farr | DL | 99.5% UL No exceedances detected 
Farr | DL | 95% UL 44 2010 17 9.4 15.2  
6 2011 16 8.6 13.9  
8 2011 17 9.1 14.6  
10 2011 20 10.8 16.7  
11 2011 18 10.7 16.6  
25 2011 17 9.1 14.6  
39 2011 16 9.7 15.3  
8 2012 18 11.1 17.7  
20 2012 12 6.2 11.4  
Farr | ESD | 99.5% UL 9 2011 29 10.4 20.0  
Farr | ESD | 95% UL 5 2011 16 8.7 14.1  
8 2011 16 9.6 15.2  
9 2011 29 10.4 16.3  
24 2011 15 9.2 14.7  
44 2011 17 10.4 16.3  
45 2011 16 9.9 15.7  
4 2012 15 8.9 14.3  
12 2012 21 11.5 17.6  
Nouf | DL | 99.5% UL No exceedances detected 
Nouf | DL | 95% UL No exceedances detected 
Nouf | ESD | 99.5% UL 9 2011 29 14.4 25  
Nouf | ESD | 95% UL 9 2011 29 14.4 21  
12 2012 21 13.0 20  
Farr, Farrington algorithm; Nouf, Noufaily algorithm; DL, date loaded; ESD, earliest specimen date; UL, upper limit 
Table 4.9: Summary of E. coli exceedances detected by the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms 
 
Very few exceedances were detected when the 99.5% UL was applied (two across all algorithms and 
parameters used) with many more detected when the 95% UL was employed (n=19). Unusually, the 
exceedance detected in week 9 of 2011 was only identified when the earliest specimen date was used. This 
exceptional event was detected by both algorithms, although not detected at all when using the date 
loaded. As can be seen when looking at the earliest specimen date charts in Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.18 
there is a large number of reports in week 9, 2011 (n=29), by far the largest number of reports made in the 
entire analysis period. However, there is no evidence of this in the date loaded charts (Figures 4.15 and 
4.17). This would suggest that the 29 incidents of E. coli infection were loaded into LabBase2 over a period 
of several weeks, resulting in a potential outbreak event being missed. In fact, of the 29 observations 
resulting in the identification of an exceptional event, 18 reports were loaded onto the system in week 10 
of 2011, a further 9 reports were loaded in week 11, and the remaining two reports were loaded in week 9. 
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Both of these weeks were identified as separate exceedances when date loaded was used in the Farrington 
algorithm, although the number of excessive observations made in those weeks does not reflect the true 
extent of the exceedance detected in week 9 of 2011 when the earliest specimen date was used, with the 
Noufaily algorithm failing to detect exceedances when date loaded variable was used in the algorithm at all. 
 
Figure 4.15: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for E.coli, using date loaded; nine weeks were identified 
as exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.16: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for E. coli, using earliest specimen date; eight weeks 
were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Figure 4.17: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for E. coli, using date loaded; no weeks were identified as 
exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.18: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for E.coli, using earliest specimen date; two weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL  
 
The exceptional event at week 9 in 2011 can also be identified in the cusum model, with a clear breach of 
the decision limit (  
 = 27.7, H = 13.5, Figure 4.19). This potential outbreak situation is also obviously 
identifiable from Figure 4.20, the output generated from the raw data cusum. The aberration at week 9 in 
2011 was successfully detected by both exceedance algorithms at both UL thresholds when the earliest 
specimen date was used, and by the cusum and residual cusum methods. In addition,  a small peak in the 
cumulative difference observed within the overall decreasing trend in the VLAD chart also suggests that an 
exceptional event may have occurred which may require further investigation (Figure 4.21). 
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Figure 4.19: Cusum chart for E. coli 
 
Figure 4.20: Residual cusum chart for E. coli 
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Figure 4.21: VLAD chart for E. coli 
 
4.5.2.3. Stenotrophomonas maltophilia 
There were 374 reports of S. maltophilia. The most commonly reported specimen site was “BLOOD” (175, 
46.8%), followed by “LOWER RESPIRATORY TRACT” specimens (156, 41.7%). Nearly all specimens were 
taken from inpatients (309, 82.6%), with 56 specimens taken from outpatients (15.0%). The weekly mean 
number of reports was 1.4 (  = 1.3,   
 
= 1.6). There was a significant increase in the number of reports 
made in month 10 when compared with month 1 (70.7%; 95% CI 6.0 – 174.9%, p=0.03), with the likelihood 
ratio test revealing a significant evidence of seasonality (p=0.003). Additionally, a significantly decreasing 
trend effect was also identified (p=0.001). The GoF assessment indicated that there was a small degree of 
evidence to suggest that the Poisson model was appropriate for modelling the data (p=0.05). With such a 
borderline result from the GoF and φ estimated as 1.1, the over-dispersion parameter was incorporated to 
create the quasi-Poisson output presented in Figure 4.22.  
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Figure 4.22: Quasi-Poisson chart for S. maltophilia (95% data limits) 
 
Table 4.10 contains the details of all exceedances detected for S.maltophilia in the two year analysis period. 
The Noufaily algorithm detected more than double the number of exceedances detected by the Farrington 
algorithm when applied to the S. maltophilia data (44 alerts vs. 19 alerts). All three aberrations detected by 
the Farrington algorithm using date loaded and 95% UL were detected by the Noufaily algorithm using the 
same parameters. This was also the case when earliest specimen date was used in the models rather than 
date loaded, with all 12 exceedances detected. There were two more exceedances detected by the 
Noufaily algorithm when using earliest specimen date with 95% UL compared with date loaded, and nine 
more exceptions detected when the same parameters were used in the Farrington algorithm. Again, similar 
to the findings described above for E. coli, there is evidence that reports within the same earliest specimen 
week are being loaded onto LabBase2 over a series of weeks, which may help explain why more 
exceedances are being detected when earliest specimen date is used in the algorithms compared to date 
loaded. 
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Algorithm Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit  
Farr | DL | 99.5% UL 3 2011 3 0.2 2.5  
Farr | DL | 95% UL 3 2011 3 0.2 1.5  
3 2012 3 0.8 2.8  
17 2012 4 1.4 3.9  
Farr | ESD | 99.5% UL 2 2011 5 0.1 2.0  
13 2011 2 0.1 1.8  
16 2012 5 1.2 5.0  
Farr | ESD| 95% UL 50 2010 2 0.4 1.9  
2 2011 5 0.1 1.2  
8 2011 3 0.4 2.0  
10 2011 2 0.4 2.0  
13 2011 2 0.1 1.1  
14 2011 2 0.3 1.7  
46 2011 5 1.3 3.6  
2 2012 3 0.6 2.4  
9 2012 3 0.9 3.0  
12 2012 3 0.9 2.8  
16 2012 5 1.2 3.4  
38 2012 4 1.2 3.6  
Nouf | DL | 99.5% UL 17 2012 4 1.0 4  
Nouf | DL | 95% UL 49 2010 3 0.8 3  
3 2011 3 0.7 2  
9 2011 2 0.7 2  
10 2011 2 0.7 2  
14 2011 2 0.6 2  
42 2011 4 1.6 4  
46 2011 4 1.3 3  
47 2011 3 1.1 3  
49 2011 3 1.1 3  
1 2012 2 0.8 2  
3 2012 3 0.8 3  
9 2012 2 0.8 2  
10 2012 2 0.8 2  
11 2012 2 0.7 2  
13 2012 3 0.7 2  
17 2012 4 1.0 3  
19 2012 2 0.7 2  
Nouf | ESD| 99.5% UL 2 2011 5 0.6 4  
8 2011 3 0.6 3  
46 2011 5 1.0 5  
2 2012 3 0.6 3  
9 2012 3 0.7 3  
12 2012 3 0.6 3  
16 2012 5 0.8 4  
Nouf | ESD| 95% UL 47 2010 2 0.7 2  
50 2010 2 0.5 2  
2 2011 5 0.6 2  
8 2011 3 0.6 2  
10 2011 2 0.6 2  
13 2011 2 0.5 2  
14 2011 2 0.7 2  
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17 2011 2 0.7 2  
46 2011 5 1.0 3  
52 2011 3 0.7 2  
2 2012 3 0.6 2  
5 2012 3 0.9 3  
8 2012 2 0.7 2  
9 2012 3 0.7 2  
12 2012 3 0.6 2  
16 2012 5 0.8 3  
18 2012 2 0.6 2  
20 2012 2 0.7 2  
38 2012 4 1.9 4  
Farr, Farrington algorithm; Nouf, Noufaily algorithm; DL, date loaded; ESD, earliest specimen date; UL, upper limit 
Table 4.10: Summary of S. maltophilia exceedances detected by the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms 
 
 
Figure 4.23: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for S. maltophilia, using date loaded; three weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.24: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for S. maltophilia, using earliest specimen date; 12 
weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Figure 4.25: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for S. maltophilia, using date loaded; 17 weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.26: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for S. maltophilia, using earliest specimen date; 19 weeks 
were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Both cusum charts indicate that there is an overall increase in the number of reports over time with the 
majority of peaks occurring in the   
  statistic (Figures 4.27 and 4.28); this is clearer to see in the residual 
cusum chart although the decision limit is not reached at any time. Towards the end of the analysis there 
appears to be a decrease in the weekly number of reports, which can be seen in the cusum, residual cusum 
and VLAD charts. Out of all the organisms investigated in this analysis, S. maltophilia was the only organism 
besides E. aerogenes to demonstrate such an obvious increase in trend over time, with all the cumulative 
difference points plotted above the zero line (Figure 4.29). 
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Figure 4.27: Cusum chart for S. maltophilia 
 
Figure 4.28: Residual cusum chart for S. maltophilia 
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Figure 4.29: VLAD chart for S. maltophilia 
 
4.5.2.4. Acinetobacter baumannii 
Throughout the entire study period there were 100 reports of A. baumannii. The majority of reports were 
on organisms isolated from blood specimens (67%). Seventy-three reports were on specimens sent from 
hospital inpatients, 19 from outpatients, three each from general practice and genito-urinary medicine 
departments, with the remaining two specimen locations recorded as “UNKNOWN”. The mean number of 
weekly reports was 0.4 (  = 0.6,   
 
= 0.4). There were no significant increases or decreases in the weekly 
number of reports when each month was compared with month 1 in the Poisson regression analysis. This 
was supported by results from the likelihood ratio tests, which revealed that there was no strong evidence 
of seasonality (p=0.09) or trend (p=0.3). Results from the GoF suggested that the Poisson model was a very 
good approximation for the distribution of cases of A. baumannii (p=0.8). As the Poisson model was 
determined to be a good fit for the data, the output in Figure 4.30 does not include the over-dispersion 
parameter and is therefore representative of the predicted counts and limits based on the Poisson 
regression initially performed. 
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Figure 4.30: Poisson chart for A. baumannii (95% data limits) 
 
Table 4.11 contains a summary of all exceedances detected by the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms. 
There were four more exceedances of A. baumannii detected by the Farrington algorithm overall (n=29). 
Comparing the Farrington algorithm alerts generated using both date loaded and earliest specimen date 
with 95% UL applied, there are seven occasions where exceedances were detected one week earlier when 
earliest specimen date was used as opposed to the date loaded. This was also observed when comparing 
the Noufaily algorithm outputs, with six exceedance weeks being detected a week earlier when the earliest 
specimen date was used in the model. The expected and UL lines are very similar in the exceedance charts 
produced for the Farrington algorithm (Figures 4.31 and 4.32). This is also true for the Noufaily algorithm 
chart outputs (Figures 4.33 and 4.34), suggesting that cases are reported in a timely and consistent manner. 
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Algorithm Week Year Observed Expected  Upper limit 
Farr | DL | 99.5% UL 19 2012 1 0.0 0.8 
21 2012 1 0.0 0.8 
22 2012 2 0.0 0.8 
23 2012 1 0.0 0.8 
Farr | DL | 95% UL 49 2010 1 0.1 0.8 
33 2011 2 0.5 2.0 
38 2011 3 0.5 2.0 
48 2011 1 0.0 0.6 
15 2012 1 0.1 0.8 
17 2012 1 0.1 0.8 
18 2012 1 0.0 0.6 
19 2012 1 0.0 0.4 
21 2012 1 0.0 0.4 
22 2012 2 0.0 0.4 
23 2012 1 0.0 0.4 
Farr | ESD | 99.5% UL 19 2012 1 0.0 0.8 
21 2012 3 0.0 0.8 
22 2012 1 0.0 0.8 
Farr | ESD | 95% UL 48 2010 1 0.1 0.8 
2 2011 2 0.3 1.6 
32 2011 2 0.4 1.9 
37 2011 3 0.5 2.1 
48 2011 1 0.1 0.8 
14 2012 1 0.1 0.8 
16 2012 1 0.1 0.8 
17 2012 1 0.0 0.6 
19 2012 1 0.0 0.4 
21 2012 3 0.0 0.4 
22 2012 1 0.0 0.4 
Nouf | DL | 99.5% UL 22 2012 2 0.2 2 
Nouf | DL | 95% UL 49 2010 1 0.2 1 
1 2011 1 0.2 1 
38 2011 3 0.8 3 
48 2011 1 0.2 1 
51 2011 1 0.3 1 
17 2012 1 0.3 1 
18 2012 1 0.2 1 
19 2012 1 0.2 1 
21 2012 1 0.2 1 
22 2012 2 0.2 1 
23 2012 1 0.2 1 
35 2012 3 0.9 3 
40 2012 2 0.5 2 
Nouf | ESD | 99.5% UL 21 2012 3 0.2 2 
Nouf | ESD| 95% UL 48 2010 1 0.2 1 
2 2011 2 0.6 2 
37 2011 3 0.8 3 
48 2011 1 0.2 1 
16 2012 1 0.2 1 
17 2012 1 0.2 1 
19 2012 1 0.2 1 
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21 2012 3 0.2 1 
22 2012 1 0.2 1 
39 2012 2 0.6 2 
Farr, Farrington algorithm; Nouf, Noufaily algorithm; DL, date loaded; ESD, earliest specimen date; UL, upper limit 
Table 4.11: Summary of A. baumannii exceedances detected by the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms 
 
 
Figure 4.31: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for A. baumannii, using date loaded; 11 weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.32: Farrington algorithm exceedance chart for A. baumannii, using earliest specimen date; 11 
weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Figure 4.33: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for A. baumannii, using date loaded; 13 weeks were 
identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 4.34: Noufaily algorithm exceedance chart for A. baumannii, using earliest specimen date; 10 weeks 
were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Looking at the cusum charts it appears that there are fluctuations in the number of cases of A. baumannii 
over the analysis period, which is clearer to see in the residual cusum chart (Figure 4.36). Figure 4.35 shows 
that there were two points at which the   
  statistic reached the decision limit; first at week 34, 2011 (  
 = 
2.9, H = 2.5), then again at week 22 in 2012 (  
 = 2.6, H = 2.5). The first breach of the decision limit does 
not coincide with any of the exceedances detected by either algorithm, however, there is an exceedance 
detected shortly after at week 37, which was detected by both algorithms using the 95% UL. The cusum has 
not detected the exception at week 37 in 2011 resulting from three cases being reported in the same week. 
This could be due to the detection of an increase in the number of reports in the preceding weeks, resulting 
in a breach of H at week 34. As cusum statistics are reset to zero after the decision limit has been exceeded 
it makes it more difficult for this method to detect what appears to be a one-off exception immediately 
after the statistic has been reset. The second breach of the decision limit does, however, coincide with 
exceedances detected by both the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms. Output from the VLAD chart shown 
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in Figure 4.37 indicates that there is a decrease in reports overall, but there are two occasions where the 
cumulative difference begins to decrease, firstly at 2011 week 32 and then at 2012 week 13. 
 
Figure 4.35: Cusum chart for A. baumannii 
 
Figure 4.36: Residual cusum chart for A. baumannii 
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Figure 4.37: VLAD chart for A. baumannii 
 
4.6. Discussion 
4.6.1. Model performance 
It appears that several factors affect the detection of exceptional events, including the algorithm applied to 
the data, the UL employed and the date variable used in the analysis. The analysis of four organisms with 
differing reporting frequencies also revealed that some organisms can be approximated by a Poisson 
distribution (E. coli and A. baumannii) whereas others may not (S. aureus and S. maltophilia). It is possible 
to overcome overdispersion, which is often observed in the analysis of infectious disease data, through the 
inclusion of parameters that account for this; both the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms incorporate 
methods to allow for overdispersion. This is not necessarily the case for methods based on statistical 
process control. Caution must therefore be taken when interpreting the results generated using SPC 
methods, including cusum approaches. 
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Although several alerts were created by the Noufaily and Farrington algorithms for S. aureus, the cusum 
methods did not exceed the decision limit. There was a strong downward trend, which can be seen in the 
VLAD chart (Figure 4.13) and the standard cusum chart (Figure 4.11). Using the residual counts in the 
residual cusum method appeared to help account for this trend effect. However, the   
  still did not reach 
the decision limit during the analysis period, suggesting that the cusum method may not successfully 
identify outbreak situations when trends are present. This is despite the fact that the expected (i.e. mean) 
weekly count was amended to account for the change in reporting frequencies each time the   
  statistic 
reached the decision limit. The cusum methods did, however, identify one of the E. coli exceedances 
detected by the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms at week 9 in 2011 when the earliest specimen date and 
95% UL were used. The second exceedance identified using the same parameters in the Noufaily algorithm 
was not detected by the cusum methods though. Again, the VLAD chart for E.coli (Figure 4.21) appears to 
show a decreasing trend over time, which may explain why the cusum only detected one of the 
exceedances. 
 
S. maltophilia had the highest number of exceedances detected, with 63 alerts generated across all 
algorithm and parameter combinations investigated. However, the decision limit was not reached at all by 
either of the cusum methods. The disparity in model performance could be explained by different issues 
affecting the Farrington and Noufaily algorithms, and the cusum methods. As the UL for the Noufaily and 
Farrington algorithms are estimated from historical weekly counts it is possible that the limits applied to 
the data do not reflect the current reporting situation. However, it is important to detect a general increase 
in reporting or an upward trend of an infectious disease in the healthcare setting as it could represent an 
emerging problem. The increasing trend identified from the analysis of S. maltophlia data is clear to see in 
the VLAD chart (Figure 4.29). Risk factor studies have found that prior treatment with broad spectrum 
antibiotics, including carbapenems, is strongly associated with the development of S. maltophilia infection 
(165).Therefore an increasing trend may indicate that there is a growing problem with antimicrobial 
resistant organisms within the trust. 
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With such small numbers observed at the trust level there were often weeks where no reports were made 
for certain organisms, as was the case for A. baumannii. There were 44 exceedances detected in total using 
all algorithm and parameter combinations, 17 of which occurred in weeks where no cases were expected to 
be reported. Although these weeks may not represent outbreak situations independently, a series of alerts 
generated in sequential weeks may be related. This alert pattern was observed several times in the analysis 
performed on A. baumannii. Although it has not been possible to further investigate these instances within 
this analysis, alerts in successive weeks occurring when using local level data will be further investigated in 
Chapter 6, where patient location and antimicrobial susceptibility data are available. Weeks where no 
reports were made also appear to affect the cusum methods, with the standard cusum only identifying two 
exceptional events and the residual cusum detecting one. 
 
4.6.2. Threshold selection 
One way of overcoming threshold issues would be to employ user-defined thresholds, as suggested by 
Widdowson et al. (141). The authors describe an outbreak detection system that uses both thresholds 
generated through the application of algorithms to historical data and thresholds set at specific values 
depending on the organisms under surveillance. This approach could be taken when TLE reporting is fully 
implemented, with thresholds for rarely reported organisms set at a level that is known to indicate an 
emerging problem. Equally, thresholds could purposefully be set to zero to identify organisms of particular 
concern. User-defined thresholds would need to be carefully considered though. Huang et al. found great 
differences when they compared a rule-based outbreak detection method with automated systems 
incorporating statistical methods for outbreak detection (11). The statistical method identified far fewer 
infection clusters than the rule-based criteria, suggesting that a considerable amount of time and resources 
may have been misallocated as a result of classifying instances of random variation as potential outbreaks. 
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4.6.3. Date variable for analysis 
The findings from Chapter 3 and the results of the analysis presented in this chapter seem to suggest that 
the earliest specimen date should be used for outbreak detection rather than the date the specimen was 
reported. Besides the issues associated with batched reporting, which were described in the previous 
chapter, there were several instances where potential outbreaks were not identified by either of the 
exceedance algorithms when the date loaded variable was used. Of particular note were the two occasions 
where isolates of E. coli were reported over a series of weeks when all specimens had actually been taken 
in the same earliest specimen week. This may explain why there were more outbreaks detected when the 
earliest specimen date was used as opposed to the date loaded for some organisms (Table 4.6 and Table 
4.7). 
 
As the analysis presented was carried out retrospectively, reporting delays did not need to be accounted 
for when the algorithms were applied to the data. As described in the previous chapter there is variation in 
how laboratories report to the national system. This included the delays observed between the earliest 
specimen date and the date the specimen was reported. Addressing this issue will be a complex process, 
but must be considered prior to the full implementation of a prospective outbreak detection system. One 
option would be to inflate the observed count for the current week based on the delay distribution for a 
particular laboratory and running the algorithm in real time. Alternatively, the algorithm could be run 
several weeks after the week of interest, when the majority of reports are expected to be available. This 
second option, however, somewhat defeats the purpose of prospective outbreak detection as the analysis 
would be retrospective. 
 
4.6.4. Method selection for local level outbreak detection 
Based on the findings from this work it was decided that the Noufaily algorithm would be used in the 
chapter to investigate the use of local level data in outbreak detection (Chapter 6). This method is 
essentially an advancement of the original Farrington algorithm described in 1996. The Noufaily algorithm 
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incorporates more weekly data and employs a more appropriate down-weighting parameter, which results 
in the production of less erratic expected counts and UL. Additionally, the minimum reports criterion has 
been removed in the Noufaily algorithm, which is crucial when analysing data at the trust level. The UL will 
be based on the 95% prediction limit as the sensitivity of the system is considered to take priority over 
specificity and the number of alerts generated should be manageable. As discussed above it does not 
appear that the output generated by cusums provides further knowledge regarding small, persistent shifts 
in trends over time. This may be due to the selection of reference values (K) and decision limits (H). With 
the conventional K and H parameters used it appears that the methods do not supplement the output 
generated by the Noufaily algorithm. Optimisation of the cusum parameters will be investigated in Chapter 
6 to ensure that the values selected are more appropriate for the analysis of infectious disease data.  VLAD 
charts will also be produced as these provide a clear sense of the past and current trend, which is not 
necessarily clear to see from the output generated by the Noufaily algorithm. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ORGANISMS FOR INCLUSION IN LOCAL LEVEL 
OUTBREAK DETECTION 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the Chief Medical Officer’s annual report it was suggested that surveillance for infections occurring in the 
healthcare setting should expand beyond MRSA and C. diffcile; specifically, there is a need for the 
surveillance of carbapenem resistance in Gram negative bacteria (3). It is therefore imperative that 
bacterial isolates exhibiting carbapenem resistance can be identified from microbiology data. Although this 
was not possible when using data from LabBase2, antimicrobial susceptibility data is readily available at the 
local level. Hence it is possible to incorporate this information into outbreak detection systems at the 
hospital level for the identification of outbreaks involving MDRO.  
 
Many antimicrobial resistance mechanisms exist. Extended-spectrum β-lactamases (ESBL) were first 
identified in clinical specimens the 1980s (166); initially temoneira (TEM) and sulfhydryl variable (SHV) β-
lactamases were the most frequently isolated, however, the cefotaxime (CTX-M) ESBLs became increasing 
prevalent , with CTX-M-15 declared as the most prevalent form of ESBL, exhibiting an almost worldwide 
distribution (167). The production of ESBLs by bacterial species results in resistance to several antibiotic 
classes including cephalosporins, fluoroquinalones, aminoglycosides and tetracyclines (166), although 
treatment with carbapenems was often found to be effective. It is thought, however, that the increasing 
consumption of carbapenems required to treat ESBL-producing bacteria may have resulted in a rise in 
carbapenem-resistance (168). 
 
Carbapenem resistance results from one or more of several different mechanisms: hyperproduction of 
ESBLs or Ambler class C β-lactamases (including AmpC, another type of β-lactamase) with loss of outer 
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membrane proteins; augmented drug efflux; alteration in penicillin binding proteins or; carbapenemase 
production (169). There are three molecular classes of carbapenemases; Ambler class A, B and D. Ambler 
class A β-lactamases include KPC, one of the most frequently isolated carbapenemases (170;171). Another 
carbapenemase of increasing concern, NDM, belongs to the Ambler class B carbapenemases. NDM-1 was 
first identified in 2008, and is already regarded as being one of the biggest antimicrobial resistance threats 
due to its ability to be expressed by numerous pathogens. Of particular concern is the identification of 
NDM-1 in E. coli ST 131, the strain associated with the global spread of CTX-M-15 ESBLs (171). 
 
 The final class of carbapenemases, known as the carbapenem-hydrolysing class D β-lactamases (CHDLs), 
are comprised exclusively of oxacillinases. CHDLs tend to be most frequently isolated in Acinetobacter spp., 
but recently there has been increasing isolation among Enterobacteriaceae (172). Although it is not 
possible to determine the resistance mechanism operating within organisms isolated from patients based 
on the microbiology data available for analysis in this chapter, there is the potential to identify and 
distinguish strains of MDRO using antimicrobial resistance profiles as a proxy indicator. A systematic 
approach for the detection of MDRO using routine microbiology data is presented in this chapter. For this 
section of the thesis, data from the ICHT microbiology LIMS was analysed. A study on the prevalence of 
ESBL/AmpC-producing organisms using the same data set used in this thesis chapter had already been 
performed by Moore et al. (L.S.P. Moore, R. Freeman, C.P. Thomas, E. T. Brannigan, M. Gilchrist, H. 
Donaldson, A.H. Holmes, “Antimicrobial resistance - homogeneity of policy, heterogeneity of cohorts”, 
manuscript in preparation). The focus of the epidemiological analysis presented in this section will 
therefore focus on carbapenem-resistant organisms, as well as MRSA, GRE and iGAS. 
 
5.2. Objectives 
 Define MDRO and invasive disease using data available from the laboratory information 
management system 
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 Create algorithms that can distinguish MDRO and invasive disease; apply these directly to data 
available from the laboratory information management system  
 Perform epidemiological analysis on data available from the microbiology laboratory information 
system 
 Describe the main epidemiological features of all organisms investigated 
 
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Data processing 
Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust is the largest NHS trust in England (173), and together with Imperial 
College London became the first academic health science centre (AHSC) in the country in October 2007 
(174;175). The trust has five hospitals: Charing Cross Hospital, Hammersmith Hospital, Queen Charlotte’s 
and Chelsea Hospital, St Mary’s Hospital and the Western Eye Hospital. The trust provides a range of clinical 
services including accident and emergency services, general medicine and surgery and maternity services. 
ICHT also includes the Imperial College Renal and Transplant Centre, which is the largest of its kind in 
Europe (176). 
 
ICHT use several LIMS as a result of the merger of Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust and St Mary’s NHS 
Trust in October 2007. Microbiology data for analysis was extracted from Misys, the LIMS covering 
Hammersmith Hospital, Charing Cross Hospital, the multi-site renal unit and community settings; 
specimens from the community setting were not included in the analysis. Data on organisms isolated from 
specimens taken between March 2009 and February 2012 were included in the epidemiological analysis. 
The data files were originally provided in an Excel format; these data files were submitted directly to the 
CIPM Data Manager to undergo essential processing prior to using the data in compliance with the Ethical 
Approval (Appendix 11). To use the data for research purposes all patient identifiable information had to be 
removed and a new unique identifier created through the use of a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). SHA-256 
codes were created for all patient reports based on the patient’s hospital number and date of birth. The 
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data files were then made available in a .csv format on the secure research server, where they were 
imported to Stata/SE Version 11.  
 
Each row in the data set represented an individual susceptibility result for an organism isolated from a 
patient. The variables in the data set included; SHA-256 code; specimen date; laboratory number; organism 
name; time period; patient age; patient sex; patient location (ward); hospital site; specimen type; 
antimicrobial name and; antimicrobial susceptibility result. To create antibiograms for bacterial isolates the 
data needed to be re-shaped from long to wide. This processing was required for the data evaluation 
presented in Chapter 3 and so a similar approach was intended for processing the ICHT microbiology data. 
It initially appeared that reshaping the data was not possible due to inconsistencies observed in variables 
e.g. the duplication of reports on the same organism but with different susceptibilities reported. This issue 
was further investigated and several examples of problematic reports were identified. It was initially 
considered that a simple data de-duplication could be performed to overcome the issues arising from re-
shaping as it was thought that maybe duplicate results had been accidentally introduced to the data set; 
however, this was not the case. 
 
Figure 5.1 portrays an example of a situation where two strains of E.coli were isolated from a specimen 
sent from one patient.  If several different organisms or strains are isolated from a specimen all 
organisms/strains identified are assigned the same laboratory number, meaning that it is not possible to 
distinguish between strains or even organisms isolated based on the laboratory number, which is required 
in the data re-shaping process. De-duplicating the data would create inaccurate antibiograms (as seen in 
Figure 5.1) and would be of limited use in the epidemiological analysis. Fortunately, the data was stored in 
an order that allowed the identification of different strains manually; to allow the data re-shaping to take 
place, manual data manipulation was required. The complete data set was split into organism-specific data 
files and records causing re-shaping errors were identified. If a patient had, for example, two strains of E. 
coli isolated from the same specimen, the laboratory numbers associated with each strain were changed to 
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represent the existence of two strains. Reshape errors (i.e. errors arising from inconsistencies in the 
variables used to perform the data reshaping) were still occurring after this manual data manipulation, 
often due to the existence of duplicate antimicrobial results, which should not exist within the data; these 
were removed from the data sets. Changes made to the original data sets are documented in Appendix 12. 
After the re-shaping of the data from long to wide the organism-specific data sets could be appended, 
creating a master data set of all organisms included for analysis with their corresponding antibiograms.  
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Figure 5.1: Example of inaccurate antibiogram created after simple de-duplication of data 
 
As comparisons across patient groups were intended in the epidemiological analysis, several new variables 
needed to be created. Using the age variable, it was possible to generate age groups. Age groups were 
De-duplication
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defined and applied as described in Table 5.1. Patients with a reported age of less than 16 years old were 
removed prior to analysis as the hospitals included in the analysis specialised in adult care (n=24). A table 
containing information on wards, specialties and clinical programme groups (CPG) was created in Stata 
after consulting with one of the trust’s Infectious Diseases and Medical Microbiology Registrars and the 
Infection Prevention and Control Data Manager. Each of the CPGs include different specialties; of particular 
note is that the Specialist Services CPG includes ICUs and the Clinical & Investigative Sciences CPG includes 
the haematology and oncology specialties. Using the ward location, the table was merged into the master 
data, assigning a CPG number and descriptor to all records in the data set.   
Age group Age range 
1 16 – 24 
2 25 – 39 
3 40 – 54 
4 55 – 64 
5 65 – 74  
6 75 – 84 
7 85 and over 
Table 5.1: Age groups created and used in the epidemiological analysis  
 
5.3.2. Definitions for multidrug-resistant organisms and invasive disease 
Similar to the analysis performed using data from the national system, a selection of organisms considered 
to be of interest at the hospital level were investigated in both the epidemiological and outbreak detection 
analysis. The organisms chosen for this analysis reflect the selection of organisms studied in the previous 
chapter, and are listed in Table 5.2. Several organisms were reported only to the genus level. Additionally, a 
large proportion of sensitivity results were reported for organisms identified as “Coliforms” 
(47,041/386,828 (12.2%) of sensitivity results). Manual data processing to produce antibiogram data would 
have required an inordinate amount of time and organisms reported as “Coliforms” were therefore not 
able to be included in the analysis. 
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Organism name 
Acinetobacter baumannii 
Streptococcus pyogenes (Group A Streptococci) 
Enterobacter spp. 
Enterococcus spp. 
Escherichia coli 
Klebsiella spp. 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Staphylococcus aureus 
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia 
Table 5.2: Organisms investigated using data available from a local laboratory information management 
system 
 
To explore the epidemiology of specific MDRO, criteria to distinguish cases of MDRO were developed using 
guidelines for the detection of resistance mechanisms prepared by EUCAST (177). In addition, cases of 
multidrug-resistant A. baumannii were defined based on criteria described in the “Working Party Guidance 
on the Control of Multi-Resistant Acinetobacter Outbreaks” (178). Table 5.3 summarises the antimicrobials 
used to determine if a particular strain was considered to represent a MDRO. Only the highest level of 
resistance was included in the analysis e.g. if an isolate of E. coli exhibited a resistance profile which 
suggested that it was both an ESBL/AmpC producer and carbapenem-resistant  (which is common), to avoid 
counting the case twice, the E. coli report would be categorised as carbapenem-resistant. For 
Enterobacteriaceae and P. aeruginosa, carbapenem-resistance was considered to represent a higher level 
of resistance than strains with antibiograms suggesting ESBL/AmpC production only. In reports of A. 
baumannii, the highest level of resistance was represented by isolates exhibiting a multidrug-resistant 
Acinetobacter MRAB profile plus carbapenem-resistance (MRAB-C), followed by strains indicating 
carbapenem-resistance only, then cases of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter (MRAB). An isolate was 
classed as a MDRO if a resistant result was recorded against at least one of the antimicrobials used to 
define MDRO.  
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Key
MRAB - must exhibit aminoglycoside
AND 3GC resistance
Carbapenem resistant
Indicators for ESBL/AmpC
Indicators for GRE
Indicators for MRSA  
3GC, third generation cephalosporin; GRE, glycopeptide-resistant enterococci; MRSA, methicillin-resistant S. aureus 
Organism
Ami Ctx Cfp Ctz Ctr Gen Tob Neo Imi Mer Ert Azt Van Tei Fox Flu
A. baumannii         
Enterobacter  spp.       
E. coli        
Klebsiella  spp.       
P. aeruginosa  
Enterococcus  spp.  
S. aureus  
Antimicrobial name
 
Ami, amikacin; Ctx, cefotaxime; Cfp, cefpodoxime; Ctz, ceftazidime; Gen, gentamicin; Tob, tobramycin; Neo, 
neomycin; Imi, imipenem; Mer, meropenem; Ert, ertapenem; Azt, aztreonam; Van, vancomycin; Tei, teicoplanin; Ctr, 
ceftriaxone; Fox, cefoxitin; Flu, flucloxacillin 
Table 5.3: Antimicrobials used to identify multidrug-resistant organisms 
 
Similar to the methods described in Chapter 4, invasive specimen sites were determined according to the 
guidelines “Laboratory Reporting to the Health Protection Agency: Guide for Diagnostic Laboratories” 
(138). 
 
5.3.3. Data de-duplication 
It was essential that data de-duplication was performed for both the epidemiological analysis and outbreak 
detection analysis. The methods used for de-duplication were different, due to differing objectives from the 
analyses. To avoid multiple isolates from individual patients being included in the epidemiological analysis 
and potentially skewing results, only the first report of distinct strains from a patient were retained, where 
a strain is determined by the antimicrobial resistance phenotype. To avoid artificially reducing the number 
of cases of particular strains in the later years of the time period studied, a report would be counted again 
if the same strain was isolated from a patient more than one year after the initial report. It was crucial to 
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identify different strains in patients as a patient with an infection initially treatable with first-line 
antimicrobial therapy may go on to develop a resistant strain of the organism over time (which may or may 
not be associated with the initial therapy administered) or may acquire a MDRO whilst in the healthcare 
setting. 
 
5.3.4. Methods for epidemiological analysis 
A descriptive analysis was first performed on the data set as a whole before the organism specific data sets 
were examined. At organism level, chi-squared (  ) tests of association were employed to assess whether 
there were differences in the proportions of MDRO between; age groups; patient sex; CPGs; hospital sites 
or; full-year time periods (March – February). The total number of reports for each organism has been used 
as the denominator data to produce proportions of resistance e.g. the reported percentage of MRAB-C 
represents the proportion of isolates that were identified as MRAB-C within all reports of A. baumannii. 
Binomial regression analysis was performed if the results from the    analysis indicated that there had 
been a significant change in the proportion of carbapenem-resistant isolates over time (at the 5% 
significance level). A multivariable logistic regression model was used to allow the inclusion of all 
explanatory variables in the analysis and thus determine if any factor was associated with a significantly 
higher proportion of MDRO when all other variables had been adjusted for. Finally, tests of interaction 
were performed to determine if the effect of two variables (hospital site and time period) were the same 
regardless of the level of the other; interactions were assessed if results from the binomial regression 
analysis indicated a significant change in the proportion of MDRO isolated across any of the three time 
periods March 2009 – February 2010, March 2010 – February 2011 and March 2011 – February 2012. 
 
5.4. Results 
There were 24,943 reports for organisms included in this study between 1st March 2009 and 29th February 
2012. After de-duplication, 19,133 reports remained. The organism distribution can be seen in Table 5.4. 
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Organism name Frequency (%) 
A. baumannii 196 (1.0) 
Group A Streptococci 77 (0.4) 
Enterobacter spp. 885 (4.6) 
Enterococcus spp. 3,127 (16.3) 
E. coli 4,683 (24.5) 
Klebsiella spp. 865 (4.5) 
P. aeruginosa 3,119 (16.3) 
S. aureus 5,836 (30.5) 
S. maltophilia 345 (1.8) 
Total 19,133 
Table 5.4: Frequency of organisms isolated during the three-year study period (post de-duplication) 
 
There were slightly more reports for male patients than females (51.7% vs. 48.3%) and a decrease in the 
number of reports made year-on-year; there were 7,072 reports in 2009/10, 6,218 in 2010/11 and 5,843 in 
2011/12. The majority of isolates were from patients in Charing Cross Hospital (10,702, 55.9%), with 8,411 
isolates from patients at Hammersmith Hospital (44.0%) and 20 from patients located at other sites. Two-
hundred and thirty-three different specimen sites were reported over three years. The most commonly 
reported specimen types can be seen in Table 5.5. There were 965 reports with missing values for specimen 
type. The number of organisms isolated from patients in the different CPGs can be seen in Table 5.6, with 
the distribution of isolates by patient age-groups displayed in Table 5.7. 
Specimen type Frequency (%) 
Mid stream urine 3,430 (17.9) 
Wound 1,424 (7.4) 
Swab 1,334 (7.0) 
Blood 1,276 (6.7) 
Sputum 1,246 (6.5) 
Nose 1,199 (6.3) 
Catheter urine 1,010 (5.3) 
Cumulative percentage = 57.1% 
Table 5.5: Summary of most commonly reported specimen types 
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CPG description (CPG number) Frequency (%) 
Medicine (1) 5,932 (31.0) 
Surgery & Cancer (2) 3,919 (20.5) 
Specialist Services (3) 3,804 (19.9) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal Medicine (4) 4,104 (21.5) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences (6) 517 (2.7) 
Private Patients (7) 732 (3.8) 
Unknown 125 (0.7) 
Total 19,133 
Table 5.6: Frequency of isolates by clinical programme group 
Age group Frequency (%) 
16 – 24 424 (2.2) 
25 – 39 1,871 (9.8) 
40 – 54 3,151 (16.5) 
55 – 64 3,144 (16.4) 
65 – 74 4,356 (22.8) 
75 – 84 3,850 (20.1) 
≥ 85 2,337 (12.2) 
Total 19,133 
Table 5.7: Distribution of all organisms isolated by age-group 
 
Epidemiological analysis for each of the organisms investigated has been split into sub-sections and the 
results are presented below. As previously mentioned, the analysis will focus on cases of MDRO (as defined 
in the Methods) and in the case of Enterobacteriaceae and A. baumannii, the analysis has been limited to 
strains exhibiting the highest level of resistance (carbapenem-resistant strains and MRAB-C, respectively).  
 
5.4.1. Acinetobacter baumannii 
There were 196 cases of A. baumannii in the three year study period. MRAB-C strains were the most 
commonly isolated (129, 65.8%), followed by strains not defined as multi-drug resistant (47, 24.0%). There 
were 10 cases each of carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii and MRAB. There was no significant difference 
in the proportion of isolates identified as MRAB-C between hospital sites (Charing Cross Hospital=68.9%, 
Hammersmith Hospital=59.4%; p=0.2). Additionally, there was no difference in the proportion of MRAB-C 
across the CPGs, which is summarised in Table 5.8 (p=0.2). The proportion of isolates identified as MRAB-C 
in male and female patients was also similar (68.4% and 62.0% respectively, p=0.4) and there was no strong 
evidence of differences in proportions across age groups, as can be seen in Table 5.9 (p=0.8). There was, 
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however, a significant difference in the proportion of MRAB-C isolates identified over the three full year 
time periods. In 2009-10 the proportion of MRAB-C was 47.1%, which increased to 74.7% in 2010/11, with 
the proportion in 2011/12 at 77.2% (p<0.001). 
CPG MRAB-C proportion, % (cases) 
Medicine 57.7 (15) 
Surgery & Cancer 55.6 (10) 
Specialist Services 65.7 (71) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal 
Medicine 
61.1 (11) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 75.0 (9) 
Private Patients 92.9 (13) 
Table 5.8: Proportion of MRAB-C across the clinical programme groups 
Age group MRAB-C proportion, % (cases) 
16 – 24 50.0 (3) 
25 – 39 60.0 (21) 
40 – 54 60.0 (24) 
55 – 64 70.4 (19) 
65 – 74 69.0 (40) 
75 – 84 70.8 (17) 
≥ 85 83.3 (5) 
Table 5.9: Proportion of MRAB-C by patient age groups 
 
Results from the binomial regression analysis revealed that there was a significant relative increase of 
58.6% (95% CI 19.1 – 111.2%, p=0.002) between 2009/10 and 2010/11. Although there was a small relative 
increase from 2010/11 to 2011/12, this was not found to be significant (p=0.7). Figure 5.2 shows the 
proportion of cases of MRAB-C isolates over the entire study period.  After performing a multivariable 
logistic regression model including all variables individually investigated above i.e. sex, CPG, hospital site, 
age group and time period, significant increases in MRAB-C  were still observed (2009/10 to 2010/11: odds 
ratio (OR)=3.6, 95% CI 1.6 – 8.3, p=0.002; 2009/10 to 2011/12: OR=3.9, 95% CI 1.6 – 9.4, p=0.002). In 
addition, results from the regression analysis revealed that the odds of isolating MRAB-C from patients 
located in wards associated with CPG 7, the CPG for Private Patients, was higher when compared with 
patients in wards associated with the Medicine CPG (OR 18.0, 95% CI 1.7 – 187.5, p=0.02). 
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Figure 5.2: Proportions of MRAB-C between March 2009 and February 2012 
 
Since a significant difference in the proportion of MRAB-C was observed over time, a test to determine if 
interactions existed was performed to find out whether different temporal patterns existed across the 
hospitals; interactions between hospital and time period were investigated. Results from the likelihood 
ratio test revealed that the trends over time were different at the two main hospital sites (p=0.01). At 
Charing Cross Hospital the odds ratio for isolating MRAB-C increased significantly from 2009/10 to 2010/11 
(OR=6.1, 95% CI=2.5-15.0, p<0.001). During the same time period the odds of isolating MRAB-C from 
patients at Hammersmith Hospital appeared to decrease from the baseline time period (OR=0.5, 95% 
CI=0.1-2.2, p=0.4). At both hospitals the OR increased from 2010/11 to 2011/12, although the odds of 
isolating MRAB-C from patients at Hammersmith Hospital were lower than for those patients at Charing 
Cross Hospital (OR=7.8, 95% CI=2.5-24.6, p<0.001 and OR=1.7, 95% CI=0.6-5.2, p=0.4, respectively). The 
increase in MRAB-C observed over time appears to be as a result of increasing numbers of isolates at 
Charing Cross Hospital. The difference in the odds of isolating MRAB-C from patients at the two hospital 
sites can be seen in Figure 5.3.  
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CX, Charing Cross Hospital; HH, Hammersmith Hospital 
Figure 5.3: Comparison of MRAB-C odds ratios at the two main hospital sites. 
 
5.4.2. Group A Streptococci 
There were 77 cases of S. pyogenes (Group A Streptococci) from March 2009 to February 2012. Of these, 13 
(16.9%) were classed as iGAS according to the HPA’s definitions of invasive specimen sites. There was a 
significant difference in the proportion of iGAS isolated between the two hospital sites, with iGAS 
representing 25.0% (n=11) of S. pyogenes isolates at Charing Cross Hospital, compared to just 6.1% (n=2) at 
Hammersmith Hospital (p=0.03). There was no difference in proportions of iGAS across the three time 
periods studied (2009/10=22.5%, n=9; 2010/11=12.5%, n=3; 2011/12=7.7%, n=1; p=0.4), between the sexes 
(males=13.3%, females=19.2%; p=0.5) or across age groups (Table 5.10; p=0.4). The only other significant 
difference observed was across the CPGs (Table 5.11; p=0.05). With such small numbers reported the 
proportions ranged from zero (Private Patients) to 100% (Clinical & Investigative Sciences and CPG 
“unknown”, each with only one case of iGAS). Again, with such small numbers, the output from the 
multivariable regression analysis was not informative with several variable categories containing no 
observations. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
O
d
d
 r
at
io
 
MRAB-C odds ratios over time 
CX odds ratio
HH odds ratio
 171 
 
Age group iGAS proportion, % (cases) 
16 – 24 0.0 (0) 
25 – 39 13.0 (3) 
40 – 54 15.8 (3) 
55 – 64 42.9 (3) 
65 – 74 25.0 (2) 
75 – 84 16.7 (1) 
≥ 85 25.0 (1) 
Table 5.10: Proportion of iGAS by patient age groups 
CPG iGAS proportion, % (cases) 
Medicine 12.8 (5) 
Surgery & Cancer 11.8 (2) 
Specialist Services 33.3 (3) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal 
Medicine 
11.1 (1) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 100.0 (1) 
Private Patients 0.0 (0) 
Unknown 100.0 (1) 
Table 5.11: Proportion of iGAS across the clinical programme groups 
 
5.4.3. Enterobacter spp. 
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. represented the smallest proportion of all strain-types isolated (69 
cases, 7.8%). The majority were isolates displaying no evidence of an ESBL carbapenem resistant phenotype 
(510, 57.6%), followed by ESBL/AmpC-producing isolates (306, 34.6%). There was a significant difference in 
the proportion of carbapenem-resistant strains isolated at the different hospital sites; 6.3% (n=32) at 
Charing Cross Hospital, 9.9% (n=37) at Hammersmith Hospital (p=0.05). No strong evidence of differences 
in proprtions across CPGs (Table 5.12; p=0.08), patient sex (males=8.9%, n=48; females=6.1%, n=21; p=0.1) 
or age group (Table 5.13; p=0.5) were observed. There was, however, a year on year increase in the 
proportion of carbapenem-resistant organisms isolated over the three time periods, which was found to be 
significant from the    analysis. In 2009/10 the proportion of carbapenem-resistant isolates was 2.2% 
(n=7), which increased to 10.2% (n=27) in 2010/11, rising again to 11.5% (n=35) in the final year of analysis 
(p<0.001). Figure 5.4 demonstrates the increase in cases of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. 
observed over time.  
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CPG Proportion carbapenem-resistant, % (cases) 
Medicine 5.1 (9) 
Surgery & Cancer 6.5 (11) 
Specialist Services 7.9 (25) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal 
Medicine 
12.6 (22) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 13.3 (2) 
Private Patients 0.0 (0) 
Unknown 0.0 (0) 
Table 5.12: Proportion of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. across the clinical programme groups 
Age group Proportion carbapenem-resistant, % (cases) 
16 – 24 16.7 (4) 
25 – 39 3.2 (2) 
40 – 54 9.0 (15) 
55 – 64 7.1 (12) 
65 – 74 7.6 (17) 
75 – 84 7.3 (12) 
≥ 85 9.3 (7) 
Table 5.13: Proportion of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. by patient age groups 
 
Figure 5.4: Proportions of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. between March 2009 and February 
2012 
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As the results from the    analysis indicated that there had been a significant change in the proportion of 
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. isolated over time, binomial regression analysis was also 
performed. This indicated that there had been a significant increase from 2009/10 to 2010/11 (risk ratio 
(RR) = 4.6, 95% CI 2.0 – 10.4, p<0.001). Although there was a small increase from 2010/11 to 2011/12, this 
was not found to be significant (RR=1.1, 95% CI 0.7 – 1.8, p=0.6). After including all variables in the logistic 
regression model to provide adjusted odds ratios, the increase in carbapenem-resistance from the baseline 
year (2009/10) to 2010/11 and 2011/12 was still found to be significant (p<0.001 in both cases). There was 
no evidence of interactions between time period and hospital site for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter 
spp. (p=0.7). 
 
5.4.4. Enterococcus spp. 
There were a total of 3,127 Enterococcus spp. reports included in the analysis, 23.2% (724) of which were 
cases of GRE. There were 303 incidents of GRE at Charing Cross Hospital (303/1,300, 18.9%) compared to 
420 cases at Hammersmith Hospital (420/1,103, 27.6%) and this represented a significant difference in the 
proportion of resistant isolates between the two main hospital sites (p<0.001). There was only one case of 
GRE observed at one of the off-site locations i.e. a renal satellite unit. There was a significant difference in 
the proportions of GRE across the CPGs (p<0.001), as can be seen in Table 5.14. Furthermore, there was 
evidence that a difference across the age groups existed (Table 5.15; p=0.05). 
CPG GRE proportion, % (cases) 
Medicine 8.9 (65) 
Surgery & Cancer 8.4 (62) 
Specialist Services 42.8 (292) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal 
Medicine 
35.5 (258) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 34.6 (38) 
Private Patients 8.3 (9) 
Unknown 0.0 (0) 
Table 5.14: Proportion of GRE across the clinical programme groups 
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Age group GRE proportion, % (cases) 
16 – 24 22.9 (8) 
25 – 39 19.7 (58) 
40 – 54 22.9 (122) 
55 – 64 24.9 (139) 
65 – 74 26.9 (202) 
75 – 84 20.9 (135) 
≥ 85 19.5 (60) 
Table 5.15: Proportion of GRE by patient age groups 
 
There appeared to be an initial increase in the proportion of GRE isolated from 2009/10 (23.7%, n=290) to 
2010/11 (25.2%, n=258), followed by a decrease in 2011/12 (20.1, n=176). Overall, the results of the    
analysis suggested that the observed changes were significant (p=0.03) and this time trend can be seen in 
Figure 5.5. Results from the binomial regression showed that there was no significant difference in the 
proportion of isolates identified as GRE from 2009/10 to 2010/11 (p=0.4), however, there was a significant 
relative decrease of 20.2% from 2010/11 to 2011/12 (95% CI 5.5 – 32.6, p=0.009). After performing the 
multivariable logistic regression it was clear to see that the odds of becoming infected or colonised with 
GRE were much greater if patients were in wards associated with Specialist Services (OR = 7.9, 95% CI 5.6 – 
10.7, p<0.001), Circulation Sciences & Renal Medicine (OR = 5.7, 95% CI 4.0 – 8.1, p<0.001) or Clinical & 
Investigative Sciences (OR = 5.4, 95% CI 3.3 – 9.0, p<0.001) than patients located in Medicine wards. The 
presence of interactions was investigated but there was no evidence to suggest that interactions between 
time period and hospital site existed (p=0.8). 
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Figure 5.5: Proportions of GRE between March 2009 and February 2012 
 
5.4.5. Escherichia coli 
Of the 4,683 reports of E. coli, 969 (20.7%) were found to exhibit resistance profiles suggesting ESBL/AmpC 
production, whereas 43 (0.9%) demonstrated carbapenem resistance. Significant differences in proportion 
of carbapenem-resistant E. coli were observed between hospital sites (Charing Cross Hospital=0.5%, 
Hammersmith Hospital = 1.4%; p=0.002), CPGs (p<0.001), sex (males=1.4%, females=0.7%; p=0.01) and age 
group (p=0.01). Tables 5.16 and 5.17 show the differences in proportions across CPGs and age groups, 
respectively. There was no evidence of a change in the proportion of carbapenem-resistant E. coli isolates 
identified over time (2009/10=1.1%, n=18; 2010/11=1.0%, n=15; 2011/12=0.6%, n=10; p=0.3).  
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CPG Proportion carbapenem-resistant, % (cases) 
Medicine 0.2 (3) 
Surgery & Cancer 0.5 (5) 
Specialist Services 2.3 (13) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal 
Medicine 
0.8 (9) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 5.8 (9) 
Private Patients 2.5 (4) 
Unknown 0 (0) 
Table 5.16: Proportion of carbapenem-resistant E. coli across the clinical programme groups 
Age group Proportion carbapenem 
resistant, % (cases) 
Odds ratios (95% 
CI) 
p value 
16 – 24 3.5 (4) (base category)  
25 – 39 0.8 (4) 0.2 (0.04 – 0.7) 0.02 
40 – 54 0.8 (6) 0.2 (0.04 – 0.6) 0.006 
55 – 64 1.2 (8) 0.2 (0.06 – 0.7) 0.01 
65 – 74 1.4 (14) 0.3 (0.08 – 0.9) 0.03 
75 – 84 0.5 (5) 0.2 (0.04 – 0.6) 0.01 
≥ 85 0.3 (2) 0.2 (0.03 – 1.0) 0.04 
Table 5.17: Proportions and odds ratios for carbapenem-resistant E. coli by age group (OR as estimated 
from the multivariable logistic regression) 
 
Results from the multivariable logistic regression analysis indicated that the odds of isolating carbapenem-
resistant E. coli remained significantly higher in patients on wards associated with Specialist Services 
(p<0.001), Clinical & Investigative Sciences (p<0.001) and Private Patients (p=0.003) when other factors had 
been adjusted for. The odds of isolating carbapenem-resistant E. coli from patients located at 
Hammersmith Hospital were also significantly greater than for patients at Charing Cross Hospital (OR = 3.1, 
95% CI 1.4 – 7.2, p=0.007). As initially indicated by the results of the     analysis, the proportion of isolates 
identified as being carbapenem resistant was highest in patients aged 16 – 24 years old. This was supported 
by results from the logistic regression, with the odds of isolating carbapenem-resistant E. coli from patients 
in all other age groups significantly lower (Table 5.17).    
 
5.4.6. Klebsiella spp. 
Forty-nine isolates of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. were identified, comprising 5.7% of all Klebsiella 
spp. reports. There were almost equal numbers of antimicrobial sensitive strains of Klebsiella spp. and 
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ESBL/AmpC-producing strains over the three year study period (410 and 406, respectively). There were no 
significant differences in the proportion of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. by hospital site (Charing 
Cross Hospital=5.1%, n=23; Hammersmith Hospital=6.3%, n=26; p=0.7), sex (males=6.3%, n=32; 
females=4.8%, n=17; p=0.3) or across the three time periods (2009/10=4.4%, n=13; 2010/11=5.8%, n=15; 
2011/12=6.8%, n=21; p=0.4). Differences in proportions across clinical specialties was observed (p=0.05), 
and stronger evidence of differences by age groups was also seen (p<0.001). The proportion of 
carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. by CPG and age group can be found in Tables 5.18 and 5.19 below. 
 CPG Proportion carbapenem  resistant, % (cases) 
Medicine 3.6 (7) 
Surgery & Cancer 1.7 (2) 
Specialist Services 6.5 (17) 
Circulation Sciences & Renal 
Medicine 
9.3 (21) 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 0 (0) 
Private Patients 5.9 (2) 
Unknown 0 (0) 
Table 5.18: Proportion of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. across the clinical programme groups 
Age group Proportion carbapenem 
resistant, % (cases) 
Odds ratios (95% 
CI) 
p value 
16 – 24 31.8 (7) (base category)  
25 – 39 4.4 (4) 0.06 (0.01 – 0.3) <0.001 
40 – 54 5.5 (6) 0.08 (0.02 – 0.3) <0.001 
55 – 64 4.4 (7) 0.06 (0.02 – 0.2) <0.001 
65 – 74 4.4 (9) 0.06 (0.02 – 0.2) <0.001 
75 – 84 6.4 (12) 0.1 (0.03 – 0.4) <0.001 
≥ 85 4.6 (4) 0.08 (0.02 – 0.4) 0.001 
Table 5.19: Proportions and odds ratios for carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. by age group (OR as 
estimated from the multivariable logistic regression) 
 
The multivariable logistic regression analysis revealed that the odds of isolating carbapenem-resistant 
Klebsiella spp. from patients on wards related to the Circulation Sciences & Renal Medicine CPG were 
significantly higher compared to patients on Medicine wards (OR=3.7, 95% CI 1.1 – 12.3, p=0.03). Similar to 
the results for carbapenem-resistant E. coli, the highest proportion of carbapenem resistance in Klebsiella 
spp. was observed in patients aged 16 – 24. The results from the regression analysis can be found in Table 
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5.19, which shows that the odds ratios in all other age groups are significantly lower when compared with 
patients in the 16 – 24 age category. 
 
5.4.7. Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
There were 3,119 cases of P. aeruginosa in the study period, with 591 (19.0%) identified as being 
carbapenem-resistant isolates. Significant differences in the proportions of carbapenem-resistant P. 
aeruginosa were observed in all variables analysed, including full-year time periods (Table 5.20). Figure 5.6 
displays the decrease in proportion of carbapenem-resistant isolates observed over time (p<0.001 from the 
   analysis). The binomial regression analysis supported these findings, showing a significant relative 
decrease in proportions of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa between 2009/10 and 2010/11 (19.3%, 95% 
CI 4.4 – 31.8, p=0.01). Although there was a further decrease from 2010/11 to 2011/12, although this was 
not found to be significant at the 5% level (p=0.1). The proportion of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa 
isolates was higher at Hammersmith Hospital than Charing Cross Hospital (21.2% vs. 17.3%; p=0.01) and 
was higher in males than females (21.3% vs. 16.2%; p<0.001) 
 
The results from the multivariable logistic regression model have been summarised in Table 5.20. As can be 
seen from Table 5.20 the odds of isolating carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa from female patients was 
significantly lower than for males. Also, the odds were increased for patients in locations associated with 
Specialist Services and Private Patient wards compared to patients on Medicine wards. Interestingly, when 
other factors have been adjusted for, the initial decrease in resistance from 2009/10 to 2010/11 identified 
in the binomial regression model is no longer statistically significant (p=0.1). Similar to the findings from the 
analysis performed on E. coli and Klebsiella spp., the highest proportion of carbapenem resistance was 
observed in patients in the youngest age group (30.0%). The odds of isolating carbapenem-resistant P. 
aeruginosa in the older age groups were lower compared with patients in the youngest age group (Table 
5.20) and in the three oldest age categories, the observed difference was statistically significant (proportion 
of carbapenem resistance: 65 – 74=19.9%; 75 – 84=13.3%; ≥ 85=9.6%). 
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Figure 5.6: Proportions of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa between March 2009 and February 2012 
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 Proportion, % (cases) Odds Ratio 95% CI p value 
Sex 
Male 21.3 (359) (base group) 
Female 16.2 (232) 0.8 0.7 – 1.0 0.02 
CPG 
Medicine 11.9 (111) (base group) 
Surgery & Cancer 11.6 (64) 0.9 0.6 – 1.3 0.6 
Specialist Services 32.7 (252) 3.2 2.5 – 4.1 <0.001 
Circulation Sciences & Renal Medicine 16.8 (105) 0.9 0.7 – 1.3 0.8 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 31.8 (21) 1.8 1.0 – 3.2 0.1 
Private Patients 23.5 (35) 1.9 1.2 – 3.0 <0.001 
Unknown 15.8 (3) 1.0 0.3 – 3.4 >0.9 
Hospital site 
Charing Cross 17.3 (310) (base group) 
Hammersmith 21.2 (280) 1.7 1.3 – 2.1 <0.001 
Other 50.0 (1) 12.8 0.8 – 212.4 0.1 
Age group 
16 – 24 30.0 (21) (base group) 
25 – 39 21.2 (49) 0.6 0.3 – 1.1 0.1 
40 – 54 26.6 (124) 0.8 0.4 – 1.4 0.4 
55 – 64 21.3 (108) 0.6 0.3 – 1.1 0.1 
65 – 74 19.9 (167) 0.5 0.3 – 0.9 <0.001 
75 – 84 13.6 (90) 0.4 0.2 – 0.6 <0.001 
≥85 9.9 (32) 0.3 0.2 – 0.6 <0.001 
Time period 
2009/10 22.6 (243) (base group) 
2010/11 18.3 (192) 0.8 0.7 – 1.0 0.1 
2011/12 15.7 (156) 0.7 0.5 – 0.8 <0.001 
Table 5.20: Proportion of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (from the chi-squared analysis) and summary 
of output from the multivariable logistic regression analysis 
 
5.4.8. Staphylococcus aureus 
More than half of the S. aureus isolates were MRSA (3,184, 54.6%). Similar to the results for carbapenem-
resistant P. aeruginosa, significant differences in the proportion of isolates identified as MRSA were found 
in all variables following univariate analysis (Table 5.21). The proportion of MRSA isolates was higher at 
Hammersmith Hospital (59.5%) than at Charing Cross Hospital (51.4%), which was notably higher in 
patients located in the renal satellite units (93.3%, although numbers were much lower at this location, 
n=14 MRSA isolates; p<0.001). There were also significant differences observed across the CPGs, with the 
highest proportions of MRSA seen in patients located in wards associated with the Medicine and Clinical & 
Investigative Sciences CPGs (64.1% and 64.6%, respectively) and the lowest proportion seen in patients on 
wards for Private Patients (40.6%, p<0.001). There was a significant difference in the proportion of isolates 
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identified as MRSA between male and female patients at 56.0% and 52.5%, respectively (p=0.01). The 
highest proportion of MRSA isolates was seen in patients aged over 85 years old (71.7%) and the lowest in 
patients aged 16 – 24 years old (24.5%, p<0.001). 
 
As a significant change in proportions of MRSA was detected from the    analysis over the three time 
periods, decreasing from 59.0% in 2009/10 to 49.6% in 2011/12 (p<0.001), binomial regression analysis was 
performed. Results from this analysis revealed a significant year-on-year decrease in the proportion of S. 
aureus isolates identified as MRSA; a 9.2% relative decrease occurred between 2009/10 and 2010/11 (95% 
CI 4.2 – 14.0, p<0.001), followed by a 7.4% relative decrease from 2010/11 to 2011/12 (95% CI 1.3 – 13.2, 
p=0.02). Figure 5.7 demonstrates the change in MRSA proportions over time. 
 
Figure 5.7: Proportions of MRSA between March 2009 and February 2012 
 
Results from the multi-variable logistic regression revealed that differences in the proportions of MRSA still 
existed across all variables analysed at an individual level (Table 5.21). This analysis revealed that the odds 
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significantly lower than the odds observed in the Medicine CPG (p<0.001 in all cases). However, the odds of 
patients being found to be MRSA positive was significantly higher in patients on Clinical & Investigative 
Sciences wards compared to patients on Medicine wards (OR=1.8, 95% CI 1.1 – 2.7, p=0.01). Also, when age 
groups were compared against patients in the 16-24 years age group, all age groups besides patients in the 
25-39 age group were found to have significantly increased odds of being infected or colonised with MRSA 
(p<0.001 in all cases). The existence of interactions between time period and hospital site was investigated 
but there was no strong evidence to suggest that this was the case for MRSA (p=0.06). 
 Proportion, % (cases) Odds Ratio 95% CI p value 
Sex 
Male 56.0 (1,935) (base group) 
Female 52.5 (1,249) 0.9 0.8 – 1.0 0.008 
CPG 
Medicine 64.1 (1,344) (base group) 
Surgery & Cancer 44.7 (589) 0.6 0.5 – 0.7 <0.001 
Specialist Services 43.6 (411) 0.6 0.5 – 0.7 <0.001 
Circulation Sciences & Renal Medicine 59.7 (661) 0.9 0.7 – 1.1 0.2 
Clinical & Investigative Sciences 64.6 (73) 1.8 1.1 – 2.7 0.01 
Private Patients 40.6 (93) 0.5 0.4 – 0.7 <0.001 
Unknown 44.8 (13) 0.5 0.2 – 1.2 0.1 
Hospital site 
Charing Cross 51.4 (1,846) (base group) 
Hammersmith 59.5 (1,324) 1.2 1.0 – 1.3 0.05 
Other 93.3 (14) 8.7 1.1 – 67.3 0.04 
Age group 
16 – 24 24.5 (34) (base group) 
25 – 39 30.5 (184) 1.4 0.9 – 2.1 0.1 
40 – 54 41.1 (415) 2.2 1.4 – 3.3 <0.001 
55 – 64 51.3 (487) 3.1 2.0 – 4.7 <0.001 
65 – 74 59.1 (698) 4.2 2.8 – 6.4 <0.001 
75 – 84 68.9 (784) 6.2 4.1 – 9.5 <0.001 
≥85 71.7 (582) 6.8 4.4 – 10.5 <0.001 
Time period 
2009/10 59.0 (1,343) (base group) 
2010/11 53.6 (1,034) 0.8 0.7 – 1.0 0.008 
2011/12 49.6 (807) 0.7 0.6 – 0.8 <0.001 
Table 5.21: Proportion of MRSA (from the chi-squared analysis) and summary of output from the 
multivariable logistic regression analysis 
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5.4.9. Stenotrophomonas maltophilia 
As specific resistance profiles for S. maltophilia were not investigated there is no denominator data 
available for calculating proportions and making comparisons across patient categories. A descriptive 
analysis is therefore presented instead. There were 345 cases of S. maltophilia during the study period after 
de-duplication. There were more cases in patients at Hammersmith Hospital (n=208) than Charing Cross 
Hospital (n=137). The highest number of cases were reported from patients on Specialist Services wards, 
representing 38.6% of all reports (n=133). The number of reports appeared to decrease over time, as can 
be seen in Figure 5.8. Males represented almost two-thirds of cases (n=217, 62.3%), and the largest number 
of reports were on patients aged 65 – 74 years old (n=99, 28.7%), with only four cases in patients aged 16 – 
24 years old. 
 
Figure 5.8: Number of cases of S. maltophilia, March 2009 – February 2012 
 
5.5. Discussion 
Performing epidemiological analysis on microbiology data prior to the application of outbreak detection 
models at the local level has identified significant increases in carbapenem resistance in two organisms 
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investigated; A. baumannii and Enterobacter spp. The proportion of MRAB-C isolates identified was 
alarming, with 77.2% of A. baumannii isolates found to be resistant to imipenem or meropenem in addition 
to aminoglycosides and third-generation cephalosporins in 2011/12. There was also a year-on-year increase 
in the number of cases of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. The results from this analysis indicate that 
carbapenem-resistance appears to be an emerging problem within ICHT and the investigation of automated 
methods for the rapid detection of outbreaks is justified. 
 
Differences in the proportions of MDRO were observed across all variables analysed. Evidence of 
differences in proportions across CPGs were observed in GRE, carbapenem-resistant E. coli, carbapenem-
resistant Klebsiella spp., carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa and MRSA. Younger patients (age group 16-
24) were found to have the highest odds of being infected or colonised with isolates of E.coli, Klebsiella spp. 
or P. aeruginosa resistant to carbapenems, yet this group of patients was found to have lowest odds of 
being MRSA positive. Differences in proportions of resistance between the sexes were identified in 
carbapenem-resistant E. coli, carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa and MRSA. Differences in proportions of 
resistance across the hospital sites were found to be significant for the majority of organisms, with Charing 
Cross Hospital demonstrating a higher proportion of isolates classed as iGAS than Hammersmith Hospital. 
Additionally, results from the likelihood ratio test investigating the presence of interactions revealed that 
there was evidence of increased odds of isolating of MRAB-C from patients in Charing Cross Hospital, which 
had not been initially identified from the χ2 analysis. In contrast, there was evidence of higher proportions 
of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp., GRE, carbapenem-resistant E. coli, carbapenem-resistant P. 
aeruginosa and MRSA at Hammersmith Hospital compared to Charing Cross Hospital. 
 
The manual data management required to perform this epidemiological analysis presents limitations in the 
implementation of an automated system for the identification of MDRO, and thus outbreak detection. 
Misys, the LIMS used in this data analysis, is an example of a hierarchical data model and is not an ideal 
system for use in epidemiological analysis. This type of data structure relies on a one-to-many relationship, 
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which is inflexible since a “parent” data field (e.g. laboratory number) can be associated with many 
“children” data fields (e.g. organism name, antimicrobial and result). As a consequence, it was not possible 
to use automated methods to de-duplicate or reorganise the data in preparation for analysis.  Additionally, 
a large proportion of organisms were not speciated beyond “Coliforms”. This may affect the findings 
presented in this chapter as the epidemiological analysis was only performed on organisms identified to the 
genus level. It must also be noted that this may affect the ability of automated methods to detect 
outbreaks in the next chapter.  
 
Although outbreak detection systems can detect exceptional events, they are not best suited for identifying 
if a particular group of patients are at an increased risk of developing infections caused by MDRO. It is 
therefore important to perform regular epidemiological analysis in addition to outbreak detection to help 
understand the local situation and identify potential risk factors. For example, the epidemiological analysis 
performed in this chapter revealed that the odds of isolating carbapenem-resistant E. coli, Klebsiella spp. 
and P. aeruginosa were significantly higher in patients in the youngest age-group analysed (16 to 24 years 
old). In support of the published literature, patients on wards associated with the Specialist Services CPG, 
which includes intensive care wards, were found to have the highest proportion of carbapenem-resistant E. 
coli and carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (179). This information can be used to target infection control 
efforts before potential outbreak situations arise. However, with the isolation of carbapenem-resistant 
organisms from patients in the community and non-ICU setting, the evolving epidemiology of carbapenem-
resistance must also be considered when developing infection prevention and control strategies, including 
outbreak detection, within the healthcare setting (24). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6. CAN ROUTINELY COLLECTED MICROBIOLOGY DATA BE USED TO PERFORM 
OUTBREAK DETECTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL? 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As previously described in Chapter 3 there are several issues to overcome when applying outbreak 
detection models to data contained within a national surveillance system. Such issues include: variation in 
the diversity of organisms reported by laboratories; reporting delays and; inconsistencies in the availability 
of antimicrobial susceptibility data within LabBase2. Many of these limitations can be overcome by using 
data contained within local LIMS for outbreak detection. It is therefore worth investigating the application 
of outbreak detection methods directly to data recorded in local LIMS. This avoids issues associated with 
reporting via a national reporting system and provides an opportunity to use more comprehensive 
information on antimicrobial susceptibilities, which can be used in the identification of MDRO. Additionally, 
using data directly from the LIMS allows us to access data on patient location within the hospital, 
information that was not available in LabBase2.  
 
Besides general concerns around the increasing rates of carbapenem resistance, local level analysis 
presented in the previous chapter revealed significant increases in carbapenem resistance in two organisms 
between March 2009 and February 2012; A. baumannii and Enterobacter spp. Additionally, analysis of ICHT 
microbiology data performed by Moore et al. revealed that there has been an increase in the rate of 
ESBL/AmpC-producing Enterobacteriaceae in the same time period (L.S.P. Moore, R. Freeman, C.P. Thomas, 
E. T. Brannigan, M. Gilchrist, H. Donaldson, A.H. Holmes, “Antimicrobial resistance - homogeneity of policy, 
heterogeneity of cohorts”, manuscript in preparation). These findings suggest that identification of 
outbreaks caused by these organisms is required at the hospital level. In this chapter outbreak detection 
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will therefore be performed on organisms exhibiting carbapenem resistance and ESBL/AmpC-production as 
well as those that are currently under mandatory surveillance (MRSA and GRE) (34;40;52). 
 
One of the studies described in the literature review presented in the Chapter 4 recognised the importance 
of applying statistical “rules” to surveillance data to ensure that there is a standardised approach to the 
identification of outbreaks (10). The work presented in this chapter explores the potential benefits of using 
statistical methods for outbreak detection at the local level. Application of the systematic approach for the 
detection of MDRO described in the previous chapter is also performed to allow the detection of potential 
outbreaks caused by MDRO. For this section of the thesis, data from the ICHT microbiology LIMS was 
analysed using previously described outbreak detection models (Chapter 4). 
 
6.2. Objectives 
 Apply outbreak detection algorithms to organism data; all isolates and MDRO strains 
 Determine the relevance of cumulative sum and variable life adjusted display chart outputs in 
outbreak detection analysis at the trust level 
 Compare exceedances detected using outbreak detection models with outbreaks and incidents 
identified by the ICHT Infection Prevention and Control Team in the same time period (March 2011 
to February 2012) 
 
6.3. Methods 
6.3.1. Data de-duplication 
As previously mentioned, different de-duplication methods were used for the epidemiological analysis and 
outbreak detection. To replicate the 14 day de-duplication period used in LabBase2, a non-cumulative 14 
day de-duplication was performed. This is slightly different from the LabBase2 method, which is a 
cumulative time period. However, as found in the LabBase2 data evaluation presented in Chapter 3, the 
cumulative nature of the de-duplication could result in a large number of reports being classed as one 
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illness episode, spanning time periods much greater than 14 days. The antimicrobials used for testing vary 
depending on the specimen type and as a consequence antimicrobial susceptibility results were not 
consistently reported. It was therefore decided that the 14 day de-duplication would only be applied at 
organism level, rather than strain level. This would help avoid including multiple reports of the same 
organism in the outbreak detection models, which would artificially increase the number of reports 
observed in a week and could result in more outbreaks being detected than actually occurred (high FPR). 
Table 6.1 demonstrates where such an issue would arise. With a missing result for cephalexin, mecillinam, 
nitrofurantoin and trimethoprim in the specimen taken on the 19th April 2010 is it not possible to 
determine whether this isolate is the same as the specimen reported on the 27th April 2010. If the 14 day 
de-duplication had been applied to strains with different antibiograms there would have been six reports 
from this patient contributing to the outbreak analysis within 36 days, whereas the actual number of 
reports included in the analysis was three after the de-duplication was performed (specimens taken on the 
01/04/2010, 15/04/2010 and 06/05/2010). 
 
Ami, amikacin; Amo, amoxicillin; Aug, augmentin; Ctx, cefotaxime; Fox, cefoxitin; Cfp, cefpodoxime; Ceph, cephalexin; 
Cip, ciprofloxacin; Cotr, co-trimoxazole; Gen, gentamicin; Imi, imipenem; Mec, mecillinam; Mer, meropenem; Nit, 
nitofurantoin; Taz, tazocin; Tim, timentin; Tob, tobramycin; Tri, trimethoprim; Missing results highlighted in blue 
Table 6.1: Example of inconsistent testing/reporting of antimicrobial sensitivities 
 
6.3.2. Automated outbreak detection methods 
The algorithm described by Noufaily et al. (140) (also referred to as the “exceedance detection algorithm”) 
was applied to all organisms of interest, as detailed in the epidemiological analysis presented in Chapter 5 
(Table 5.2, page 164). Additionally, the Noufaily algorithm was also applied to MDRO and invasive disease 
as defined in Chapter 5 (Table 5.3, page 165). The details of this method have previously been described in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.4.3.3., page 113). As only three years of microbiology data was available the model 
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was not able to reliably fit temporal trends however, the method can still be confidently applied with two 
years’ worth of data available for the generation of expected counts. The historical data time period ran 
from March 2009 to February 2011, with outbreak detection performed on data reported between March 
2011 and February 2012. 
 
The cusum and VLAD chart methods were also applied to all organism-level data sets. These methods have 
been described in detail in Chapter 4 (sections 4.4.3.4 and 4.4.3.5, pages 115 and 118, respectively). As 
discussed at the end of Chapter 4, different reference values (K) and decision limits (H) were to be 
investigated to ensure more appropriate parameters were used in the cusum method. The equations used 
to calculate the new K and H can be found in Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.2. 
   
μ
  
 
where μ represents the mean weekly count. 
[Equation 6.1] 
     
[Equation 6.2] 
It was considered that a shift of one standard deviation (σ) was too high and that it would be of interest to 
detect smaller consistent shifts in the mean weekly count as this could represent an emerging problem. K 
was therefore selected as described above to detect a 10% increase in mean weekly counts. As H was set to 
4 times the standard deviation in the analysis presented in Chapter 4 the   
  statistic did not reach the 
decision limit often. Since large variances are often observed in counts of infection disease data the 
standard deviations will also be large. To try and overcome this, the value of H, which is directly related to 
the standard deviation, was also reduced. The mean weekly count, K and H were generated using two 
years’ worth of historical data (March 2009 – February 2011) and the data used in the analysis ran from 
March 2011 to February 2012. 
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6.3.3. Outbreak detection methods at Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust  
The Infection Outbreak and Incident Management Policy is prepared by the trust’s Infection Prevention and 
Control Team (IPCT). The document includes definitions for outbreaks as follows: 
 An incident in which two or more people experiencing a similar illness caused by infection are 
linked in time/place 
 A greater than expected rate of infection compared with the usual background rate for the place 
and time where the outbreak has occurred 
Local and major outbreak situations are also distinguished, with local outbreaks described as affecting only 
one clinical area, and a major outbreak defined as affecting a number of clinical areas with “substantial 
impact on the function of the Trust”. According to the policy document an outbreak may be recognised by 
one of several processes; the laboratory surveillance of microbiology reports may show an increase in the 
incidence of a particular infection or “alert organism”; clinical staff may indentify an increase in the number 
of patients affected by the same organism or symptoms or; Occupational Health may identify an increase in 
the number of staff affected by the same infectious disease or symptoms.  
 
Staff use their clinical judgement and local intelligence to determine if there has been an increase in 
incidence or if an outbreak situation is occurring within the hospital setting. It is difficult to ascertain exactly 
the number of cases in a specific time period that would result in the declaration of an outbreak as these 
parameters are not defined in the Infection Outbreak and Incident Management Policy. In addition, the 
term “greater than expected rate” does not give a clear indication of what constitutes an outbreak 
situation as the methods used to determine rates and identify an increase in the observed rate are not 
detailed in the policy. It is also not clear which organisms are considered to be “alert organisms” as a core 
list of these organisms had not been created after the merger of two infection control systems used by the 
IPCT. The IPCT do, however, produce and archive electronic documentation on outbreak situations and 
incidents on a trust network drive. The documentation of outbreaks that occurred between March 2011 
and February 2012 were compared with the alerts generated by the exceedance detection algorithm. 
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6.5. Results 
Exceedances were detected if the observed count was equal to or greater than the upper 95% limit for that 
week, as calculated using the two-year historical data to create expected values. There were a total of 26 
exceedances identified when the outbreak detection algorithm was applied to total organism data. Only 
one organism did not exceed the predicted UL within the one year analysis period (Enterococcus spp.). 
6.4. Case Study: Serratia marcescens “outbreak” 
In February 2013 ICHT were alerted to a potential outbreak of S. marcescens by the North West 
London Health Protection Team (part of the HPA). The episode related to 14 reports of S. marcescens 
made within one week in February 2013, including two reports from the same patient within 14 days. 
This event was identified by the weekly LabBase Exceedance Reporting using the Farrington algorithm 
and the chart relating to this incident is shown below. 
 
Exceedance chart: Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust – Serratia spp.
 
 
Further investigation of this incident revealed that although 13 reports (after de-duplication) were 
loaded into LabBase2 within one week in February, only three reports had an earliest specimen date in 
February. The remaining specimens were taken over a period of 13 days in January. The identification 
of a potential outbreak appears to have resulted from batched reporting, suggesting that using earliest 
specimen date in the exceedance algorithm is justified. However, the delay in reporting of cases would 
not allow for the prospective detection of outbreaks, with many of the reports made to LabBase2 over 
a month after the specimen date. 
 
The specimens were taken from patients at several different locations; four patients were in 
Hammersmith Hospital, four were at Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, three were at St Mary’s 
Hospital, one patient was at Ealing Hospital and the remaining report was for a patient whose 
specimen was taken at a GP surgery. Of the five locations, only Hammersmith Hospital and St Mary’s 
Hospital belong to ICHT. The issue of centralised laboratory testing and the need for correct mapping 
of hospitals to trusts was raised in the Chapter 3. This case illustrates the importance of ensuring that 
the data used in surveillance and outbreak detection reflects the current NHS landscape if outbreak 
alerts are to be of any value to trusts.  
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Further to this, there were no exceedances observed in GRE. As expected at the trust level, particularly 
within multidrug-resistant strains, a series of zero reports within sequential weeks was observed. This 
resulted in a negative UL being generated. The algorithm was aritifically amended to overcome this; the UL 
for affected organisms (iGAS and carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp.) was changed from minus one to 
zero in this situation. 
 
There were many more exceedances observed when the outbreak detection model was applied to isolates 
classified as MDRO or invasive infections (iGAS) compared to the number of exceedances identified using 
all organism data (67 alerts versus 26 alerts). A comparison between the output generated using the total 
organism data and strains exhibiting specific resistances are compared for each organism in the following 
sections. The key in Figure 6.1 applies to all exceedance charts within this chapter, and Table 6.2 
summarises the abbreviated version of antimicrobials used in susceptibility testing. 
 
Figure 6.1: Key for all exceedance charts 
Antibiotic name Abbrev. Antibiotic name Abbrev. 
Amikacin Ami Gentamicin Gen 
Amoxycillin Amo Imipenem Imi 
Augmentin Aug Mecillinam Mec 
Aztreonam Azt Meropenem Mer 
Cefotaxime Ctx Nitrofurantoin Nit 
Cefoxitin Fox Tazocin Taz 
Ceftazidime Ctz Temocillin Tem 
Cefuroxime Cfx Tigecycline Tig 
Cephalexin Ceph Tobramycin Tob 
Ciprofloxacin Cip Trimethoprim Tri 
Ertapenem Ert     
Table 6.2: Abbreviations for antimicrobials used in susceptibility testing 
 
As discussed previously in Chapter 4, output from cusum and VLAD chart analysis can be used to visualise 
deviations from the expected number of isolates over time. Results from the exceedance algorithm did 
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indicate that there may be increasing trends in some organisms, particularly when the algorithm detected a 
series of exceedances above the 95% UL within close proximity; however, these trends are not particularly 
easy to visualise when plotting small numbers in raw time series. In addition, as there were only two years’ 
worth of data available, it was not possible to determine trends in the data series as the model published 
by Noufaily et al. requires data from at least three years to detect trends. Due to the considerable amount 
of output created from this analysis, cusum charts are only presented when a series of consecutive alerts 
have been generated by the exceedance detection algorithm to determine if this method is capable of 
identifying small but persistent shifts in the frequency of observed isolates. This output is then compared to 
the corresponding VLAD charts. The key in Figure 6.2 applies to all cusum charts. The cusum statistics are 
measured on the primary y-axis, and the frequency of reports are measured on the secondary y-axis. 
 
Figure 6.2: Key for all cusum charts 
 
6.5.1. Acinetobacter baumannii 
There were 163 isolates of A. baumannii included in the outbreak detection algorithm, including seven 
multidrug-resistant cases, ten carbapenem-resistant isolates and 100 MRAB-C cases. Table 6.3 summarises 
the occurrence of exceedances observed across all A. baumannii categories. When using all reports of A. 
baumannii in the exceedance detection algorithm there were three weeks where the observed cases 
exceeded the UL. These appear to cluster within a four-week time period, as can be seen in Figure 6.3. 
During the same time period, exceedances were observed in cases of MRAB-C (Figure 6.4). However, the 
exceedance detected in carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii does not correspond to the weeks where the 
total number of A. baumannii resulted in an exceedance above the UL. This exceedance represents the only 
incident of carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii reported between March 2011 and February 2012. There 
were no cases of MRAB observed in the one year analysis period. 
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Besides the three exceedances detected when data on all isolates of A. baumannii was used in the 
exceedance algorithm, two additional exceedances were detected for MRAB-C at weeks 27 and 30 of 2011. 
It is difficult to determine if there was an increase in trend in the 11-week time period during which five 
separate outbreaks alerts were generated, however, analysis of the cusum and VLAD charts will be used to 
further investigate this. 
Organism Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit 
A. baumannii 34 2011 2 0.8 2 
35 2011 3 0.8 2 
37 2011 2 0.7 2 
Carbapenem-
resistant A. 
baumannii 
20 2011 1 0.1 1 
MRAB-C 27 2011 2 0.5 2 
30 2011 2 0.6 2 
34 2011 2 0.6 2 
35 2011 3 0.5 2 
37 2011 2 0.4 2 
Table 6.3: A. baumannii alerts generated by the exceedance detection algorithm 
 
Figure 6.3: Exceedance chart for A. baumannii; three weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% 
UL 
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Figure 6.4: Exceedance chart for strains of A. baumannii exhibiting multidrug resistance and carbapenem 
resistance (MRAB-C); five weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Further investigation of the exceedances detected in MRAB-C revealed that several specimens had been 
taken from the same location between week 27 and week 37 in 2011. Table 6.4 contains additional details 
of patient location, as well as full antimicrobial susceptibility results reported by the microbiology 
laboratory for specimens associated with exceedances. The majority of specimens were taken from 
patients in the critical care setting (6/11). Of particular concern are the three instances in which isolates of 
A. baumannii are resistant to all antimicrobials tested.   
 
These investigations also revealed that in one instance, three specimens were taken from one patient over 
a series of weeks. This patient was on Ward 11N when the first specimen was taken (28/07/11), the 
subsequent two specimens were taken on Ward 15N (01/09/11 and 16/09/11). On the same date as the 
second specimen was taken, another patient also tested positive for MRAB-C on Ward 15N. Although 
duplicate reports from the same patient has resulted in the detection of an exceedance, if this specimen 
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had been excluded from the analysis the exceedance identified at week 35 of 2011 would have only have 
included two specimens from patients in different locations. However, the identification of two patients on 
the same ward in this week indicates that there may have been a breakdown in infection control practices, 
with the two organisms isolated exhibiting almost identical resistant profiles. 
Pt, patient number; Spec., specimen 
Table 6.4: Location, specimen site and susceptibility results for A. baumannii exhibiting multi-drug 
resistance and carbapenem resistance (MRAB-C) 
 
After the identification of three exceedances in close proximity (2011 weeks 34, 35 and 37), the cusum and 
VLAD charts were evaluated. Figure 6.5 displays the results of the cusum analysis. There appears to be an 
increase in the number of MRAB-C occurrences between week 26 in 2011 and week 35 in 2011, resulting in 
the   
  statistic reaching the decision limit at week 35, 2011. This coincides with the close succession of 
exceedances detected by the Noufaily algorithm as described earlier, with the cusum indicating that there 
was an increasing trend during the weeks identified as representing exceedances above the 95% UL. Similar 
to the cusum output, the VLAD chart shows a clear increase in the cumulative difference between expected 
and observed cases between week 26 in 2011 and week 37 in 2011 (Figure 6.6). Both outputs do, however, 
indicate a decrease in the occurrence of MRAB-C from the end of 2011 until the end of the study period, 
with the   
  statistic surpassing the decision limit for the second time during the analysis period. The target 
mean at the end of the analysis period was therefore 0.65 per week, compared to a staring target mean of 
0.68 reports per week at the beginning of the analysis. 
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Figure 6.5: Cusum plot for strains of A. baumannii exhibiting multidrug resistance and carbapenem 
resistance (MRAB-C) 
 
Figure 6.6: VLAD chart for strains of A. baumannii exhibiting multidrug resistance and carbapenem 
resistance (MRAB-C) 
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6.5.2. Escherichia coli 
There were a total of 4,521 E. coli reports used in the exceedance algorithm, with 803 isolates exhibiting 
ESBL/AmpC production and 36 reports of carbapenem-resistant E. coli. The UL threshold for carbapenem-
resistant E. coli was low, with all alerts resulting from an observed count of one (Table 6.5 and Figure 6.9). 
Only one of the total E. coli exceedance alerts coincided with an exceedance detected in those isolates 
exhibiting ESBL/AmpC-production (Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8, 2011, week 13). This was also the case for 
carbapenem-resistant E. coli (2011, week 11). 
Organism Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit 
E. coli 11 2011 39 29.2 39 
13 2011 44 30.1 40 
26 2011 35 24.1 34 
27 2011 43 24.9 35 
E. coli 
(ESBL/AmpC) 
13 2011 10 6.0 10 
42 2011 10 5.2 9 
50 2011 9 4.7 9 
2 2012 10 4.4 8 
Carbapenem 
resistant E. coli 
11 2011 1 0.2 1 
14 2011 1 0.0 0 
33 2011 1 0.2 1 
36 2011 1 0.3 1 
39 2011 1 0.2 1 
41 2011 1 0.2 1 
3 2012 1 0.1 1 
Table 6.5: E. coli alerts generated by the exceedance detection algorithm 
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Figure 6.7: Exceedance chart for E. coli; four weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Figure 6.8: Exceedance chart for ESBL/AmpC-producing E. coli; four weeks were identified as exceedances 
above the 95% UL 
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Figure 6.9: Exceedance chart for carbapenem-resistant E. coli; seven weeks were identified as exceedances 
above the 95% UL 
 
Specimens associated with exceedances of carbapenem-resistant E. coli were studied to determine if any 
cases of infection had occurred in the same location, or if the same strain had been isolated from numerous 
patients; Table 6.6 contains the information necessary to determine if either of these situations did occur in 
the study period. It does not appear that one particular strain was responsible for multiple cases associated 
with an exceedance above the 95% UL. Two patients had carbapenem-resistant E. coli isolated from urine 
specimens in the Renal Outpatient setting within a two week time frame, although the isolates appear to 
exhibit very different antimicrobial resistance patterns. 
Pt, patient number; Spec., specimen 
Table 6.6: Location, specimen site and susceptibilty results for E. coli exhibiting carbapenem-resistance 
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6.5.3. Enterobacter spp. 
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. saw the joint-highest number of exceedances detected, with 16 
alerts generated in the one-year analysis period, as can be seen in Table 6.7. The low alert threshold, based 
on observed counts within the two previous years, meant that the majority of alerts were generated when 
one case was observed in a week. However, there was one instance where three cases of carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacter spp. were detected in a week with an UL of zero (Figure 6.12, 2011 week 30). This 
was not detected in the output created for all Enterobacter spp. reports (Figure 6.10), although two 
exceedances detected for all cases of Enterobacter spp. did coincide with exceedances detected for 
carbapenem-resistant strains. A further three alerts created for all cases did occur close to exceedances 
detected in carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. (within one week).  
 
Three instances of exceedance detection in ESBL/AmpC-producing isolates occurred at the same time as 
exceedances detected using all Enterobacter spp. reports (Figure 6.11). A further alert for all Enterobacter 
spp. cases was generated one week prior to an exceedance detected in ESBL/AmpC-producers. One week 
where an exceedance was generated in ESBL/AmpC-producers did not correspond with any of the 
exceedances identified using all Enterobacter spp. reports (2012, week 2). Further investigation revealed 
that four out of five cases reported that week were actually ESBL/AmpC-producers. 
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Organism Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit 
Enterobacter spp. 11 2011 8 4.2 8 
24 2011 9 4.7 9 
27 2011 9 4.9 9 
46 2011 10 4.9 9 
49 2011 10 4.1 8 
Enterobacter spp. 
(ESBL/AmpC) 
24 2011 5 2.0 5 
28 2011 4 1.2 3 
46 2011 4 1.4 4 
49 2011 5 0.9 3 
2 2012 4 1.1 3 
Carbapenem 
resistant 
Enterobacter spp. 
10 2011 1 0.1 1 
11 2011 1 0.1 1 
12 2011 1 0.1 1 
13 2011 1 0.2 1 
20 2011 1 0.1 1 
23 2011 1 0.2 1 
25 2011 1 0.1 1 
28 2011 1 0.0 0 
30 2011 3 0.2 1 
40 2011 1 0.1 1 
42 2011 1 0.2 1 
43 2011 1 0.2 1 
44 2011 1 0.3 1 
47 2011 2 0.5 2 
49 2011 2 0.4 2 
1 2012 1 0.3 1 
Table 6.7: Enterobacter spp. alerts generated by the exceedance detection algorithm 
 
 
 203 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Exceedance chart for Enterobacter spp.; five weeks were identified as exceedances above the 
95% UL 
 
Figure 6.11: Exceedance chart for ESBL/AmpC-producing Enterobacter spp.; five weeks were identified as 
exceedances above the 95% UL 
 204 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Exceedance chart for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp.; 16 weeks were identified as 
exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Specimen site, patient location and antimicrobial sensitivities for isolates of carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacter spp. associated with exceedances can be found in Table 6.8. All isolates appear to confer 
resistance to third generation cephalosporins, suggesting the presence of ESBL/AmpC mechanisms of 
resistance in addition to carbapenem resistance. Nearly all isolates in Table 6.8 have been classed as 
carbapenem-resistant due to a resistant ertapenem result (19/20), with only one determined as 
carbapenem-resistant due to a resistant result for meropenem. 
 
Many of the alerts generated were as the result of one case being observed in a week, with the UL also 
being one case for that week. It is therefore of more interest to look several alerts concurrently and at the 
distribution of patients across the hospital locations within short time periods. Three specimens taken from 
different patients on Ward 11N, an ICU, were taken within a seven week period. Although the first two 
cases, occurring within two weeks of one another, have different susceptibility patterns, the isolate from 
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the third patient has an identical antibiogram to the second patient in which carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacter spp. was identified. Without information on patient movement or ADT data it is not possible 
to conclude that cross-contamination occurred in this situation. 
 Pt, patient number; Spec., specimen 
Table 6.8: Location, specimen site and susceptibility results for Enterobacter spp. exhibiting carbapenem 
resistance 
 
There were two time periods where a consecutive series of exceedances were identified in carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacter spp., firstly from week 10 to week 13 in 2011, then at week 40 to week 44 in the 
same year (note, no exceedance in week 41). Peaks in the   
  statistic above the decision limit can be seen 
at these time periods in Figure 6.13. There were four further occasions where the   
  statistic surpassed the 
decision limit, at weeks 30, 35, 47 and 49 in 2011. The highest peak in the   
  statistic results from three 
cases of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. isolated from patients in week 30 of 2011. The breach of 
the decision limit at week 35 in 2011 does not appear to coincide with any exceedances detected using the 
Noufaily algorithm, but may indicate that reports of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. in the 
preceding weeks were consistently above the expected mean weekly count, but were not high enough to 
generate alerts using the exceedance detection algorithm.  The breach of the decision limit at week 49 in 
2011 does, however, appear to coincide with exceedances detected by the Noufaily algorithm at weeks 47 
and 49 in 2011. The overall increasing trend during the analysis period is clearer to see from the VLAD 
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output (Figure 6.14). It is also possible to identify a sharp increase in reports between weeks 10 and 13 in 
2011, before a decrease immediately after week 13. Another sharp increase in the cumulative difference is 
also observed at week 30 in 2011, where the exceedance week consisting of the greatest number of reports 
occurred.  
 
 
Figure 6.13: Cusum plot for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. 
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Figure 6.14: VLAD chart for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. 
 
6.5.4. Group A Streptococci 
Table 6.9 summarises the exceedances detected for Group A Streptococci. There were four alerts 
generated for all GAS, as seen in Figure 6.15. These alerts relate to the isolation of GAS from several 
different body sites; swab, wound, pus and aspirate specimens. There was only one case of iGAS at the end 
of 2011; this isolate was obtained from a tissue sample taken from a patient in theatre.  Discussion with 
one of the Trust’s infection prevention and control nurses (IPCN) revealed that their definition of invasive 
disease is not limited to the specimen sites outlined in the HPA’s Guidelines for Diagnostic Laboratories, but 
depends on a range of clinical symptoms in addition to isolation of the organism from the patient.  
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Organism Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit 
Group A 
Streptococci 
28 2011 2 0.6 2 
30 2011 2 0.7 2 
46 2011 2 0.6 2 
8 2012 1 0.2 1 
Invasive Group A 
Streptococci 
51 2011 1 0.1 1 
Table 6.9: Group A Streptococci alerts generated by the exceedance detection algorithm 
 
Figure 6.15: Exceedance chart for Group A Streptococci; four weeks were identified as exceedances above 
the 95% UL 
 
6.5.5. Klebsiella spp. 
Along with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter sp., carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. had the highest 
number of exceedances identified. Table 6.10 contains the details of all the exceedances detected in one 
year. Two of the alerts generated for carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. occurred in weeks where alerts 
were also generated for all cases of Klebsiella spp. (Figure 6.16). Six exceedances were detected in 
ESBL/AmpC-producing Klebsiella spp. (Figure 6.17), with half of these alerts being created during the same 
weeks where exceedances were also identified in all cases of Klebsiella spp. 
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In carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. exceedances appear to cluster; exceedances were detected at 
weeks 13 – 15 in 2011, shortly followed by another cluster of alerts in weeks 19, 20 and 22, and shortly 
after this another series of alerts generated in weeks 27 – 31, 33 and 35 (Figure 6.18). Again, from this 
output it is difficult to determine if this reflects an increase in incidence throughout these time periods. 
Results from the cusum and VLAD analysis should help in identifying any trends. 
Organism Week Year Observed Expected Upper limit 
Klebsiella spp. 30 2011 8 4.4 8 
38 2011 8 4.0 8 
42 2011 10 3.9 7 
45 2011 10 4.5 8 
51 2011 9 5.2 9 
8 2012 10 3.9 7 
Klebsiella spp. 
(ESBL/AmpC) 
24 2011 5 2.1 5 
30 2011 4 1.9 4 
38 2011 5 1.7 4 
50 2011 9 2.4 5 
8 2012 3 1.3 3 
9 2012 3 1.1 3 
Carbapenem 
resistant 
Klebsiella spp. 
13 2011 1 0.2 1 
14 2011 2 0.2 1 
15 2011 1 0.1 1 
19 2011 1 0.1 1 
20 2011 1 0.1 1 
22 2011 1 0.2 1 
27 2011 1 0.3 1 
28 2011 1 0.2 1 
29 2011 1 0.2 1 
30 2011 1 0.3 1 
31 2011 1 0.2 1 
33 2011 1 0.1 1 
35 2011 1 0.1 1 
45 2011 1 0.1 1 
46 2011 1 0.3 1 
2 2012 1 0.0 0 
Table 6.10: Klebsiella spp. alerts generated by the exceedance detection algorithm 
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Figure 6.16: Exceedance chart for Klebsiella spp.; six weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% 
UL 
 
Figure 6.17: Exceedance chart for ESBL/AmpC-producing Klebsiella spp.; six weeks were identified as 
exceedances above the 95% UL 
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Figure 6.18: Exceedance chart for carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp.; 16 weeks were identified as 
exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
Similar to exceedances detected in carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp., many resulted from one 
observation in a week. It is therefore more appropriate to look at several alerts simultaneously to further 
investigate instances in which there appears to be a cluster of exceedances detected. Table 6.11 includes 
information on the location of patients at the time of specimen and antibiograms for Klebsiella spp. 
exhibiting carbapenem resistance in weeks where alerts were produced. The first two alerts were 
generated by the identification of isolates of Klebsiella spp. with identical antimicrobial susceptibility results 
taken within five days. However, these patients were located at different hospitals at the time the 
specimens were taken. Although there are several occasions of exceedances being generated in sequential 
weeks, there is little evidence from the analysis of antibiograms and patient location at time of specimen 
that any of these are related.  
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 Pt, patient number; Spec., specimen 
Table 6.11: Location, specimen site and susceptibility results for Klebsiella spp. exhibiting carbapenem 
resistance 
 
Figure 6.19 displays the graphical cusum output for carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. The   
  statistic 
breaches the decision limit six times, at weeks 14, 20, 28, 31, 35 and 46 in 2011. All of these points coincide 
with the series of exceedances detected using the Noufaily algorithm as previously described. Additionally, 
the surpassing of the decision limit at week 46 coincides with the detection of two sequential weeks 
identified as representing exceedances by the Noufaily algorithm. Although there are several occasions 
where the   
  statistic peaks, none of these reached the decision limit. This supports the VLAD chart (Figure 
6.20), which shows an overall increase in trend over time, although there are periods where the cumulative 
difference begins to decrease on separate occasions.  
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Figure 6.19: Cusum plot for carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. 
 
Figure 6.20: VLAD chart for carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. 
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6.5.6. Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
There was one alert created for P. aeruginosa towards the end of the analysis. Figure 6.21 displays the 
observed and expected counts of P. aeruginosa cases over one year, with an exceedance above the 95% UL 
at week 8, 2012. This exceedance included 24 cases. These patients were located across all three sites 
included in the analysis, although the majority of patients were located at Charing Cross Hospital (n=15). 
There were several locations where two or more patients were on the same ward during this exceedance 
week. All three isolates from patients within one ward (CPG 4, Circulation Sciences and Renal Medicine) 
had the same antibiogram.  At three other ward locations, isolates from patients on the same ward 
appeared to exhibit the same resistance profiles, although the same susceptibility tests were not 
performed consistently for each of the isolates.  
 
There were no exceedances of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa detected in the analysis period. 
 
 
Figure 6.21: Exceedance chart for P. aeruginosa; one week was identified as an exceedance above the 95% 
UL 
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6.5.7. Staphylococcus aureus 
Similar to P. aeruginosa, there was only one exceedance above the 95% UL detected for S. aureus in the 
one-year analysis period. As can be seen in Figure 6.22, this occurred in week 50 of 2011, and included 45 
reports. Thirty of the patients were at Charing Cross Hospital; eight were in renal care units and; seven 
were at Hammersmith Hospital. Eleven locations across both hospitals were identified as having more than 
one patient on the same ward during this exceedance week. On one ward within CPG 1 (Medicine) there 
were five patients from which S. aureus was isolated. After assessing the antibiograms it appeared that two 
of the isolates had the same antibiogram but the other three had distinct resistance patterns. Besides this 
ward, a further two wards were identified as having patients either infected or colonised with isolates 
exhibiting identical resistance profiles. 
 
There were no exceedances for MRSA detected in the one year analysis period, as can be seen in Figure 
6.23. 
 
Figure 6.22: Exceedance chart for S. aureus; one week was identified as an exceedance above the 95% UL 
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Figure 6.23: Exceedance chart for MRSA; no weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% UL 
 
6.5.8. Stenotrophomonas maltophilia 
As can be seen in Figure 6.24 there were two occasions where the observed number of cases of S. 
maltophilia exceeded the UL. These occurred at week 23 in 2011 and in week seven of 2012. On both 
occasions, the observed count was the same as the UL. There appears to be a downward trend from week 
40 in 2011 onwards, which is clearer to see form the VLAD chart (Figure 6.25).  
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Figure 6.24: Exceedance chart for S. maltophilia; two weeks were identified as exceedances above the 95% 
UL  
 
Figure 6.25: VLAD chart for S. maltophilia 
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6.6. ICHT outbreaks and incidents: March 2011 – February 2012 
The majority of outbreaks detected by the IPCT were caused either by norovirus or C. difficile. The data set 
used in this chapter did not include information on norovirus or C. difficile and so comparisons between the 
methods cannot be made for these organisms. None of the exceedances detected by the Noufaily 
algorithm were detected by the IPCT. This may be due to the definitions used by the Infection Prevention 
and Control department, which state that patients must be linked in place and time. However, there was 
one incident that involved two patients on the same ward at the same time (both specimens taken on the 
01/09/11 on Ward 15N, Charing Cross Hospital), with MRAB-C isolated from sputum samples. This was 
detected by the exceedance algorithm and analysis of susceptibility results identified almost identical 
antibiograms, the only discrepancy being an “intermediate” result reported against tigecycline in one 
patient, whereas the other result was “resistant”.  
 
There were also several instances where organisms with identical antibiograms were isolated from more 
than one patient on the same ward in the same week (S. aureus and P. aeruginosa), yet these were not 
documented by the IPCT. In addition, there was one occasion where two patients on an ICU were found to 
be either infected or colonised with isolates of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacter spp. exhibiting identical 
antimicrobial resistance profiles. Although there was a difference of five weeks between these incidents, 
further investigation into these incidents would be required to determine if the patients were on the ICU at 
the same time at any point, or if they had been in the same location prior to admission onto the ICU. 
 
6.7. Discussion 
The results presented above indicate that microbiology data contained within electronic LIMS can be used 
for outbreak detection of MDRO within the healthcare setting. More exceedances were detected after 
organisms had been classified as MDRO, indicating that using all reports of an organism for outbreak 
detection is not sufficient for identifying potential clusters of MDRO. This finding emphasises the 
importance of distinguishing resistant forms of bacteria when performing outbreak detection. Furthermore, 
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the use of automated systems allows surveillance and outbreak detection activities to be performed on a 
range of microorganisms across all hospital locations. 
 
6.7.1. MDRO definitions and data de-duplication 
Various methods exist for the identification of antimicrobial resistance and several definitions for the 
classification of MDRO have been proposed (177;180;181). Employing a systematic approach for the 
identification of MDRO is crucial; the automated application of definitions ensures that MDRO are 
identified from microbiology reports consistently. Whilst liaising with members of the IPCT it was 
mentioned that microbiologists did not always alert the team to organisms of interest as the 
microbiologists classified MDRO differently. The IPCT were very enthusiastic about the potential 
implementation of an automated system for the classification and identification of MDRO.  
 
It is important to use the most suitable de-duplication method for outbreak detection. It is difficult to 
determine the best approach as the de-duplication methods used appear to vary across studies; some 
groups exclude any duplicate cultures from patients (11;12), whereas others used de-duplication definitions 
based on time periods (when data de-duplication methods were described in studies) (152;153). It was 
decided that a non-cumulative 14-day period would be employed for outbreak detection methods 
investigated in this chapter. This avoids the issues associated with using a 14-day cumulative time period, 
such as that employed by LabBase2, which was discussed in Chapter 3. Although several specimens from 
one patient may be included in different exceedances detected over time, excluding these specimens could 
result in cross-infection being missed, as was highlighted by the MRAB-C exceedance detected on ward 
15N.  
 
It is best to keep false positive alerts to a minimum to ensure that end-users remain confident in the 
outbreak detection methods being employed. If de-duplication based on organism and antimicrobial 
susceptibilities had been used in the data preparation phase for outbreak detection it is likely that many 
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more false positive alerts would be generated as susceptibility patterns are not reported consistently. This 
issue has also been recognised by another research group employing a data de-duplication method based 
on antimicrobial susceptibilities (10). Additionally, isolates were not limited to those obtained after a 
defined time period from hospital admission. This practice has been described in the literature by other 
research groups (11;12) and in guidelines produced on behalf of the DH (182). Limiting cases to those 
defined as “nosocomial” or “healthcare-associated” may result in the index case being missed, therefore 
delaying the time to detection of an outbreak, or potentially missing an outbreak altogether.  
 
6.7.2. Outbreak detection and interperating alerts 
Looking only at specimens related to outbreaks means that we could be over-looking potential cross-
infection events by excluding cases that occurred between several closely-timed outbreak alerts. The 
cusum method addresses this issue to some extent by identifying weeks where the number of observed 
cases is higher than the mean weekly count, accumulating deviances over several weeks until the decision 
limit is breached. Ideally it would be best to use a method that can both identify higher than expected rates 
of infection based on historical data, as well as identify cases of cross-contamination and potential 
breakdowns in infection control practices. Such a method would require comprehensive patient 
administration data, particularly ward movement data. 
 
There were multiple occasions where two or more patients were on the same ward during the weeks 
identified as representing aberrations. When investigating the S. aureus and P. aeruginosa exceedances 
there were several instances of organisms exhibiting identical resistance profiles isolated from patients at 
the same location within the same week. This may be the same at any given week, but these weeks were 
detected as being above the 95% limit and therefore required further investigation. With time and 
resources limited it may not always be possible to investigate these situations, and infection control efforts 
tend to focus on a limited number of organisms of particular concern. However, it is important to identify 
occasions where non-resistant organisms have been responsible for outbreaks as this can help identify a 
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possible breakdown in infection control which can be addressed, possibly before the occurrence of a MDRO 
outbreak. 
 
The output generated by the cusum method presented in this chapter appears to be much more 
informative than the method used in Chapter 4. Incorporating the new parameters seems to be more 
suitable for small numbers of infectious disease data. Although the cusum did not always breach the 
decision limit at the same weeks identified as representing exceedances by the Noufaily algorithm, a 
breach in decision limit often occurred within a series of exceedance weeks. There were also occasions 
where the Noufaily algorithm did not identify an exceedance, but the cusum identified a persistent shift in 
the frequency of isolates (for example, the breach of the decision limit at week 35 in 2011 for carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacter spp.). These differences in performance are to be expected, however, as the 
objectives of the methods are very different; the Noufaily algorithm aims to detect absolute exceedances 
above an expected frequency based on historical data, whereas the cusum aims to detect small, persistent 
shifts (of 10% in this case) over time. In combination, these automated methods can provide a “screening” 
method which can alert infection prevention and control specialists to potential outbreaks that require 
confirmation. In addition, the VLAD charts can help to indicate increasing problems through the graphical 
display of trends over time. 
 
Although none of the exceedances were detected by the IPCT, this may be due to the differences in 
definitions used to identify outbreak situations. Several other groups have also found that automated 
methods for outbreak detection do not concur with traditional methods used by IPCT for outbreak 
detection (10-12;148). Infection prevention and control teams traditionally employ definitions for outbreak 
based on space and time criteria, for example, two or more patients with a particular infectious disease on 
the same ward within 28 days. With some MDRO exhibiting such high levels of resistance, responding to 
outbreaks based on these criteria, or single cases of certain MDRO, may be justified. This ensures that 
appropriate infection control measures are implemented rapidly, rather than reacting only to a statistically 
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significant number of cases. As discussed in Chapter 4 user-defined thresholds can be introduced to 
outbreak detection systems, rather than relying solely on statistically significant thresholds. With the 
exceedance algorithm identifying a manageable number of exceedance weeks, it is worth considering the 
introduction of single-case thresholds for the most serious infections, such as iGAS, or for organisms 
demonstrating high levels of antimicrobial resistance.  
 
6.7.3. Limitations 
Several limitations must be overcome before an automated system for outbreak detection can be 
implemented at ICHT. As the LIMS was designed for patient management and the reporting of microbiology 
results the data is not structured in a way that allows the implementation of a fully automated outbreak 
detection system at present. There is a considerable amount of manual data management required to get 
the data in a format that allows data de-duplication, the application of algorithms capable of distinguishing 
MDRO and incorporation of weekly count data into the exceedance detection algorithm. These challenges 
currently mean that it is not feasible to perform regular, real-time outbreak detection however, new 
computing systems are to be introduced in August 2014 which may overcome these issues. 
 
The use of antiobiogram data as a proxy to determine genetic relatedness has been demonstrated by 
others (12;152), however, the limitations of this approach have also been noted (12). Output from more 
discriminatory and rapid methods such as whole genome sequencing (WGS) (183) and matrix-assisted laser 
desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS) (184) can be incorporated into the 
outbreak detection system, although this was not available for inclusion in this chapter. Using data from 
more discriminatory typing methods could provide a solution to the current disparities observed in 
antimicrobial susceptibility testing and reporting. Furthermore, the results from WGS can provide more 
reliable information for drawing epidemiological conclusions than relying on antibiograms.  
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The amalgamation of more data sources can help provide more informative outbreak detection alerts. The 
integration of patient location data and clinical data could help to provide more comprehensive 
information on the exceedances identified using the Noufaily algorithm. As previously stated, the IPCT 
include clinical symptoms when diagnosing cases of iGAS. Electronic medical notes do not currently exist 
within ICHT and so could not be included in the analysis. Furthermore, the incorporation of patient 
movement data could help to identify situations where cross-infection has occurred. The importance of 
including this information in outbreak detection was highlighted after a two patients with carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacter spp. exhibiting identical antibiograms were identified as being on the same ward five 
weeks apart. Without ADT data immediately available it is not possible to determine if these patients were 
on the same ward at the same time without accessing the patient administration system (PAS) separately 
to further investigate patient movement. This is a time consuming process, and as concluded in Chapter 2, 
electronic surveillance systems integrating microbiology, clinical and patient movement data can be 
employed within the healthcare setting to aid in surveillance activities. 
 
6.7.4. Conclusions 
In summary, there is an abundance of microbiology data available in an electronic format which can be 
used in outbreak detection; however, several limitations need to be addressed before the implementation 
of automated methods for outbreak detection. With increasing concerns around carbapenem resistance it 
is important to identify and distinguish these isolates for outbreak detection. As demonstrated in this 
chapter, it is possible to identify MDROs using routinely collected data and apply statistical methods for 
outbreak detection, which can be investigated further and acted on should the exceedances detected 
actually represent true outbreak situations. This approach will help to ensure that these situations are dealt 
with in a timely manner to prevent further spread of MDRO. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7. OVERARCHING DISCUSSION 
 
7.1. Summary of findings 
From the initial thesis introduction it was apparent that many electronic data sources exist within the 
healthcare setting, with a number of national data collections on healthcare data also in operation. The 
systematic review on the utilisation of electronic data sources for HCAI surveillance demonstrated the 
potential for implementing ESS. The majority of the articles reviewed (41 out of 44) described, developed 
or applied surveillance methods that involved the linkage of several data sources. Results of validation 
studies often demonstrated high sensitivity and specificity, with some studies indicating that automated 
methods could out-perform traditional, manual methods for HCAI surveillance. Several authors described 
how the systems they presented were already integrated into hospital information systems and routine 
surveillance practices, demonstrating the feasibility of adopting electronic and automated methods for 
HCAI surveillance. 
 
The results from the review indicated that research in this field is increasing, with almost 30% of the articles 
reviewed published in the final year of the search period. Another review article on automated surveillance 
for HCAI was published shortly after the publication of my review paper. The review prepared by van 
Mourik et al. focused on the potential of using multivariable prediction models based on clinical data for 
the efficient detection of infections within the healthcare setting (185). The authors found the adoption of 
regression-based methods to be attainable in the future, although recognised a number of issues that 
would need to be overcome, including the requirement of high-quality data for incorporation into 
electronic methods. 
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Prior to the application of statistical models for outbreak detection, a critical analysis of the national 
voluntary reporting system intended for use in outbreak detection was performed. Results from this 
evaluation revealed great variation in laboratory reporting practices, which will affect the performance of 
outbreak detection systems. The main findings from Chapter 3 indicated that further work to ensure 
consistent and timely reporting to the national system was required. Results from the evaluation indicated 
that only a small number of trusts currently have data of high enough quality for reliable TLE reporting 
across a range of organisms. The findings of the critical analysis highlighted the importance of performing a 
system evaluation prior to the application of statistical methods to avoid producing misleading results. The 
analysis also revealed that LabBase2 may not be the most suitable surveillance system for use in the 
detection of outbreaks caused by MDRO. A recent publication by Ironmonger et al. suggested that AmWeb, 
a system for antimicrobial resistance surveillance managed by PHE, has the potential to monitor emerging 
antimicrobial resistance threats (186).  
 
An epidemiological analysis of local level data provided insight into the data intended for use in outbreak 
detection. This form of analysis is required to provide an understanding of the local situation and also helps 
to identify emerging problems with antimicrobial resistance. Results from the analysis did identify an 
emerging problem with carbapenem resistance, with some organisms showing significant increases in rates 
of resistance over the three year time period investigated. The analysis also helped to identify patient 
groups with increased odds of being infected or colonised with carbapenem-resistant organisms. An 
algorithm for the classification of MDRO was also developed and successfully applied to electronically 
stored microbiology data, which has the potential for incorporation into routine practice. This may aid in 
the identification of MDRO from antimicrobial susceptibility data, as well as provide a consistent and 
systematic application of definitions for MDRO. 
 
Many different methods for outbreak detection are available. The differing objectives of the methods 
investigated within this thesis demonstrated the benefit of employing methods capable of detecting 
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absolute exceedances and persistent shifts in the frequency of reports. It is important to select appropriate 
methods based on the objectives of the system and the data intended for use in outbreak detection. 
Specifically, it is essential to optimise parameters. The use of conventional parameters in the cusum 
method presented in Chapter 4 did not produce informative output and did not supplement the results of 
the exceedance detection algorithms. This was addressed in Chapter 6, where more suitable parameters 
were incorporated into the cusum method.  
 
Results from Chapter 6, which investigated the use of local data in outbreak detection showed that it is 
essential to distinguish MDRO prior to performing outbreak detection. Many more exceedances were 
detected after organisms had been classified as MDRO, indicating that using all organism reports for 
outbreak detection is not sufficient for reliable outbreak detection. After initial data management, 
application of MDRO classifications and algorithm amendment, it took very little time to generate output 
from the application of outbreak detection models. This allowed the investigation of several different 
organisms simultaneously. The use of automated methods, such as the methods presented in this thesis, 
allowed comprehensive surveillance and outbreak detection to be performed for a range of organisms 
across the entire hospital setting.  
 
7.2. Data issues and limitations 
7.2.1. Public Health England 
The initial evaluation of data from LabBase2 was carried out on an incorrect data extract. 
Miscommunication between staff from several departments involved in establishing TLE reporting resulted 
in an antimicrobial filter being applied to reports on all organisms for inclusion in the outbreak detection 
system. Analysis of data at the trust level was being performed on a weekly basis on this incorrect data, 
with the Farrington algorithm applied to all drug-bug combinations as well as organism level data. It was 
assumed that the data provided for the LabBase2 evaluation was correct, however, suspicions that the data 
feed was being limited to specific antimicrobial susceptibility results was confirmed approximately eight 
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weeks after data analysis commenced. This had not been readily identified by those responsible for 
extracting the data from LabBase2 or those applying the algorithm for exceedance reporting. 
 
This example emphasises the importance of evaluating data prior to the application of statistical methods 
for outbreak detection. It should not have been assumed that the data provided for analysis was correct; 
this resulted in a considerable amount of work having to be repeated. The identification of this issue means 
that this issue can be addressed prior to the full implementation of TLE reporting. 
 
After it was recognised that the data extract was incorrect a new query to extract data was created. 
Working with members of the Information Management department, a new query to extract all reports of 
organisms for inclusion in the data evaluation was confirmed. The query removed any restriction on 
antimicrobials as it was intended that the identification of antimicrobial resistant isolates would be 
performed after the data extract had been imported into Stata Version 12 through the development and 
application of an algorithm. Several attempts were made by staff to extract the data using the new query 
but running the query would often cause the computer to crash. The query was therefore split into four 
smaller time periods but this resulted in the generation of empty data files as the extract was still too large. 
It was decided, after much consideration, that the antimicrobial data would have to be omitted from the 
main data extract and that a series of specific drug-bug queries would be produced instead. The process of 
getting the final validated data set for the critical analysis took nearly four months. 
 
7.2.2. Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 
There was limited availability of ICHT microbiology data. Although one of the other PhD students had used 
microbiology data in the development of predictive models for HCAI, only six to 12 months of data was 
available. This was not sufficient for outbreak detection. García Álvarez et al. (CIPM) described the 
development of a data warehouse comprising of numerous electronic data sources that could be used to 
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perform real-time infectious disease surveillance (97). This data source was not available for use in this PhD 
project and the development of the comprehensive data warehouse is still ongoing. 
 
Other local data sets for use in outbreak detection were pursued. Liaising with other researchers within 
CIPM lead to the potential use of CDI data; this data set also included ribotyping results. This option was 
abandoned after it was decided that one of the other PhD students would use the data set instead. 
Fortunately, a meeting with one of the ICHT Infectious Diseases and Medical Microbiology Registrars 
resulted in the acquisition of three years’ worth of microbiology data, which included full antimicrobial 
susceptibility results. The data was sent to the CIPM Data Manager for anonymisation prior to the data 
becoming available on the secure research server. The data was available for epidemiological analysis and 
outbreak detection in September 2012, over two years after the PhD began. 
 
The systematic review presented in Chapter 2 advocates the linkage of disparate data sources to provide 
comprehensive data for surveillance purposes. The microbiology data was therefore linked to data stored 
within the PAS.PAS contains patient demographic data, diagnosis codes and patient movement throughout 
the trust. It was anticipated that data on patient movement could be included in the outbreak detection 
methods. The data was linked using deterministic linkage methods. Between 10 and 20 percent of 
microbiology records could not be linked to PAS data using this approach as the linkage method relied on 
the patient’s hospital number and their date of birth. Patients can have more than one hospital number, 
and although all hospital numbers may be recorded in PAS, only one hospital number was used in the 
deterministic linkage. Additionally, data linkage appeared to create a large number of duplicates. This 
occurred when a patient had several hospital admissions; each microbiology result would be linked to all 
hospital admissions, which meant that the admission relating to the positive microbiology result had to be 
identified manually. With an extensive amount of manual data processing already required for the 
preparation of data for epidemiological analysis and outbreak detection it was decided that the linked data 
set would not be used in outbreak detection. 
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7.3. Incorporating typing data into automated outbreak detection 
As previously discussed, there are several limitations with using antibiogram data to distinguish bacterial 
isolates. For the purpose of this research project it acted as a proxy indicator for relatedness in the absence 
of more discriminatory typing data, which is not routinely available. However, advances in the field of WGS 
is creating the potential for the adoption of this technology by hospital and reference laboratories 
performing routine microbial analysis. A study by Köser et al. demonstrated the utility of WGS in the rapid 
investigation of an outbreak of MRSA on a neonatal unit (183). The authors recognise the need to translate 
this technology from a tool employed for research purposes into a method that can be used in the clinical 
diagnostic setting. They also found complete concordance between the WGS results and the 
phenotypically-derived  antibiogram, supporting findings made by another research group investigating the 
concordance of genetic-based and phenotypic methods for determining antimicrobial resistance (187). 
Zankari et al. did note several discrepancies between the genotypic and phenotypic approaches applied to 
the organisms investigated, but concluded that there was a high concordance overall (99.7%) and 
suggested that resistance testing based on WGS could provide an alternative method to traditional 
phenotypic testing. 
 
With the cost of WGS continuing to decrease and the availability of bench-top instruments it does appear 
that the introduction of genotypic methods for routine clinical purposes is becoming increasingly feasible. 
Several obstacles need to be overcome prior to the implementation for WGS technologies for routine 
practice though. Köser et al. briefly allude to the automation of data interpretation in their discussion (183). 
The output generated by WGS is complex and requires interpretation before the production of informative 
results. Performing this step manually is very time consuming and limits the application of WGS. It is 
imperative that bioinformaticians and other specialists in data analysis are involved in the automation and 
production of usable data for typing purposes on a larger scale. 
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Other issues for consideration include the evolution of bacterial species and changes in gene expression. 
Young et al. published a study on the evolution of S. aureus during disease progression (188). They found 
that eight mutations had occurred in an isolate of S. aureus as it transitioned from nasal carriage to an 
invasive form of disease. The existence of small colony variants (SCV) also presents challenges; SCV are sub-
populations with distinctive phenotypic and pathogenic characteristics that occur naturally in bacterial 
cultures and often exhibit altered genotypes through the presence of mutations (189). If WGS is to be used 
in drawing epidemiological conclusions the definitions used in determining whether isolates are related 
must acknowledge the evolutionary characteristics exhibited by bacterial species. In addition, outbreak 
investigations should employ genotypic investigations to supplement epidemiological evidence, rather than 
draw conclusions based on the results of microbiological typing data alone. 
 
7.4. Implementing outbreak detection systems 
It must be acknowledged that surveillance data is often deficient in some regard and exhaustive data is 
rarely available and often not required. Additionally, the systems investigated in this thesis were not 
designed specifically for the purpose of hospital level outbreak detection. However, data quality issues and 
inadequate surveillance systems represent two main obstacles in the implementation of prospective, 
automated outbreak detection systems using national and local level data. It was intended that outbreak 
detection could be performed at the trust level using national data, however, the current process used to 
map laboratory reports to hospitals may not allow this. As previously described, laboratories are associated 
with a particular NHS trust. Hospitals exclusive of this trust may also send specimens to the laboratory for 
diagnostic purposes. At present, reports from hospitals outside of the main trust associated with the 
laboratory are automatically (and incorrectly) assigned to the main trust. It is therefore not possible to 
distinguish reports from different trusts in some circumstances. As a result it has been suggested that 
outbreak detection be performed at the laboratory level until the hospital mapping issues have been 
addressed. This approach presents its own issues, with many laboratories carrying out diagnostic services 
for several NHS trusts as well as primary care organisations. An example of this was described in the case 
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study presented in Chapter 6. It would become the responsibility of the microbiology laboratory to 
distinguish reports from different healthcare settings and determine if alerts need to be further 
investigated to confirm if an outbreak situation was in progress. This is not an ideal situation however, the 
launch of SGSS by PHE, which is due to take place in March 2014, may help to overcome this; the findings 
from the LabBase2 data evaluation in Chapter 3 will be informing the development of SGSS, including 
addressing the hospital mapping issues. 
 
Another barrier in the implementation of trust level outbreak detection using national data is the variation 
in reporting behaviours observed across laboratories. Data completeness and timeliness of reporting differs 
greatly. It has already been recognised that only a select number of trusts would currently benefit from 
receiving exceedance alerts based on historical data. The paper published on the work carried out in 
Chapter 3 highlights the limitations of using delayed and inconsistent data in outbreak detection and it is 
hoped that laboratories assess their reporting practices as a result. In addition, recommendations that 
could result in more trusts receiving informative outbreak alerts are made in the next chapter. 
 
At the local level, some LIMS may not be appropriate for use in automated outbreak detection. This 
appears to be the case at ICHT, although it must be acknowledged that this may be the case at other NHS 
trusts. LIMS must be able to provide data in a format suitable for automated data processing. The manual 
data processing required prior to the application of outbreak detection models limits the frequency with 
which outbreak detection can be performed. Specifically, it would not allow the performance of 
prospective outbreak detection. 
 
Another obstacle at the local level, likely to affect the majority of NHS trusts, is the lack of expertise 
required to implement and maintain systems such as those presented in this thesis. Healthcare 
epidemiologists and statisticians are not routinely employed at the trust level. Very few NHS trusts 
currently employ epidemiologists or statisticians as part their IPCT. Although the implementation of a 
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national system for trust level outbreak detection is on the horizon, the ability of trusts to perform 
outbreak detection independently may improve the response to alerts generated. Furthermore, with more 
complete and timely data available, plus the ability to apply local clinical judgement, the performance of 
automated outbreak detection at the local level provides an opportunity to carry out comprehensive, 
prospective outbreak detection.  
 
7.5. Future work 
The immediate steps following on from this research is the implementation of TLE reporting using data 
reported via LabBase2. The findings from the research presented in this thesis will inform the 
implementation of TLE reporting and feedback of exceedance alerts to regional staff.The findings from the 
research presented in this thesis will also be used to inform the application of outbreak detection methods 
to data contained in AmSurv for the purpose of identifying outbreaks caused by antimicrobial resistant 
organisms. As mentioned in Chapter 1, LabBase2 will be replaced by SGSS in 2014. With the expectation 
that the data provided will be of improved quality and timeliness, and mapping issues identified in Chapter 
3 resolved, it is planned that the automated outbreak detection methods described in this thesis will be 
applied to data available directly from SGSS. 
 
 Although there are issues with using the current ICHT LIMS in automated outbreak detection, the trust will 
be moving nearly all of their electronic data systems to Cerner in August 2014. This offers a great 
opportunity for the implementation of MDRO outbreak detection at the local level as described in Chapters 
5 and 6. 
 
Variations in reporting by laboratories observed in Chapter 3 should be further investigated to help 
understand why such differences in reporting practices exist. It has been proposed that the variations in 
positive blood specimens reported by laboratories may be associated with local blood culturing practices. 
Further investigation requires the comparison of specimen data reported to LabBase2 with blood culture 
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data available from a mandatory reporting system (Quarterly Laboratory Reports). As there are currently 
issues with how LabBase2 maps hospital trusts to reporting laboratories, any progress in this area will rely 
on the re-mapping of trusts so that comparisons between data sets can be made with confidence. It is 
possible that this work could be carried out after the implementation of SGSS, which has the capacity to 
correctly map hospitals to responsible NHS trusts. 
 
Two other PhD projects ran concurrently with this one. The projects were meant to complement each 
other, with an overall aim of improving infectious disease surveillance through the development of novel 
methods. The findings from the other projects can help inform and further develop the methods presented 
in the preceding chapters. Of particular interest is the incorporation of spatio-temporal models to enhance 
the outbreak detection models described in Chapters 4 and 6. Furthermore, studies incorporating typing 
data from WGS or MALDI-TOF MS should be performed with the aim of quantifying the proportion of true 
outbreaks identified through the application of prospective outbreak detection methods. Additionally, the 
routine use of more discriminatory typing methods in outbreak detection should help to provide more 
insight into the epidemiology of infectious diseases in the healthcare setting.  
 
Simulation studies are required to determine the best parameters for use in the cusum methods presented. 
This work would require the generation of data containing known outbreaks and shifts in frequency over 
time. After various parameters have been investigated and the best performing model has been identified, 
it would be possible to apply the cusum to real data for the identification of emerging problems. Other 
methods for outbreak detection could also be investigated. Of particular interest are methods that allow 
the analysis of small numbers, such as g charts, which analyse the number of days between rare events 
(190). 
 
In Chapter 1 it was suggested that there may be a gap in the translation of research into practice. The work 
presented in this thesis indicates that there is potential to improve surveillance and outbreak detection 
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activities at the national and local levels. With rising levels of carbapenem-resistance presenting a real 
threat to patients using our healthcare system, it is crucial that advances in surveillance and outbreak 
detection are made through the adoption of novel and innovative methods. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8. THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. Conclusions 
The findings of this thesis indicate that electronic data sources can be better utilised for surveillance and 
outbreak detection of infectious diseases within the healthcare setting. Prior to the implementation of 
automated methods for infectious disease surveillance, it is imperative that a comprehensive assessment of 
systems for use in surveillance and outbreak detection activities is performed; the application of algorithms 
capable of identifying HCAI or potential outbreaks to data of poor quality is not informative. Additionally, 
epidemiological analysis of infectious disease data should be performed regularly to provide an 
understanding of the local situation, as this cannot necessarily be determined from the application of 
outbreak detection methods. This thesis has demonstrated that there is potential for the implementation 
of automated systems for hospital level outbreak detection using both national and local microbiological 
data sources. 
 
8.2. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are supported by evidence presented in this thesis to improve surveillance 
and outbreak detection activities for infections occurring in the healthcare setting: 
 Hospitals should evaluate and assess electronically-stored data with a view to implementing 
electronic surveillance systems for monitoring healthcare-associated infections and antimicrobial 
resistance trends 
 Laboratories need to ensure that the data they provide to the national system is reported in a 
timely and consistent manner 
 To allow more trusts to benefit from Trust Level Exceedance reporting, Public Health England 
should consider allowing laboratories to upload historic data to LabBase2 
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 A comprehensive evaluation of data from surveillance systems intended for use in outbreak 
detection should be performed prior to the application of statistical methods 
 Methods for outbreak detection should be selected based on the data characteristics and model 
parameters should be optimised before outbreak detection models are applied to data 
 Regular epidemiological analysis should be performed in addition to outbreak detection to provide 
a greater understanding of the epidemiology of organisms within a trust 
 Laboratory information management systems capable of producing data in a suitable format for 
automated data processing should replace outdated systems that are unable to support automated 
methods to allow prospective outbreak detection at the local level 
 An automated and systematic approach for the identification of outbreaks caused by multidrug-
resistant organisms should be employed locally and nationally 
 
Furthermore, the following recommendations are based on opinions formulated whilst carrying out 
research in the field of healthcare epidemiology and surveillance: 
 The role and career development of healthcare epidemiologists needs to be further explored; if 
improvements in healthcare surveillance and epidemiology are to be achieved it is vital that 
specialists with skills in this field are employed at the national and local levels 
 The capacity for infection control teams to support advances made in healthcare surveillance and 
epidemiology needs to be determined, with further funding made available if this is found to be 
necessary 
 Protocols for responding to alerts generated from automated outbreak detection methods need to 
be developed to ensure that appropriate actions and interventions are implemented 
 Regular performance reviews should be undertaken to ensure that the systems employed are 
detecting outbreaks sufficiently, with revisions to systems and methods performed as required  
 Further work to harmonise antimicrobial resistance testing across hospital laboratories in England 
is required; the standardisation of laboratory methods will result in the ability to make direct 
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comparisons in reported rates of resistance and aid in the interpretation of results in the absence 
of details on the methods employed 
 A standardised method for the interpretation of results provided by WGS analysis needs to be 
developed to allow the comparison of results across institutions performing these methods 
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Appendix 2: Systematic review search strategy 
The following systematic search was carried out to identify articles that considered the use of automated 
surveillance methodologies to identify cases of healthcare-associated infections in the healthcare setting. 
Thesaurus (MeSH; Medical subject Headings) terms, and free text (FT) terms for; i) infection type; ii) 
surveillance terms and; iii) data-related terms were grouped using OR. The four groups of terms (#12, #37, 
#59 and #70) were combined using OR and AND (#71) and the resulting 15,542 hits were downloaded into 
reference management software (RefMan version 12) and screened against the inclusion criteria. 
 
A similar approach was used in all databases searched, with the same free text terms used across all 
databases. Search fields were limited to Title, Abstract or Keywords in all instances except for when 
searching the Web of Science, where Title and Topic searches were performed. 
 
Database: PubMed (MEDLINE) 
Limits: Publication Date from 2000 to 2012, Field: Title/Abstract 
Searched: Friday 9th December 2011 
 
#1: MeSH = Bacterial Infections and Mycoses 
#2: MeSH = Virus Diseases  
#3: FT = norovirus 
#4: FT = bacteraemia 
#5: FT = bacteremia 
#6: FT = ventilator associated pneumonia 
#7: FT = vap 
#8: FT = crbsi 
#9: FT = hcai  
#10: FT = hai  
#11: FT = cdad 
#12: #1 OR #2 OR #3 OR #4 OR #5 OR #6 OR #7 OR #8 OR #9 0R #10 OR #11 
#13: FT = healthcare associated  
#14: FT = hospital acquired  
#15: FT = bloodstream  
#16: FT = surgical site  
#17: FT = methicillin resistant staphylococcus aureus 
#18: FT = meticillin resistant staphylococcus aureus 
#19: FT = mrsa 
#20: FT = clostridium difficile 
#21: FT = vre 
#22: FT = extended spectrum beta lactamase 
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#23: FT = esbl 
#24: FT = multi drug resistant 
#25: FT = vancomycin resistant enterococc* 
#26: FT = catheter associated 
#27: FT = catheter related  
#28: FT = device associated  
#29: FT = surgical wound  
#30: FT = healthcare acquired 
#31: FT = nosocomial 
#32: FT = ventilator associated 
#33: #13 OR #14 OR #15 OR #16 OR #17 OR #18 OR #19 OR #20 OR #21 OR #22 OR #23 OR #24 OR #25 OR 
#26 OR #27 OR #28 OR #29 OR #30 OR #31 OR #32 
#34: FT = infection 
#35: FT = infections 
#36: #34 OR #35 
#37: #33 AND #36 
#38: MeSH = Data Collection 
#39: MeSH = Program Evaluation 
#40: MeSH = Health Facility Administration 
#41: MeSH = Hospital Administration  
#42: MeSH = Contact Tracing 
#43: MeSH = Disease Notification 
#44: MeSH = Molecular Epidemiology 
#45: MeSH = Sentinel Surveillance 
#46: MeSH = Infection Control 
#47: MeSH = Biosurveillance  
#48: FT = surveillance  
#49: FT = report*  
#50: FT = monitor*  
#51: FT = benchmark*  
#52: FT = network*  
#53: FT = infection prevention 
#54: FT = feedback 
#55: FT = database 
#56: FT = data base  
#57: FT = dataset 
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#58: FT = data set 
#59: #38 OR #39 OR #40 OR #41 OR #42 OR #43 OR #44 OR #45 OR #46 PR #47 OR #48 OR #49 OR #50 OR 
#51 OR #52 OR #53 OR #54 OR #55 OR #56 OR #57 OR #58 
#60: MeSH = Algorithms 
#61: MeSH = Automatic Data Processing 
#62: MeSH = Computer Systems 
#63: MeSH = Software Validation 
#64: MeSH = Database Management Systems  
#65: FT = link*  
#66: FT = match*  
#67: FT = merg* 
#68: FT = probabilistic  
#69: FT = deterministic 
#70: #60 OR #61 OR #62 OR #63 OR #64 OR #65 OR #66 OR #67 OR #68 OR #69 
#71: (#12 OR #37) AND #59 AND #70 
 
Search #12 (infection type): 
"Bacterial Infections and Mycoses"[Mesh] OR "Virus Diseases"[Mesh] OR norovirus OR bacteraemia OR 
bacteremia OR ventilator associated pneumonia OR vap OR crbsi OR hcai OR hai OR cdad 
Search time: 15:02 
Results: 564,636 
 
Search #37 (infection type): 
(healthcare associated OR hospital acquired OR bloodstream OR surgical site OR methicillin resistant 
staphylococcus aureus OR meticillin resistant staphylococcus aureus OR mrsa OR clostridium difficile OR vre 
OR extended spectrum beta lactamase OR esbl OR multi drug resistant OR vancomycin resistant 
enterococc* catheter associated OR catheter related OR device associated OR surgical wound OR 
healthcare acquired OR nosocomial OR ventilator associated) AND (infection OR infections) 
Search time: 15:05 
Results: 18,260 
 
Search #59 (surveillance terms): 
"Data Collection"[Mesh] OR "Program Evaluation"[Mesh] OR "Health Facility Administration"[Mesh] OR 
"Hospital Administration"[Mesh] OR "Contact Tracing"[Mesh] OR "Disease Notification"[Mesh] OR 
"Molecular Epidemiology"[Mesh] OR "Sentinel Surveillance"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control"[Mesh] OR 
"Biosurveillance"[Mesh] OR surveillance OR report* OR monitor* OR benchmark* OR network* OR 
infection prevention OR feedback OR database OR data base OR dataset OR data set 
Search time: 15:07 
Results: 2,361,143 
 
Search #70 (data linkage): 
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"Algorithms"[Mesh] OR "Automatic Data Processing"[Mesh] OR "Computer Systems"[Mesh] OR "Software 
Validation"[Mesh] OR "Database Management Systems"[Mesh] OR link* OR match* OR merg* OR 
probabilistic OR deterministic 
Search time: 15:08 
Results: 653,194 
 
Search #71 (all groups combined): 
(("Bacterial Infections and Mycoses"[Mesh] OR "Virus Diseases"[Mesh] OR norovirus OR bacteraemia OR 
bacteremia OR ventilator associated pneumonia OR vap OR crbsi OR hcai OR hai OR cdad) OR ((healthcare 
associated OR hospital acquired OR bloodstream OR surgical site OR methicillin resistant staphylococcus 
aureus OR meticillin resistant staphylococcus aureus OR mrsa OR clostridium difficile OR vre OR extended 
spectrum beta lactamase OR esbl OR multi drug resistant OR vancomycin resistant enterococc* catheter 
associated OR catheter related OR device associated OR surgical wound OR healthcare acquired OR 
nosocomial OR ventilator associated) AND (infection OR infections))) AND ("Data Collection"[Mesh] OR 
"Program Evaluation"[Mesh] OR "Health Facility Administration"[Mesh] OR "Hospital 
Administration"[Mesh] OR "Contact Tracing"[Mesh] OR "Disease Notification"[Mesh] OR "Molecular 
Epidemiology"[Mesh] OR "Sentinel Surveillance"[Mesh] OR "Infection Control"[Mesh] OR 
"Biosurveillance"[Mesh] OR surveillance OR report* OR monitor* OR benchmark* OR network* OR 
infection prevention OR feedback OR database OR data base OR dataset OR data set) AND 
("Algorithms"[Mesh] OR "Automatic Data Processing"[Mesh] OR "Computer Systems"[Mesh] OR "Software 
Validation"[Mesh] OR "Database Management Systems"[Mesh] OR link* OR match* OR merg* OR 
probabilistic OR deterministic) 
Search time: 15:10 
Results: 15,542 
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Appendix 3: Quality assessment tool used in systematic review 
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The maximum score varied across studies as some were not eligible for scoring against all criteria e.g. 
articles proposing or describing a system could not be assessed against criteria in the “Methods” and 
“Results” sections. The histogram below therefore shows the quality assessment scores in terms of percent. 
Percentage compliance with the criteria ranged from 52.5% to 93.2%, and the median value was 81.9%. The 
article with the lowest score was a paper identified within a conference proceeding. 
 
  
 270 
 
Appendix 4: Published paper on the evaluation of a national microbiological surveillance 
system 
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Appendix 5: Variation in reporting at the trust level 
TLE 
no. Trust name 
  Delay (weeks) Delay (days) Reporting proportions Proportion >= 10 weeks 
Reporting 
Delay ⁰ Mean SD Median 25% 
Median 
(50%) 75% 90% 
Total reports 
(over 5 years) 
KH03 bed 
days 
(2011/12) 
Reports 
per 10,000 
bed days 
No. of 
reports with 
delays* 
No. > =10 
weeks 
% > =10 
weeks 
1 Alder Hey Children's 96.5 1.5 0.9 1 8 9 12 15 1,381 59,771 231 1,358 3 0.2 
2 
Ashford & St Peter's 
Hospitals 91.7 1.0 0.8 1 5 7 8 10 3,898 184,624 211 3,609 11 0.3 
3 
Barking, Havering & 
Redbridge Hospitals 85.0 1.8 1.2 2 8 11 16 23 9,680 382,408 253 8,933 5 0.1 
4 
Barnet & Chase 
Farm Hospitals 73.2 2.8 3.1 1 7 8 26 64 9,118 267,995 340 9,118 862 9.5 
5 Barts & the London  77.8 2.1 2.1 2 7 10.5 17 29 14,606 299,796 487 12,968 533 4.1 
6 
Basildon & Thurrock 
University Hospitals 93.4 1.5 1.0 1 8 10 14 18 3,296 214,498 154 3,162 8 0.3 
7 Bedford Hospital 77.3 2.6 1.9 2 11 17 24 35 3,147 124,609 253 3,086 40 1.3 
8 
Birmingham 
Children's Hospital 95.7 1.2 1.2 1 5 7 9 13 541 73,652 73 539 1 0.2 
9 
Birmingham 
Women's 86.8 2.5 1.1 3 13 18 22 26 197 38,825 51 197 0 0.0 
10 
Blackpool Teaching 
Hospitals 96.2 1.3 0.8 1 6 8 11 15 8,904 262,529 339 8,692 10 0.1 
11 Bolton 86.5 1.5 1.2 1 7 9 13 20 2,371 204,780 116 2,183 4 0.2 
12 
Bradford Teaching 
Hospitals 92.0 1.8 1.2 1 8 11 16 23 3,996 208,258 192 3,987 4 0.1 
13 
Brighton & Sussex 
University Hospitals 94.9 1.7 1.0 2 9 11 14 17 16,485 269,648 611 16,084 50 0.3 
14 Bro Morgannwg 82.7 2.5 1.6 2 10 14 20 32 1,103  -  - 1,103 6 0.5 
15 Bromley Hospitals  70.7 3.0 2.9 2 9 11 29 57 2,045  -  - 2,043 178 8.7 
16 
Buckinghamshire 
Healthcare 91.5 1.1 1.1 1 5 7 9 12 5,026 211,035 238 4,711 31 0.7 
17 Burton Hospitals 96.8 0.8 0.7 1 4 5 8 10 2,618 128,391 204 2,552 1 0.0 
18 
Calderdale & 
Huddersfield 93.5 1.5 1.1 1 7 9 13 19 20,399 255,275 799 20,043 22 0.1 
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TLE 
no. Trust name 
  Delay (weeks) Delay (days) Reporting proportions Proportion >= 10 weeks 
Reporting 
Delay ⁰ Mean SD Median 25% 
Median 
(50%) 75% 90% 
Total reports 
(over 5 years) 
KH03 bed 
days 
(2011/12) 
Reports 
per 10,000 
bed days 
No. of 
reports with 
delays* 
No. > =10 
weeks 
% > =10 
weeks 
19 
Cambridge 
University Hospitals 82.1 2.4 2.0 2 10 13 19 37 12,268 301,880 406 11,905 171 1.4 
20 Cardiff and Vale  87.2 2.0 1.5 2 8 11 15 22 10,713  -  - 10,154 154 1.5 
21 Carmarthenshire  82.4 2.5 1.1 2 11 15 21 28 3,309  -  - 3,234 1 0.0 
22 
Central Manchester 
University Hospitals 54.9 3.3 2.0 3 13 21 30 41 370 344,494 11 325 7 2.2 
23 
Chelsea & 
Westminster 
Hospital 28.2 6.8 3.5 9 22 63 123 210 57,334 142,769 4,016 57,235 26959 47.1 
24 
Chesterfield Royal 
Hospital 8.9 8.4 2.6 10 52 151 218 260 43,711 195,208 2,239 43,668 29675 68.0 
25 
City Hospitals 
Sunderland 88.2 1.8 1.7 1 6 9 16 26 11,070 258,215 429 10,990 108 1.0 
26 
Clatterbridge 
Centre for Oncology 79.2 2.1 2.0 1 7 10 16 30 13,816 18,478 7,477 12,613 349 2.8 
27 
Colchester Hospital 
University 96.8 1.2 0.8 1 7 9 11 13 6,155 222,742 276 5,985 15 0.3 
28 
Countess of Chester 
Hospital 99.1 0.9 0.7 1 5 6 8 9 6,268 163,521 383 6,267 7 0.1 
29 
County Durham & 
Darlington 82.5 2.0 2.4 1 6 8 12 36 1,516 285,925 53 1,485 52 3.5 
30 
Croydon Health 
Services 75.9 1.8 1.4 1 8 11 17 24 3,046 187,727 162 2,543 14 0.6 
31 
Cumbria 
Partnership  69.2 3.3 2.8 2 12 14 24 50 26  -  - 25 2 8.0 
32 
Dartford & 
Gravesham 92.0 1.8 1.1 2 9 12 15 20 2,783 154,313 180 2,722 3 0.1 
33 Derby Hospitals 92.9 1.5 1.5 1 8 10 14 22 63,077 307,836 2,049 62,779 311 0.5 
34 
Doncaster & 
Bassetlaw Hospitals 70.9 3.2 3.0 2 8 14 28 73 3,751 316,838 118 3,729 416 11.2 
35 
Dorset County 
Hospital 59.0 3.4 2.3 3 12 20 32 44 1,784 122,014 146 1,751 58 3.3 
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TLE 
no. Trust name 
  Delay (weeks) Delay (days) Reporting proportions Proportion >= 10 weeks 
Reporting 
Delay ⁰ Mean SD Median 25% 
Median 
(50%) 75% 90% 
Total reports 
(over 5 years) 
KH03 bed 
days 
(2011/12) 
Reports 
per 10,000 
bed days 
No. of 
reports with 
delays* 
No. > =10 
weeks 
% > =10 
weeks 
36 Ealing Hospital 58.2 4.4 4.2 2 6 13 166 448 52,879 117,721 4,492 52,053 17221 33.1 
37 
East & North 
Hertfordshire 77.0 2.7 2.0 2 11 15 23 37 5,098 258,907 197 4,939 144 2.9 
38 East Cheshire 79.3 2.7 2.2 2 10 16 23 34 3,512 118,208 297 3,511 197 5.6 
39 
East Kent Hospitals 
University 96.7 1.4 0.8 1 7 9 12 15 7,158 381,237 188 6,981 2 0.0 
40 
East Lancashire 
Hospitals 98.5 1.5 1.0 1 8 10 13 15 3,022 266,032 114 3,021 22 0.7 
41 
East Sussex 
Hospitals 95.9 1.1 0.9 1 5 8 10 12 5,912 291,521 203 5,750 6 0.1 
42 
Epsom & St Helier 
University Hospitals 91.6 1.7 1.6 1 8 11 15 19 5,941 250,485 237 5,714 132 2.3 
43 
Frimley Park 
Hospital 82.2 1.9 1.6 1 7 9 18 28 9,299 193,301 481 8,911 74 0.8 
44 Gateshead Health 83.3 2.2 1.9 2 7 11 17 34 3,764 173,097 217 3,743 46 1.2 
45 
George Eliot 
Hospital 52.1 4.4 3.4 3 10 22 50 140 376 115,953 32 376 67 17.8 
46 
Gloucestershire 
Hospitals 90.3 1.4 1.1 1 6 9 12 18 7,202 329,459 219 6,809 11 0.2 
47 
Great Ormond 
Street Hospital for 
Children 88.6 1.9 2.1 1 7 10 14 24 387 88,396 44 377 19 5.0 
48 
Great Western 
Hospitals 74.4 2.3 2.1 1 6 10 
24.
5 35 2,676 181,408 148 2,616 61 2.3 
49 Guy's & St. Thomas' 96.0 1.3 1.0 1 6 7 10 16 93,550 296,614 3,154 92,517 260 0.3 
50 Gwent Healthcare 93.7 1.9 1.1 2 9 11 14 20 3,684  -  - 3,626 9 0.2 
51 
Hampshire 
Hospitals 87.1 1.7 2.3 1 5 7 12 32 23,111 103,359 2,236 23,039 836 3.6 
52 Harrogate & District 92.3 1.8 1.2 2 8 11 16 23 1,530  -  - 1,500 8 0.5 
53 Heart of England 94.3 1.1 1.0 1 7 9 11 13 16,923 517,694 327 16,185 102 0.6 
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54 
Heatherwood & 
Wexham Park 
Hospitals 4.0 1.4 1.0 5 6 7 14 15 329 187,070 18 14 0 0.0 
55 
Hinchingbrooke 
Healthcare 77.6 2.6 1.8 2 11 15 22 36 2,268 85,007 267 2,209 29 1.3 
56 
Homerton 
University Hospital 44.1 5.7 4.2 6 8 46 160 281 45,591 126,627 3,600 45,033 19756 43.9 
57 
Hull & East 
Yorkshire Hospitals 93.4 1.2 0.9 1 6 7 10 14 6,499 402,899 161 6,206 14 0.2 
58 
Imperial College 
Healthcare 36.7 6.5 3.8 9 16 66 148 235 51,525 473,361 1,088 50,688 25049 49.4 
59 Ipswich Hospital 96.8 1.2 0.8 1 7 9 11 13 4,597 197,290 233 4,482 16 0.4 
60 
Isle of Wight 
Healthcare 90.1 1.6 1.7 1 8 10 14 25 3,693 108,864 339 3,691 9 0.2 
61 
James Paget 
University Hospitals 91.2 1.5 1.4 1 7 10 13 16 2,580 134,484 192 2,445 24 1.0 
62 
Kettering General 
Hospital 65.7 3.1 2.8 2 8 14 27 59 3,150 184,339 171 2,862 249 8.7 
63 
King's College 
Hospital 69.4 2.9 2.5 2 10 14 26 51 7,904 307,561 257 7,446 259 3.5 
64 Kingston Hospital 74.2 2.2 2.5 1 7 10 16 40 3,107 157,570 197 2,732 171 6.3 
65 
Lancashire Teaching 
Hospitals 98.1 0.9 0.6 1 5 6 7 9 14,876 329,915 451 14,661 24 0.2 
66 
Leeds Teaching 
Hospitals 98.6 1.2 0.7 1 7 8 10 13 105,182 666,693 1,578 104,091 125 0.1 
67 
Lewisham 
Healthcare NHS 
Trust 13.0 7.5 3.0 9 36 64 89 100 12,188 139,776 872 11,701 5508 47.1 
68 
Luton & Dunstable 
Hospital 85.0 1.4 1.2 1 7 9 12 21 4,853 186,376 260 4,407 10 0.2 
69 
Maidstone & 
Tunbridge Wells 87.0 2.0 1.8 1 9 11 15 27 7,743 245,845 315 7,554 178 2.4 
70 Medway 97.5 1.0 0.9 1 5 8 10 14 12,002 147,442 814 11,780 13 0.1 
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71 
Mid Cheshire 
Hospitals 83.7 2.1 2.6 1 5 7 13 39 2,859 173,467 165 2,819 196 7.0 
72 
Mid Essex Hospital 
Services 95.5 1.6 1.1 1 9 11 14 18 4,489 171,706 261 4,412 39 0.9 
73 Mid Staffordshire 99.2 0.7 0.7 1 4 5 7 8 4,191 129,540 324 4,177 3 0.1 
74 
Mid Yorkshire 
Hospitals 91.7 1.2 1.2 1 4 7 10 16 6,978 345,372 202 6,661 12 0.2 
75 
Milton Keynes 
Hospital 87.2 1.6 1.7 1 6 8 11 23 5,230 155,931 335 4,900 106 2.2 
76 
Norfolk & Norwich 
University Hospitals 90.7 1.9 1.4 2 9 12 17 23 11,332 308,602 367 11,207 105 0.9 
77 North Bristol 95.9 1.1 1.4 1 5 6 8 13 84,510 342,518 2,467 84,084 884 1.1 
78 
North Cumbria 
University Hospitals 96.8 1.4 0.9 1 7 9 12 15 5,160 184,902 279 5,087 4 0.1 
79 North East Wales 91.6 1.9 1.6 2 7 10 13 18 1,828  -  - 1,795 24 1.3 
80 North Glamorgan 77.4 3.2 2.8 2 10 14 22 99 1,172  -  - 1,170 149 12.7 
81 
North Middlesex 
University Hospital 88.8 1.7 1.5 1 6 9 14 25 2,729 131,187 208 2,672 11 0.4 
82 
North Tees & 
Hartlepool 87.1 1.9 1.9 1 6 9 15 27 906 196,041 46 884 22 2.5 
83 
North West London 
Hospitals 82.2 1.8 1.3 2 7 10 15 22 15,728 240,364 654 13,912 99 0.7 
84 North West Wales 95.0 1.8 1.0 2 8 11 14 18 4,140  -  - 4,078 21 0.5 
85 
Northampton 
General Hospital 16.6 2.2 1.5 3 8 12 21 33 428 212,475 20 84 1 1.2 
86 
Northern Devon 
Healthcare 92.5 1.6 1.6 1 7 9 12 20 2,033 129,207 157 2,009 36 1.8 
87 
Northern 
Lincolnshire & 
Goole Hospitals 98.1 0.8 0.7 1 4 6 7 9 39,918 223,404 1,787 39,694 5 0.0 
88 
Northumbria 
Healthcare 91.8 2.1 1.6 2 8 11 14 20 4,752 339,564 140 4,749 69 1.5 
 282 
 
TLE 
no. Trust name 
  Delay (weeks) Delay (days) Reporting proportions Proportion >= 10 weeks 
Reporting 
Delay ⁰ Mean SD Median 25% 
Median 
(50%) 75% 90% 
Total reports 
(over 5 years) 
KH03 bed 
days 
(2011/12) 
Reports 
per 10,000 
bed days 
No. of 
reports with 
delays* 
No. > =10 
weeks 
% > =10 
weeks 
89 
Nottingham 
University Hospitals 86.5 1.7 2.1 1 6 8 11 20 12,816 512,328 250 12,054 447 3.7 
90 
Oxford University 
Hospitals 95.9 1.1 1.0 1 6 8 11 13 7,011 405,938 173 6,787 51 0.8 
91 Papworth Hospital 67.0 2.5 2.0 2 10 14 22 36 1,909 58,681 325 1,583 40 2.5 
92 
Pembrokeshire and 
Derwen 74.6 2.7 1.6 2 11 15 24 32 1,139  -  - 1,134 5 0.4 
93 
Pennine Acute 
Hospitals 88.7 1.8 1.6 1 7 10 15 23 20,650 513,771 402 19,927 255 1.3 
94 
Peterborough & 
Stamford Hospitals 94.9 1.2 0.7 1 7 8 11 13 4,928 179,664 274 4,696 3 0.1 
95 Plymouth Hospitals 82.7 2.2 2.7 1 6 8 15 43 5,229 292,818 179 5,116 407 8.0 
96 
Pontypridd and 
Rhondda 60.4 4.2 3.1 3 13 20 37 186 556  -  - 556 101 18.2 
97 Poole Hospital 87.8 0.8 0.7 1 4 5 7 8 2,914 180,355 162 2,579 0 0.0 
98 
Portsmouth 
Hospitals 94.0 1.3 1.1 1 6 8 12 17 8,207 320,092 256 8,015 13 0.2 
99 Public Health Wales 85.8 2.5 2.2 2 9 13 17 31 11,425  -  - 11,414 689 6.0 
100 
Queen Elizabeth  
54.5 3.3 2.4 3 10 19 32 45 3,007  -  - 2,619 91 3.5 
101 
Queen Mary's 
Sidcup  95.7 1.5 1.2 1 8 10 14 18 257  -  - 257 0 0.0 
102 
Queen Victoria 
Hospital 
Not enough observations 
103 Royal Berkshire 90.1 1.3 1.6 1 5 7 9 14 5,389 212,826 253 5,037 144 2.9 
104 
Royal Brompton & 
Harefield 76.9 1.8 1.9 1 8 10 15 25 21,713 134,666 1,612 18,501 494 2.7 
105 
Royal Cornwall 
Hospitals 95.0 1.2 1.0 1 6 7 9 12 7,505 222,082 338 7,324 29 0.4 
106 
Royal Devon & 
Exeter 80.4 2.3 2.0 2 8 12 21 35 7,050 235,070 300 6,885 69 1.0 
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107 
Royal Free 
Hampstead 80.1 2.2 2.6 1 7 9 13 43 5,008 218,602 229 4,644 347 7.5 
108 
Royal Liverpool & 
Broadgreen 
University Hospitals 45.6 4.2 2.7 4 14 26 41 59 6,001 280,005 214 5,773 382 6.6 
109 
Royal Surrey County 
Hospital 
Not enough observations 
110 
Royal United 
Hospital Bath 76.5 2.2 2.6 1 5 8 19 45 2,570 198,375 130 2,446 122 5.0 
111 
Royal West Sussex  
79.7 2.3 1.8 2 8 12 22 32 1,579  -  - 1,570 11 0.7 
112 Salford Royal 89.4 1.8 1.3 2 8 11 17 24 6,157 228,409 270 6,041 17 0.3 
113 Salisbury 70.7 3.5 3.5 2 8 12 31 193 1,698 154,503 110 1,660 314 18.9 
114 
Sandwell & West 
Birmingham 
Hospitals 84.7 1.3 1.0 1 6 8 12 17 6,911 314,691 220 6,021 9 0.1 
115 
Scarborough & 
North East 
Yorkshire Health 
Care 85.1 2.2 1.4 2 10 14 21 29 3,413 113,390 301 3,398 8 0.2 
116 
Sheffield Teaching 
Hospitals 94.5 1.3 1.0 1 6 9 12 18 22,359 642,645 348 21,800 15 0.1 
117 
Sherwood Forest 
Hospitals 89.3 1.8 2.1 1 7 9 13 22 4,892 216,489 226 4,754 194 4.1 
118 
Shrewsbury & 
Telford Hospital 96.4 1.0 0.9 1 5 6 8 11 5,536 277,891 199 5,391 27 0.5 
119 
South Devon 
Healthcare 81.4 2.5 3.0 1 7 9 14 71 16,379 126,155 1,298 16,260 1728 10.6 
120 
South Tees 
Hospitals 74.9 2.8 3.1 1 6 10 24 72 11,801 319,867 369 11,604 1229 10.6 
121 South Tyneside 90.4 1.8 1.5 1 7 9 14 23 1,517 120,819 126 1,515 14 0.9 
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122 
Southend 
University Hospital 89.5 1.9 0.9 2 11 14 17 21 5,351 224,110 239 5,026 2 0.0 
123 
Southport & 
Ormskirk Hospital 72.8 3.0 3.0 1 6 10 28 63 1,358 151,870 89 1,357 122 9.0 
124 
St. George's 
Healthcare 69.6 2.6 2.4 2 8 13 23 44 6,040 285,108 212 5,439 212 3.9 
125 
St Helens & 
Knowsley Hospitals 85.1 2.1 1.4 2 8 12 19 29 25,299 228,898 1,105 25,299 9 0.0 
126 Stockport 90.6 2.0 1.2 2 9 12 17 24 2,488 239,767 104 2,488 3 0.1 
127 
Surrey & Sussex 
Healthcare 92.1 1.5 1.5 1 7 9 11 15 4,471 189,116 236 4,286 89 2.1 
128 Tameside Hospital 90.4 1.5 1.4 1 5 8 12 22 4,279 160,443 267 4,190 4 0.1 
129 
Taunton & 
Somerset 96.9 1.0 0.7 1 5 6 8 10 5,449 170,833 319 5,340 1 0.0 
130 
Tees, Esk and Wear 
Valley  93.3 1.6 1.3 1 6 10 16 22 4,036  -  - 3,954 21 0.5 
131 
The Dudley Group 
of Hospitals 94.9 0.8 0.7 1 4 5 6 8 4,434 209,307 212 4,232 8 0.2 
132 
The Hillingdon 
Hospitals 56.0 3.4 2.8 2 9 17 32 62 2,917 137,576 212 2,499 216 8.6 
133 
The Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
Hospitals 87.9 1.9 2.8 1 3 6 11 38 5,037 473,313 106 5,036 465 9.2 
134 
The Princess 
Alexandra Hospital 95.3 1.6 1.2 1 8 11 15 19 3,584 154,437 232 3,558 19 0.5 
135 
The Queen 
Elizabeth Hospital 
King's Lynn 97.0 1.3 0.8 1 7 9 12 15 3,915 144,836 270 3,827 1 0.0 
136 The Rotherham 75.4 2.6 1.6 2 11 15 23 32 2,875 185,454 155 2,747 18 0.7 
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137 
The Royal 
Bournemouth & 
Christchurch 
Hospitals 92.2 1.5 1.1 1 7 9 13 18 3,723 224,151 166 3,576 3 0.1 
138 The Royal Marsden 4.3 9.1 2.3 10 71 159.5 329 506 1,729 56,341 307 1,722 1334 77.5 
139 
The Royal 
Wolverhampton 
Hospitals 99.8 1.0 0.6 1 6 7 9 12 5,521 222,845 248 5,521 4 0.1 
140 The Walton Centre 95.2 1.7 1.3 1 7 9 12 16 3,584 42,622 841 3,533 49 1.4 
141 
The Whittington 
Hospital 92.5 1.7 1.4 1 7 9 14 21 10,360 106,116 976 10,134 131 1.3 
142 Trafford Healthcare 91.9 1.8 1.1 2 8 11 17 23 1,253 80,633 155 1,253 1 0.1 
143 
United Lincolnshire 
Hospitals 98.4 0.8 0.7 1 4 5 7 9 98,699 417,318 2,365 98,276 9 0.0 
144 
University College 
London Hospitals 55.6 3.8 2.6 3 13 21 41 53 7,874 261,124 302 7,402 349 4.7 
145 
University Hospital 
of North 
Staffordshire 93.4 1.1 0.8 1 5 7 9 12 13,974 360,239 388 13,256 11 0.1 
146 
University Hospital 
of South 
Manchester 95.7 1.1 1.0 1 5 6 8 10 43,321 277,363 1,562 42,402 251 0.6 
147 
Southampton 
University Hospitals 84.2 1.8 2.6 1 5 7 9 27 9,874 345,691 286 9,295 764 8.2 
148 
University Hospital 
Birmingham 94.8 0.9 0.8 1 4 5 7 8 7,818 326,100 240 7,494 10 0.1 
149 
University Hospitals 
Bristol 74.5 2.3 2.7 1 5 8 17 48 3,092 258,897 119 2,844 180 6.3 
150 
University Hospitals 
Coventry & 
Warwickshire 93.1 1.2 0.9 1 6 8 11 15 9,322 373,781 249 8,820 10 0.1 
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151 
University Hospitals 
of Leicester 69.6 2.8 2.7 2 7 12 27 51 15,386 527,102 292 14,670 740 5.0 
152 
University Hospitals 
of Morecambe Bay 70.7 2.9 2.2 2 10 15 25 38 2,130 242,927 88 2,050 83 4.0 
153 Walsall Healthcare 92.8 1.1 1.0 1 6 8 10 12 3,829 166,124 230 3,622 15 0.4 
154 
Warrington & 
Halton Hospitals 97.3 1.0 0.8 1 4 6 9 11 2,628 191,449 137 2,609 0 0.0 
155 
West Hertfordshire 
Hospitals 75.9 2.5 1.7 2 11 15 23 33 3,866 180,300 214 3,661 30 0.8 
156 
West Middlesex 
University Hospital 38.7 6.0 3.8 7 15 47 121 217 41,682 124,897 3,337 41,128 16916 41.1 
157 
West Suffolk 
Hospitals 86.6 2.0 1.4 2 9 13 18 27 4,512 134,208 336 4,376 11 0.3 
158 Weston Area Health 95.3 1.3 1.0 1 6 8 11 16 1,971  -  - 1,932 1 0.1 
159 
Whipps Cross 
76.9 1.7 1.3 2 6 9 15 22 3,050 214,751 142 2,544 3 0.1 
160 
Winchester & 
Eastleigh 
Healthcare 96.8 1.5 0.9 1 7 10 13 17 1,519 126,719 120 1,518 2 0.1 
161 
Wirral University 
Teaching Hospital 98.1 1.1 0.8 1 5 7 9 12 5,859 240,086 244 5,824 12 0.2 
162 
Worcestershire 
Acute Hospitals 93.3 1.4 1.0 1 7 9 13 19 6,137 260,143 236 5,967 2 0.0 
163 
Worthing and 
Southlands Hospital 
95.7 1.7 0.9 2 8 11 13 17 2,536  -  - 2,530 2 0.1 
164 
Wrightington, 
Wigan & Leigh 92.5 1.7 1.1 1 7 9 14 20 2,807 172,632 163 2,765 4 0.1 
165 
Wye Valley NHS 
Trust 97.8 1.0 0.6 1 5 7 8 10 2,466 88,916 277 2,428 0 0.0 
166 
Yeovil District 
Hospital 96.9 1.0 0.6 1 5 7 8 11 1,826 108,725 168 1,788 0 0.0 
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167 
York Teaching 
Hospital 10.0 8.5 2.8 10 57 94 136 170 1,410 211,417 67 1,410 997 70.7 
 
   ⁰ % reports received within 3 weeks of 
earliest specimen date 
* excludes Mycobacterium spp. reports 
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Appendix 6: Simpson’s Diversity Index results for all reporting trusts 
TLE no. Trust Name D 
1 Alder Hey Children's 0.168 
2 Ashford & St Peter's Hospitals 0.202 
3 Barking, Havering & Redbridge Hospitals 0.148 
4 Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals 0.179 
5 Barts & the London 0.126 
6 Basildon & Thurrock University Hospitals 0.170 
7 Bedford Hospital 0.193 
8 Birmingham Children's Hospital 0.143 
9 Birmingham Women's 0.181 
10 Blackpool Teaching Hospitals 0.168 
11 Bolton 0.175 
12 Bradford Teaching Hospitals 0.462 
13 Brighton & Sussex University Hospitals 0.158 
14 Bro Morgannwg 0.219 
15 Bromley Hospitals 0.352 
16 Buckinghamshire Healthcare 0.145 
17 Burton Hospitals 0.151 
18 Calderdale & Huddersfield 0.552 
19 Cambridge University Hospitals 0.155 
20 Cardiff and Vale  0.190 
21 Carmarthenshire  0.186 
22 Central Manchester University Hospitals 0.124 
23 Chelsea & Westminster Hospital 0.147 
24 Chesterfield Royal Hospital 0.306 
25 City Hospitals Sunderland 0.421 
26 Clatterbridge Centre for Oncology 0.215 
27 Colchester Hospital University 0.185 
28 Countess of Chester Hospital 0.163 
29 County Durham & Darlington 0.341 
30 Croydon Health Services 0.144 
31 Cumbria Partnership 0.468 
32 Dartford & Gravesham 0.160 
33 Derby Hospitals 0.198 
34 Doncaster & Bassetlaw Hospitals 0.143 
35 Dorset County Hospital 0.258 
36 Ealing Hospital 0.243 
37 East & North Hertfordshire 0.149 
38 East Cheshire 0.368 
39 East Kent Hospitals University 0.147 
40 East Lancashire Hospitals 0.180 
41 East Sussex Hospitals 0.162 
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42 Epsom & St Helier University Hospitals 0.120 
43 Frimley Park Hospital 0.139 
44 Gateshead Health 0.182 
45 George Eliot Hospital 0.256 
46 Gloucestershire Hospitals 0.183 
47 Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children 0.123 
48 Great Western Hospitals 0.170 
49 Guy's & St. Thomas' 0.175 
50 Gwent Healthcare 0.342 
51 Hampshire Hospitals 0.170 
52 Harrogate & District 0.180 
53 Heart of England 0.166 
54 Heatherwood & Wexham Park Hospitals 0.917 
55 Hinchingbrooke Healthcare 0.172 
56 Homerton University Hospital 0.235 
57 Hull & East Yorkshire Hospitals 0.141 
58 Imperial College Healthcare 0.136 
59 Ipswich Hospital 0.181 
60 Isle of Wight Healthcare 0.203 
61 James Paget University Hospitals 0.183 
62 Kettering General Hospital 0.168 
63 King's College Hospital 0.118 
64 Kingston Hospital 0.140 
65 Lancashire Teaching Hospitals 0.192 
66 Leeds Teaching Hospitals 0.450 
67 Lewisham Healthcare NHS Trust 0.347 
68 Luton & Dunstable Hospital 0.131 
69 Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells 0.200 
70 Medway 0.705 
71 Mid Cheshire Hospitals 0.200 
72 Mid Essex Hospital Services 0.138 
73 Mid Staffordshire 0.287 
74 Mid Yorkshire Hospitals 0.146 
75 Milton Keynes Hospital 0.121 
76 Norfolk & Norwich University Hospitals 0.180 
77 North Bristol 0.291 
78 North Cumbria University Hospitals 0.161 
79 North East Wales 0.246 
80 North Glamorgan 0.224 
81 North Middlesex University Hospital 0.190 
82 North Tees & Hartlepool 0.407 
83 North West London Hospitals 0.346 
84 North West Wales 0.233 
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85 Northampton General Hospital 0.655 
86 Northern Devon Healthcare 0.143 
87 Northern Lincolnshire & Goole Hospitals 0.206 
88 Northumbria Healthcare 0.198 
89 Nottingham University Hospitals 0.135 
90 Oxford University Hospitals 0.199 
91 Papworth Hospital 0.163 
92 Pembrokeshire and Derwen 0.205 
93 Pennine Acute Hospitals 0.175 
94 Peterborough & Stamford Hospitals 0.170 
95 Plymouth Hospitals 0.148 
96 Pontypridd and Rhondda 0.204 
97 Poole Hospital 0.123 
98 Portsmouth Hospitals 0.161 
99 Public Health Wales 0.286 
100 Queen Elizabeth 0.122 
101 Queen Mary's Sidcup 0.784 
102 Queen Victoria Hospital NR 
103 Royal Berkshire 0.162 
104 Royal Brompton & Harefield 0.197 
105 Royal Cornwall Hospitals 0.195 
106 Royal Devon & Exeter 0.207 
107 Royal Free Hampstead 0.102 
108 Royal Liverpool & Broadgreen University Hospitals 0.210 
109 Royal Surrey County Hospital NR 
110 Royal United Hospital Bath 0.395 
111 Royal West Sussex 0.182 
112 Salford Royal 0.162 
113 Salisbury 0.170 
114 Sandwell & West Birmingham Hospitals 0.125 
115 Scarborough & North East Yorkshire Health Care 0.285 
116 Sheffield Teaching Hospitals 0.170 
117 Sherwood Forest Hospitals 0.168 
118 Shrewsbury & Telford Hospital 0.149 
119 South Devon Healthcare 0.325 
120 South Tees Hospitals 0.127 
121 South Tyneside 0.188 
122 Southend University Hospital 0.137 
123 Southport & Ormskirk Hospital 0.188 
124 St. George's Healthcare 0.146 
125 St Helens & Knowsley Hospitals 0.465 
126 Stockport 0.198 
127 Surrey & Sussex Healthcare 0.139 
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128 Tameside Hospital 0.264 
129 Taunton & Somerset 0.179 
130 Tees, Esk and Wear Valley 0.179 
131 The Dudley Group of Hospitals 0.188 
132 The Hillingdon Hospitals 0.143 
133 The Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals 0.153 
134 The Princess Alexandra Hospital 0.175 
135 The Queen Elizabeth Hospital King's Lynn 0.171 
136 The Rotherham 0.176 
137 The Royal Bournemouth & Christchurch Hospitals 0.147 
138 The Royal Marsden 0.129 
139 The Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals 0.177 
140 The Walton Centre 0.219 
141 The Whittington Hospital 0.218 
142 Trafford Healthcare 0.301 
143 United Lincolnshire Hospitals 0.208 
144 University College London Hospitals 0.144 
145 University Hospital of North Staffordshire 0.159 
146 University Hospital of South Manchester 0.248 
147 Southampton University Hospitals 0.150 
148 University Hospital Birmingham 0.132 
149 University Hospitals Bristol 0.256 
150 University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire 0.170 
151 University Hospitals of Leicester 0.151 
152 University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay 0.166 
153 Walsall Healthcare 0.134 
154 Warrington & Halton Hospitals 0.243 
155 West Hertfordshire Hospitals 0.170 
156 West Middlesex University Hospital 0.238 
157 West Suffolk Hospitals 0.220 
158 Weston Area Health 0.168 
159 Whipps Cross 0.153 
160 Winchester & Eastleigh Healthcare 0.147 
161 Wirral University Teaching Hospital 0.196 
162 Worcestershire Acute Hospitals 0.162 
163 Worthing and Southlands Hospital 0.208 
164 Wrightington, Wigan & Leigh 0.215 
165 Wye Valley NHS Trust 0.169 
166 Yeovil District Hospital 0.153 
167 York Teaching Hospital 0.156 
NR: no results (too few observations) 
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Appendix 7: Reporting behaviours pre- and post-October 2010 (i.e. before and after the 
introduction of Regulation 4 of The Health Protection (Notifications) Regulations 2010) 
 
Numbers in the table below represent mean number of weekly reports across all organisms investigated. 
Key 
IRR* >1 <1 
p value significant 
non-
significant 
*IRR = incidence rate ratio 
TLE no. Trust Name 
Pre-Oct 
2010 
Post-Oct 
2010 IRR p value 
1 Alder Hey Children's 4.0 7.0 1.76 <0.01 
2 Ashford & St Peter's Hospitals 16.8 7.2 0.43 <0.01 
3 
Barking, Havering & Redbridge 
Hospitals 
34.9 32.8 0.94 0.13 
4 Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals 5.9 86.0 14.65 <0.01 
5 Barts & the London 52.4 50.4 0.96 0.57 
6 
Basildon & Thurrock University 
Hospitals 
12.5 9.8 0.78 <0.01 
7 Bedford Hospital 12.1 9.1 0.75 <0.01 
8 Birmingham Children's Hospital 2.5 0.7 0.28 <0.01 
9 Birmingham Women's 0.7 0.7 0.96 0.81 
10 Blackpool Teaching Hospitals 32.7 29.1 0.89 0.06 
11 Bolton 8.1 9.1 1.13 0.08 
12 Bradford Teaching Hospitals 14.6 13.1 0.89 0.06 
13 
Brighton & Sussex University 
Hospitals 
64.5 44.8 0.69 <0.01 
14 Bro Morgannwg 4.5 2.5 0.55 0.01 
15 Bromley Hospitals 5.4 11.0 2.05 <0.01 
16 Buckinghamshire Healthcare 18.3 16.7 0.91 0.05 
17 Burton Hospitals 9.1 9.8 1.08 0.19 
18 Calderdale & Huddersfield 57.5 105.6 1.84 <0.01 
19 Cambridge University Hospitals 41.0 49.1 1.20 <0.01 
20 Cardiff and Vale  41.1 31.0 0.76 <0.01 
21 Carmarthenshire  13.1 8.7 0.66 <0.01 
22 
Central Manchester University 
Hospitals 
1.8 0.2 0.12 <0.01 
23 Chelsea & Westminster Hospital 178.5 248.4 1.39 0.20 
24 Chesterfield Royal Hospital 181.3 96.1 0.53 0.09 
25 City Hospitals Sunderland 42.4 32.2 0.76 <0.01 
26 Clatterbridge Centre for Oncology 52.5 41.1 0.78 <0.01 
27 Colchester Hospital University 22.3 20.9 0.94 0.20 
28 Countess of Chester Hospital 22.4 21.8 0.97 0.60 
29 County Durham & Darlington Only data from one time period 
30 Croydon Health Services 11.4 9.4 0.83 <0.01 
31 Cumbria Partnership 0.1 0.0 0.00 0.98 
32 Dartford & Gravesham 10.0 9.6 0.95 0.48 
33 Derby Hospitals 123.8 447.2 3.61 <0.01 
34 Doncaster & Bassetlaw Hospitals 11.9 16.2 1.36 <0.01 
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TLE no. Trust Name 
Pre-Oct 
2010 
Post-Oct 
2010 IRR p value 
35 Dorset County Hospital 7.0 4.9 0.70 <0.01 
36 Ealing Hospital 164.2 200.0 1.22 0.20 
37 East & North Hertfordshire 18.4 17.3 0.94 0.18 
38 East Cheshire 12.1 13.2 1.09 0.42 
39 East Kent Hospitals University 26.0 23.9 0.92 0.07 
40 East Lancashire Hospitals 10.7 10.7 1.00 0.98 
41 East Sussex Hospitals 22.4 17.8 0.79 <0.01 
42 
Epsom & St Helier University 
Hospitals 
21.4 19.7 0.92 0.26 
43 Frimley Park Hospital 33.4 31.9 0.95 0.62 
44 Gateshead Health 7.4 26.6 3.57 <0.01 
45 George Eliot Hospital 1.9 0.0 0.01 <0.01 
46 Gloucestershire Hospitals 26.3 23.8 0.91 0.06 
47 
Great Ormond Street Hospital for 
Children 
0.0 4.4 286.89 <0.01 
48 Great Western Hospitals 9.8 8.3 0.84 <0.01 
49 Guy's & St. Thomas' 461.5 40.9 0.09 <0.01 
50 Gwent Healthcare 15.2 8.3 0.54 <0.01 
51 Hampshire Hospitals 67.9 113.5 1.67 0.01 
52 Harrogate & District 5.7 4.7 0.83 <0.01 
53 Heart of England 61.3 57.1 0.93 0.19 
54 
Heatherwood & Wexham Park 
Hospitals 
1.0 1.6 1.60 <0.01 
55 Hinchingbrooke Healthcare 8.4 7.3 0.87 0.05 
56 Homerton University Hospital 146.1 196.6 1.35 0.05 
57 Hull & East Yorkshire Hospitals 23.7 21.6 0.91 0.07 
58 Imperial College Healthcare 170.9 197.3 1.15 0.38 
59 Ipswich Hospital 16.9 14.9 0.88 0.02 
60 Isle of Wight Healthcare 10.3 19.4 1.88 <0.01 
61 James Paget University Hospitals 9.5 8.3 0.88 0.03 
62 Kettering General Hospital 11.8 9.8 0.83 <0.01 
63 King's College Hospital 18.8 48.7 2.60 <0.01 
64 Kingston Hospital 11.0 11.1 1.01 0.89 
65 Lancashire Teaching Hospitals 55.2 47.2 0.85 <0.01 
66 Leeds Teaching Hospitals 379.0 359.3 0.95 0.38 
67 Lewisham Healthcare NHS Trust 59.2 5.6 0.95 <0.01 
68 Luton & Dunstable Hospital 17.6 16.4 0.93 0.15 
69 Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells 26.5 29.3 1.11 0.08 
70 Medway 41.4 45.0 1.09 0.38 
71 Mid Cheshire Hospitals 9.7 11.0 1.14 0.13 
72 Mid Essex Hospital Services 14.7 18.6 1.27 <0.01 
73 Mid Staffordshire 16.6 10.9 0.66 <0.01 
74 Mid Yorkshire Hospitals 22.2 30.3 1.36 <0.01 
75 Milton Keynes Hospital 17.3 21.2 1.23 <0.01 
76 
Norfolk & Norwich University 
Hospitals 
40.3 39.9 0.99 0.81 
77 North Bristol 201.7 519.2 2.57 <0.01 
78 North Cumbria University Hospitals 17.6 19.8 1.12 0.02 
79 North East Wales 5.0 9.9 1.98 <0.01 
80 North Glamorgan 4.7 2.9 0.60 <0.01 
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TLE no. Trust Name 
Pre-Oct 
2010 
Post-Oct 
2010 IRR p value 
81 
North Middlesex University 
Hospital 
9.5 10.0 1.06 0.57 
82 North Tees & Hartlepool 2.2 5.5 2.50 <0.01 
83 North West London Hospitals 68.4 27.1 0.40 <0.01 
84 North West Wales 16.5 10.5 0.64 <0.01 
85 Northampton General Hospital 2.0 0.4 0.21 <0.01 
86 Northern Devon Healthcare 5.6 10.7 1.91 <0.01 
87 
Northern Lincolnshire & Goole 
Hospitals 
111.2 209.6 1.88 <0.01 
88 Northumbria Healthcare 17.3 15.8 0.91 0.18 
89 Nottingham University Hospitals 42.9 51.2 1.19 <0.01 
90 Oxford University Hospitals 26.2 21.4 0.82 <0.01 
91 Papworth Hospital 6.3 7.8 1.23 0.04 
92 Pembrokeshire and Derwen 3.9 4.2 1.07 0.59 
93 Pennine Acute Hospitals 83.7 48.4 0.58 <0.01 
94 
Peterborough & Stamford 
Hospitals 
17.1 18.3 1.07 0.16 
95 Plymouth Hospitals 19.3 16.9 0.88 <0.01 
96 Pontypridd and Rhondda 0.6 5.0 8.41 <0.01 
97 Poole Hospital 9.8 11.5 1.17 <0.01 
98 Portsmouth Hospitals 28.2 31.1 1.10 0.04 
99 Public Health Wales 43.2 34.6 0.80 <0.01 
100 Queen Elizabeth 9.6 13.1 1.36 <0.01 
101 Queen Mary's Sidcup 1.2 0.4 0.32 <0.01 
102 Queen Victoria Hospital 
Not enough observations for 
analysis 
103 Royal Berkshire 18.5 18.7 1.01 0.83 
104 Royal Brompton & Harefield 64.4 105.2 1.63 <0.01 
105 Royal Cornwall Hospitals 26.9 25.9 0.96 0.38 
106 Royal Devon & Exeter 24.6 25.9 1.05 0.28 
107 Royal Free Hampstead 9.2 36.4 3.97 <0.01 
108 
Royal Liverpool & Broadgreen 
University Hospitals 
24.0 15.2 0.63 <0.01 
109 Royal Surrey County Hospital 
Not enough observations for 
analysis 
110 Royal United Hospital Bath 9.4 7.2 0.77 <0.01 
111 Royal West Sussex 5.7 5.4 0.95 0.48 
112 Salford Royal 24.0 16.9 0.70 <0.01 
113 Salisbury 5.7 6.6 1.16 0.08 
114 
Sandwell & West Birmingham 
Hospitals 
24.6 24.4 0.99 0.86 
115 
Scarborough & North East 
Yorkshire Health Care 
12.7 10.7 0.84 <0.01 
116 Sheffield Teaching Hospitals 78.3 81.4 1.04 0.46 
117 Sherwood Forest Hospitals 16.7 17.2 1.03 0.57 
118 Shrewsbury & Telford Hospital 16.2 27.4 1.70 <0.01 
119 South Devon Healthcare 34.2 111.5 3.26 <0.01 
120 South Tees Hospitals 33.5 59.7 1.78 <0.01 
121 South Tyneside 5.8 4.4 0.75 <0.01 
122 Southend University Hospital 19.3 18.2 0.94 0.24 
123 Southport & Ormskirk Hospital 2.0 11.1 5.46 <0.01 
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TLE no. Trust Name 
Pre-Oct 
2010 
Post-Oct 
2010 IRR p value 
124 St. George's Healthcare 22.8 18.2 0.80 <0.01 
125 St Helens & Knowsley Hospitals 86.8 96.2 1.11 0.26 
126 Stockport 8.6 9.2 1.07 0.37 
127 Surrey & Sussex Healthcare 12.3 23.7 1.92 <0.01 
128 Tameside Hospital 14.9 15.8 1.06 0.33 
129 Taunton & Somerset 18.2 21.9 1.20 <0.01 
130 Tees, Esk and Wear Valley 9.8 24.5 2.51 <0.01 
131 The Dudley Group of Hospitals 16.7 13.5 0.81 <0.01 
132 The Hillingdon Hospitals 10.1 10.1 1.00 1.00 
133 The Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals 16.5 20.9 1.27 0.01 
134 The Princess Alexandra Hospital 9.9 19.0 1.91 <0.01 
135 
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital 
King's Lynn 
13.1 15.6 1.19 <0.01 
136 The Rotherham 10.4 9.7 0.94 0.24 
137 
The Royal Bournemouth & 
Christchurch Hospitals 
12.5 14.7 1.17 <0.01 
138 The Royal Marsden 6.1 0.0 0.00 <0.01 
139 
The Royal Wolverhampton 
Hospitals 
18.7 21.5 1.15 <0.01 
140 The Walton Centre 13.8 10.3 0.74 <0.01 
141 The Whittington Hospital 6.7 104.1 15.52 <0.01 
142 Trafford Healthcare 4.9 3.4 0.68 <0.01 
143 United Lincolnshire Hospitals 366.3 313.6 0.86 0.05 
144 
University College London 
Hospitals 
17.9 50.2 2.80 <0.01 
145 
University Hospital of North 
Staffordshire 
52.6 42.6 0.81 <0.01 
146 
University Hospital of South 
Manchester 
156.5 147.1 0.94 0.28 
147 Southampton University Hospitals 30.1 37.4 1.25 <0.01 
148 University Hospital Birmingham 29.5 23.8 0.81 <0.01 
149 University Hospitals Bristol 10.4 10.4 1.01 0.95 
150 
University Hospitals Coventry & 
Warwickshire 
33.5 32.0 0.96 0.38 
151 University Hospitals of Leicester 57.7 47.6 0.83 <0.01 
152 
University Hospitals of Morecambe 
Bay 
6.5 9.9 1.52 <0.01 
153 Walsall Healthcare 12.6 15.7 1.25 <0.01 
154 Warrington & Halton Hospitals 10.2 7.4 0.73 <0.01 
155 West Hertfordshire Hospitals 14.7 11.4 0.77 <0.01 
156 West Middlesex University Hospital 94.7 220.6 2.33 <0.01 
157 West Suffolk Hospitals 16.5 14.9 0.90 0.04 
158 Weston Area Health 7.6 5.7 0.75 <0.01 
159 Whipps Cross 10.7 10.9 1.01 0.79 
160 Winchester & Eastleigh Healthcare 5.3 5.6 1.06 0.50 
161 Wirral University Teaching Hospital 8.5 48.3 5.69 <0.01 
162 Worcestershire Acute Hospitals 21.5 22.4 1.05 0.35 
163 Worthing and Southlands Hospital 10.1 6.5 0.64 <0.01 
164 Wrightington, Wigan & Leigh 11.3 7.0 0.62 <0.01 
165 Wye Valley NHS Trust 8.7 8.9 1.03 0.69 
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TLE no. Trust Name 
Pre-Oct 
2010 
Post-Oct 
2010 IRR p value 
166 Yeovil District Hospital 6.6 6.3 0.95 0.44 
167 York Teaching Hospital 7.1 0.2 0.03 <0.01 
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Appendix 8: Reporting delays pre- and post-October 2010 for all reporting trusts 
Key 
Increased delay ↑ Reduced delay ↓ 
No significant 
difference in delays 
• 
p value significant non-significant 
p values taken from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test 
 
TLE no. Trust 
Median delay pre-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
Median delay post-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
p value 
1 Alder Hey Children's 10 (9-13) 9 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
2 Ashford & St Peter's Hospitals 7 (5-8) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
3 
Barking, Havering & Redbridge 
Hospitals 
11 (8-16) 11 (8-15) • 0.07 
4 Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals 67 (33-153) 8 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
5 Barts & the London 13 (9-20) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
6 
Basildon & Thurrock University 
Hospitals 
10 (8-13) 11 (8-14) ↑ <0.001 
7 Bedford Hospital 18 (13-25) 12 (8-20) ↓ <0.001 
8 Birmingham Children's Hospital 7 (5-9) 6.5 (5-9) • 0.86 
9 Birmingham Women's 19 (13-22) 17.5 (13-24) • 0.68 
10 Blackpool Teaching Hospitals 8 (7-11) 9 (6-12) ↑ <0.001 
11 Bolton 8 (6-11) 12 (8-17) ↑ <0.001 
12 Bradford Teaching Hospitals 13 (9-19) 8 (6-9) ↓ <0.001 
13 Brighton & Sussex University Hospitals 11 (9-14) 11 (9-14) ↑ 0.01 
14 Bro Morgannwg 15 (10-22) 11 (9-14) ↓ <0.001 
15 Bromley Hospitals 26 (12-49) 9 (8-11) ↓ <0.001 
16 Buckinghamshire Healthcare 7 (5-9) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
17 Burton Hospitals 6 (4-9) 5 (4-6) ↓ <0.001 
18 Calderdale & Huddersfield 10 (7-15) 9 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
19 Cambridge University Hospitals 12 (9-16) 17 (10-39) ↑ <0.001 
20 Cardiff and Vale 11 (8-16) 10 (7-13) ↓ <0.001 
21 Carmarthenshire 16 (12-21) 13 (10-18) ↓ <0.001 
22 
Central Manchester University 
Hospitals 
21 (14-30) 11 (10-15) ↓ <0.001 
23 Chelsea & Westminster Hospital 104 (68-179) 18 (13-27) ↓ <0.001 
24 Chesterfield Royal Hospital 64 (35-164) 230 (178-263) ↑ <0.001 
25 City Hospitals Sunderland 11 (8-18) 5 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
26 Clatterbridge Centre for Oncology 10 (7-15) 10 (8-19) ↑ <0.001 
27 Colchester Hospital University 9 (7-11) 8 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
28 Countess of Chester Hospital 7 (5-8) 6 (5-7) ↓ <0.001 
29 County Durham & Darlington Data only in one time period 
30 Croydon Health Services 12 (9-18) 9 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
31 Cumbria Partnership Data only in one time period 
32 Dartford & Gravesham 12 (10-16) 10 (7-13) ↓ <0.001 
33 Derby Hospitals 14 (10-21) 9 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
34 Doncaster & Bassetlaw Hospitals 21 (14-44) 8 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
35 Dorset County Hospital 19 (10-30.5) 26 (17-36) ↑ <0.001 
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TLE no. Trust 
Median delay pre-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
Median delay post-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
p value 
36 Ealing Hospital 63 (9-340) 6 (4-9) ↓ <0.001 
37 East & North Hertfordshire 18 (13-28) 12 (9-15) ↓ <0.001 
38 East Cheshire 17 (12-26) 13 (8-17) ↓ <0.001 
39 East Kent Hospitals University 9 (7-12) 9 (7-12) • 0.11 
40 East Lancashire Hospitals 11 (9-14) 10 (8-11) ↓ <0.001 
41 East Sussex Hospitals 8 (5-10) 7 (6-9) ↓ <0.001 
42 Epsom & St Helier University Hospitals 12 (10-16) 7 (5-9) ↓ <0.001 
43 Frimley Park Hospital 11 (7-20) 8 (6-12) ↓ <0.001 
44 Gateshead Health 20 (11-35) 8 (7-13) ↓ <0.001 
45 George Eliot Hospital Data only in one time period 
46 Gloucestershire Hospitals 10 (7-14) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
47 
Great Ormond Street Hospital for 
Children 
12 (10-17) 10 (7-14) • 0.31 
48 Great Western Hospitals 15 (6-28) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
49 Guy's & St. Thomas' 8 (6-11) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
50 Gwent Healthcare 12 (9-15) 9 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
51 Hampshire Hospitals 7 (5-15) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
52 Harrogate & District 11 (8-16) 10 (7-15) ↓ 0.01 
53 Heart of England 9 (7-11) 9 (8-11) ↑ <0.001 
54 
Heatherwood & Wexham Park 
Hospitals 
7 (3-14) 7 (7-28) • 0.59 
55 Hinchingbrooke Healthcare 14 (11-20) 20 (13-31) ↑ <0.001 
56 Homerton University Hospital 130 (58-225) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
57 Hull & East Yorkshire Hospitals 8 (6-11) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
58 Imperial College Healthcare 108 (67-200) 15 (11-20) ↓ <0.001 
59 Ipswich Hospital 9 (7-11) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
60 Isle of Wight Healthcare 12 (9-21) 9 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
61 James Paget University Hospitals 10 (7.5-12) 10 (7-13) ↑ <0.001 
62 Kettering General Hospital 16 (9-34) 10 (7-15) ↓ <0.001 
63 King's College Hospital 16 (11-29) 13 (9-24) ↓ <0.001 
64 Kingston Hospital 12 (8-21) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
65 Lancashire Teaching Hospitals 6 (5-7) 6 (5-7) ↓ <0.001 
66 Leeds Teaching Hospitals 9 (7-11) 7 (6-9) ↓ <0.001 
67 Lewisham Healthcare NHS Trust 68 (40-90) 10 (7-28) ↓ <0.001 
68 Luton & Dunstable Hospital 9 (7-13) 8 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
69 Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells 12 (9-17) 10 (8-13) ↓ <0.001 
70 Medway 8 (5-10) 8 (5-10) ↑ <0.001 
71 Mid Cheshire Hospitals 10 (7-22) 5 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
72 Mid Essex Hospital Services 12 (9-15) 10 (8-13) ↓ <0.001 
73 Mid Staffordshire 5 (4-7) 5 (4-6) ↓ <0.001 
74 Mid Yorkshire Hospitals 9 (6-13) 5 (4-6) ↓ <0.001 
75 Milton Keynes Hospital 7 (5-9) 9 (7-18) ↑ <0.001 
76 Norfolk & Norwich University Hospitals 13 (10-17) 11 (9-15) ↓ <0.001 
77 North Bristol 7 (6-11) 6 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
78 North Cumbria University Hospitals 10 (7-13) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
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TLE no. Trust 
Median delay pre-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
Median delay post-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
p value 
79 North East Wales 11 (8-14) 9 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
80 North Glamorgan 15 (11-25) 11 (8.5-13) ↓ <0.001 
81 North Middlesex University Hospital 10 (7-17) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
82 North Tees & Hartlepool 13 (9-21) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
83 North West London Hospitals 10 (8-16) 8 (6-12) ↓ <0.001 
84 North West Wales 12 (9-14) 10 (8-13) ↓ <0.001 
85 Northampton General Hospital 12.5 (8.5-21.5) 9.5 (7.5-14.5) • 0.69 
86 Northern Devon Healthcare 11 (8-15) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
87 
Northern Lincolnshire & Goole 
Hospitals 
6 (4-8) 5 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
88 Northumbria Healthcare 11 (9-14) 10 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
89 Nottingham University Hospitals 9 (7-14) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
90 Oxford University Hospitals 8 (6-10) 9 (7-11) ↑ <0.001 
91 Papworth Hospital 12.5 (10-17) 19 (12-31) ↑ <0.001 
92 Pembrokeshire and Derwen 19 (13-26) 12 (8-15) ↓ <0.001 
93 Pennine Acute Hospitals 11 (8-17) 7 (5-9) ↓ <0.001 
94 Peterborough & Stamford Hospitals 9 (7-11) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
95 Plymouth Hospitals 10 (7-20) 5 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
96 Pontypridd and Rhondda 195 (18-348) 18 (13-26) ↓ <0.001 
97 Poole Hospital 5 (4-7) 5 (4-6) ↓ <0.001 
98 Portsmouth Hospitals 9 (6-13) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
99 Public Health Wales 13 (10-19) 11 (8-14) ↓ <0.001 
100 Queen Elizabeth 28 (19-40) 10 (7-14) ↓ <0.001 
101 Queen Mary's Sidcup 10 (8-15) 8 (7-12) • 0.67 
102 Queen Victoria Hospital Data only in one time period 
103 Royal Berkshire 7 (6-10) 7 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
104 Royal Brompton & Harefield 11 (8-15) 10 (8-14) ↓ <0.001 
105 Royal Cornwall Hospitals 8 (6-10) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
106 Royal Devon & Exeter 16 (11-26) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
107 Royal Free Hampstead 14 (8-52) 8 (7-10) ↓ <0.001 
108 
Royal Liverpool & Broadgreen 
University Hospitals 
29 (18-43) 15 (9-29) ↓ <0.001 
109 Royal Surrey County Hospital Data only in one time period 
110 Royal United Hospital Bath 10 (6-27) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
111 Royal West Sussex 16 (10-26) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
112 Salford Royal 12 (8-18) 10 (8-15) ↓ <0.001 
113 Salisbury 18 (10-100) 8 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
114 Sandwell & West Birmingham Hospitals 8 (6-12) 8 (6-11) • 0.56 
115 
Scarborough & North East Yorkshire 
Health Care 
16 (12-23) 10 (8-12) ↓ <0.001 
116 Sheffield Teaching Hospitals 10 (7-14) 7 (5-9) ↓ <0.001 
117 Sherwood Forest Hospitals 11 (8-16) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
118 Shrewsbury & Telford Hospital 7 (5-10) 6 (5-7) ↓ <0.001 
119 South Devon Healthcare 19 (9-73) 8 (7-10) ↓ <0.001 
120 South Tees Hospitals 19 (9-47) 7 (5-10) ↓ <0.001 
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TLE no. Trust 
Median delay pre-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
Median delay post-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
p value 
121 South Tyneside 10 (7-14) 8 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
122 Southend University Hospital 14 (11-17) 14 (11-17) • 0.19 
123 Southport & Ormskirk Hospital 40 (26-56) 8 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
124 St. George's Healthcare 17 (10-30) 7 (6-9) ↓ <0.001 
125 St Helens & Knowsley Hospitals 13 (8-21) 11 (8-16) ↓ <0.001 
126 Stockport 12 (9-17) 13 (9-17) ↑ 0.01 
127 Surrey & Sussex Healthcare 9 (7-12) 9 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
128 Tameside Hospital 8 (5-15) 7 (5-9) ↓ <0.001 
129 Taunton & Somerset 7 (5-9) 6 (5-7) ↓ <0.001 
130 Tees, Esk and Wear Valley 8 (6-13) 11 (7-18) ↑ <0.001 
131 The Dudley Group of Hospitals 5 (4-7) 5 (4-6) ↓ <0.001 
132 The Hillingdon Hospitals 23 (14-41) 9 (7-13) ↓ <0.001 
133 The Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals 9 (5-18) 4 (3-5) ↓ <0.001 
134 The Princess Alexandra Hospital 14 (10-17) 9 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
135 
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital King's 
Lynn 
9 (7-11) 10 (8-13) ↑ <0.001 
136 The Rotherham 16 (11-24) 14 (10-20) ↓ <0.001 
137 
The Royal Bournemouth & Christchurch 
Hospitals 
10 (7-14) 8 (6-11) ↓ <0.001 
138 The Royal Marsden 184 (71-338.5) 103 (70-114) ↓ <0.001 
139 The Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals 8 (6-10) 7 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
140 The Walton Centre 10 (8-12) 8 (7-11) ↓ <0.001 
141 The Whittington Hospital 14 (9-31) 9 (7-13) ↓ <0.001 
142 Trafford Healthcare 12 (8-18) 9 (7-13) ↓ <0.001 
143 United Lincolnshire Hospitals 6 (4-7) 5 (4-6) ↓ <0.001 
144 University College London Hospitals 19 (13-28) 24 (13-48) ↑ <0.001 
145 
University Hospital of North 
Staffordshire 
7 (6-9) 7 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
146 
University Hospital of South 
Manchester 
6 (5-8) 6 (5-8) ↑ <0.001 
147 Southampton University Hospitals 7 (5-11) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
148 University Hospital Birmingham 5 (4-6) 5 (4-7) ↑ <0.001 
149 University Hospitals Bristol 11 (6-28.5) 6 (5-8) ↓ <0.001 
150 
University Hospitals Coventry & 
Warwickshire 
9 (6-12) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
151 University Hospitals of Leicester 16 (8-35) 8 (5-12) ↓ <0.001 
152 University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay 16 (10-27) 14 (10-23) ↓ <0.001 
153 Walsall Healthcare 8 (6-10) 8 (6-10) ↓ 0.05 
154 Warrington & Halton Hospitals 6 (4-8) 7 (5-10) ↑ <0.001 
155 West Hertfordshire Hospitals 15 (10-23) 15 (11-21) ↓ 0.02 
156 West Middlesex University Hospital 121 (79-203) 15 (10-26) ↓ <0.001 
157 West Suffolk Hospitals 13 (10-18) 12 (9-16.5) ↓ <0.001 
158 Weston Area Health 9 (7-12) 5 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
159 Whipps Cross 12 (9-18) 5 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
160 Winchester & Eastleigh Healthcare 10 (7-14) 9 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
161 Wirral University Teaching Hospital 7 (5-8) 7 (6-9) ↑ <0.001 
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TLE no. Trust 
Median delay pre-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
Median delay post-
October 2010 (days) 
(IQR) 
p value 
162 Worcestershire Acute Hospitals 10 (7-14) 8 (6-10) ↓ <0.001 
163 Worthing and Southlands Hospital 11 (8-14) 9 (7-12) ↓ <0.001 
164 Wrightington, Wigan & Leigh 9 (7-13) 10 (7-15) ↑ 0.01 
165 Wye Valley NHS Trust 7 (5-9) 6 (4-7) ↓ <0.001 
166 Yeovil District Hospital 7 (6-9) 6 (5-7) ↓ <0.001 
167 York Teaching Hospital 95 (58-136) 11 (10-12) ↓ <0.001 
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Appendix 9: Statistical code for the cusum 
Please note, H and K are calculated as described in Chapter 6 (improved model) 
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Appendix 10: Exceedance charts, cusum and VLAD outputs for organisms not fully reported in Chapter 4 
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Appendix 12: Documentation of changes made to the original ICHT datasets 
Charing Cross Hospital dataset 
Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
T2014091 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2014091(1), T2014091(2) 
T2171187 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2171187(1), T2171187(2) 
F1783618 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1783618(1), F1783618(2) 
S643735 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S643735(1), S643735(2) 
W1905859 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1905859(1), W1905859(2) 
H2570930  Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2570930(1), H2570930(2) 
T2339761 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2339761(1), T2339761(2) 
X496000 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X496000(1), X496000(2) 
W1788629 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1788629(1), W1788629(2) 
X489041 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X489041(1), X489041(2) 
X461718 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X461718(1), X461718(2) 
H2066179 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2066179(1), H2066179(2) 
M1630156 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1630156(1), M1630156(2) 
X488354 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X488354(1), X488354(2) 
X488555 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X488555(1), X488555(2) 
T2169813 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2169813(1), T2169813(2) 
H2076414 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2076414(1), H2076414(2) 
H1869029 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1869029(1), H1869029(2) 
M2333570 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2333570(1), M2333570(2) 
X429356 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X429356(1), X429356(2) 
H2381687 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2381687(1), H2381687(2) 
T2454695 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2454695(1), T2454695(2) 
H2107421 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2107421(1), H2107421(2) 
H2139471 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2139471(1), H2139471(2) 
W1707640 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1707640(1), W1707640(2) 
M2154664 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2154664(1), M2154664(2) 
F2158765 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F2158765(1), F2158765(2) 
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Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
S579445 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S579445(1), S579445(2) 
H2269247 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2269247(1), H2269247(2) 
T1803640 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1803640(1), T1803640(2) 
F111148 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F111148(1), F111148(2) 
H2594886 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2594886(1), H2594886(2) 
W2468136 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2468136(1), W2468136(2) 
H979464 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H979464(1), H979464(2) 
T994470 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T994470(1), T994470(2) 
M2202799 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2202799(1), M2202799(2) 
H2370141 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2370141(1), H2370141(2) 
T2038904 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2038904(1), T2038904(2) 
S664183 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S664183(1), S664183(2) 
T1084262  P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1084262(1), T1084262(2) 
W2254397 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2254397(1), W2254397(2) 
W2256771 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2256771(1), W2256771(2) 
M906224 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M906224(1), M906224(2) 
M1791691 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1791691(1), M1791691(2) 
H2246308 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2246308(1), H2246308(2) 
S624716 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S624716(1), S624716(2) 
M2089538 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2089538(1), M2089538(2) 
T1983835 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1983835(1), T1983835(2) 
T1960968 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1960968(1), T1960968(2) 
H2175747 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2175747(1), H2175747(2) 
H2618781 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2618781(1), H2618781(2) 
M2136151 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2136151(1), M2136151(2) 
W1926360 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1926360(1), W1926360(2) 
W2353242 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2353242(1), W2353242(2) 
M2274730 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2274730(1), M2274730(2) 
F2233857 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F2233857(1), F2233857(2) 
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Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
H1698864 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1698864(1), H1698864(2) 
M871356 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M871356(1), M871356(2) 
H1954180 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1954180(1), H1954180(2) 
W1878078 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1878078(1), W1878078(2) 
W2141852 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2141852(1), W2141852(2) 
W2141859 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2141859(1), W2141859(2) 
M2207530 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2207530(1), M2207530(2) 
M2332172 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin sensitivity reported twice N/A 
H2595334 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2595334(1), H2595334(2) 
H2305963 S. maltophilia Removed one susceptibility result Co-trimoxazole result reported twice N/A 
 
Hammersmith Hospital dataset 
Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
F59534 A. baumanii Removed one susceptibility result Tigecycline result reported twice N/A 
H1904629 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1904629(1), H1904629(2) 
F174153 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F174153(1), F174153(2) 
F2019666 E. coli Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F2019666(1), F2019666(2) 
X431093 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X431093(1), X431093(2) 
W1623426 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1623426(1), W1623426(2) 
S777490 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S777490(1), S777490(2) 
F1475120 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1475120(1), F1475120(2) 
W2274278 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2274278(1), W2274278(2) 
T2423629 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2423629(1), T2423629(2) 
M1890951 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1890951(1), M1890951(2) 
H1951928 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1951928(1), H1951928(2) 
T1155473 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1155473(1), T1155473(2) 
F1523571 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1523571(1), F1523571(2) 
W1958576 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1958576(1), W1958576(2) 
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Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
T1847364 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1847364(1), T1847364(2) 
T2495336 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2495336(1), T2495336(2) 
M1927757 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1927757(1), M1927757(2) 
W1668580 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1668580(1), W1668580(2) 
W2006528 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2006528(1), W2006528(2) 
T1862952 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1862952(1), T1862952(2) 
W2275553 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2275553(1), W2275553(2) 
F1603857 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1603857(1), F1603857(2) 
H956392 Klebsiella sp. Removed one susceptibility result Tigecycline result reported twice N/A 
F1511440 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1511440(1), F1511440(2) 
F1663060 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1663060(1), F1663060(2) 
W2215258 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2215258(1), W2215258(2) 
T1733632 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1733632(1), T1733632(2) 
M1576609 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1576609(1), M1576609(2) 
W1608744 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1608744(1), W1608744(2) 
W1753405 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1753405(1), W1753405(2) 
H1729488 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1729488(1), H1729488(2) 
F1629441 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F1629441(1), F1629441(2) 
W2071446 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W2071446(1), W2071446(2) 
T2124322 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Three strains reported in one laboratory number 
T2124322(1), T2124322(2), 
T2124322(3) 
H1739799 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1739799(1), H1739799(2) 
S616466 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S616466(1), S616466(2) 
M1606911 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1606911(1), M1606911(2) 
M2087602 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2087602(1), M2087602(2) 
T1084302  P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1084302(1), T1084302(2) 
H1763107 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H1763107(1), H1763107(2) 
W1912634 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1912634(1), W1912634(2) 
S545250 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S545250(1), S545250(2) 
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Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
X525841 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X525841(1), X525841(2) 
H2403282 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number H2403282(1), H2403282(2) 
M876793 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M876793(1), M876793(2) 
M902659 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M902659(1), M902659(2) 
M902670 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M902670(1), M902670(2) 
 
Renal patients dataset 
Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
W881851 E. coli Removed one susceptibility result Ertapenem result reported twice N/A 
M818801 E. coli Removed one susceptibility result Ertapenem result reported twice N/A 
M932024 E. coli Removed one susceptibility result Temocillin result reported twice N/A 
H984562 E. coli Removed one susceptibility result Meropenem result reported twice N/A 
F57268 Enterobacter sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F57268(1), F57268(2) 
M1903303 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1903303(1), M1903303(2) 
F2139556 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
F168031 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Vancomycin result reported twice N/A 
W947766 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Teicoplanin result reported twice N/A 
F191981 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Linezolid result reported twice N/A 
W914231 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W914231(1), W914231(2) 
F2197682 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
M936555 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
F106800 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
W928751 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
T1156695 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
S522315 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S522315(1), S522315(2) 
S795968 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Teicoplanin result reported twice N/A 
X240439 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
T955334 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
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Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
T2607230 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
W921679 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
T2230162 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2230162(1), T2230162(2) 
S30390 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
W957129 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
H897037 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Vancomycin result reported twice N/A 
W2365100 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
T2496689 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2496689(1), T2496689(2) 
M1676177 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1676177(1), M1676177(2) 
F185484 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Teicoplanin result reported twice N/A 
S788254 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
S18675 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Vancomycin result reported twice N/A 
M1768644 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1768644(1), M1768644(2) 
X618007 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
F85084 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
S773269 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
X519878 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X519878(1), X519878(2) 
S80640 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
T2107097 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T2107097(1), T2107097(2) 
M1040351 Enterococcus sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1040351(1), M1040351(2) 
T917236  Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Vancomycin result reported twice N/A 
M1047556 Enterococcus sp. Removed one susceptibility result Vancomycin result reported twice N/A 
T1034768 Enterococcus sp. Removed two susceptibility results Vancomycin and teicoplanin results reported twice N/A 
T1118302 Klebsiella sp. Removed one susceptibility result Colistin sulphate result reported twice N/A 
X626840 Klebsiella sp. Removed one susceptibility result Meropenem result reported twice N/A 
W973731 Klebsiella sp. Removed two susceptibility results Ertapenem and meropenem results reported twice N/A 
T1124419 Klebsiella sp. Removed one susceptibility result Ertapenem result reported twice N/A 
F188955 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number F188955(1), F188955(2) 
S55045 Klebsiella sp. Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number S55045(1), S55045(2) 
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Laboratory 
number Organism Change made Reason New Laboratory numbers 
W973731 Klebsiella sp. Removed one susceptibility result Ertapenem result reported twice N/A 
M1570659 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M1570659(1), M1570659(2) 
W1996877 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1996877(1), W1996877(2) 
M2190267 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2190267(1), M2190267(2) 
X514077 P. aeruginosa Removed two susceptibility results Imipenem and meropenem results reported twice N/A 
M2121488 P. aeruginosa Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number M2121488(1), M2121488(2) 
T1125702 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
F8773 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
W2436927 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
H2584506 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
T1101363 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
T2638982 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
S753810 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
W1854837 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number W1854837(1), W1854837(2) 
T1044673 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1044673(1), T1044673(2) 
H1010761 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
T1102586 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
T1146604 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
T1084183 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
T1991290 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number T1991290(1), T1991290(2) 
F2187477 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
W2451424 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Vancomycin result reported twice N/A 
F2248637 S. aureus Removed one susceptibility result Mupirocin result reported twice N/A 
X620167 S. aureus Amended laboratory number Two strains reported in one laboratory number X620167(1), X620167(2) 
 
